City of Thornton v. Replogle, 94SC66

• Decision Date: 17 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94SC66,94SC66
• Parties: CITY OF THORNTON and CIRSA, Petitioners, v. Kent REPLOGLE and Industrial Claim Appeals Office, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 782

888 P.2d 782

CITY OF THORNTON and CIRSA, Petitioners, v. Kent REPLOGLE and Industrial Claim Appeals Office, Respondents.

No. 94SC66.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Jan. 17, 1995.

Watson, Nathan & Bremer, P.C., Anne Smith Myers, Andrew J. Fisher, Denver, for petitioners.

Brauer, Buescher, Valentine, Goldhammer & Kelman, P.C., Dennis E. Valentine, Ellen M. Kelman, Denver, for respondent Kent Replogle.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office, Dona Halsey, Denver, for respondent Indus. Claim Appeals Office.

Justice MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted the petition for certiorari filed by the City of Thornton and its insurer, CIRSA, (collectively referred to as the employer) to review a workers' compensation decision of the court of appeals which upheld a determination by the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that employee Kent Replogle's mental impairment injury is compensable until he attains maximum medical improvement and ordered the employer to pay temporary disability benefits until terminated by law. City of Thornton and CIRSA v. Replogle and the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 873 P.2d 30 (Colo.App.1993). The employer is seeking review of the determination that Replogle is entitled to receive temporary disability benefits for more than twelve weeks.

We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. We hold that the statutory scheme limits only permanent disability benefits paid for mental impairment to twelve weeks, and does not similarly limit temporary disability benefits paid for mental impairment. Although temporary disability benefits for mental impairment are not subject to the twelve-week time limit, they are limited by the conditions specified in section 8-42-105, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), concerning temporary total disability. Further, the employer is entitled to offset any temporary disability benefits paid for mental impairment against any award of permanent disability benefits for mental impairment.

I.

The City of Thornton hired Replogle as a full time firefighter in 1981. On December 10, 1991, Replogle responded to an emergency call at an apartment complex. At the complex, Replogle discovered that a young boy with whom he was acquainted had been seriously injured in a pool accident. Police officers already at the scene were trying to resuscitate the boy. Shortly thereafter, Replogle carried the boy to an ambulance where he continued resuscitation efforts. On December 15, 1991, Replogle learned that the boy had died from injuries sustained in the December 10 incident.

After hearing of the boy's death, Replogle had difficulty sleeping, was unable to concentrate, and experienced disturbing and traumatic flashbacks concerning his attempts to resuscitate the boy. He consulted two psychologists who concluded that Replogle was experiencing trauma from the boy's death.

Replogle filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits in which he alleged that he was suffering from post-incident traumatic stress. After a hearing, an ALJ concluded that Replogle suffered mental and emotional stress caused by his attempted rescue of the boy, and that the stress arose primarily from Replogle's occupation and place of employment. The ALJ also held that the mental impairment was sufficient to render Replogle temporarily totally disabled and awarded continuing temporary total disability benefits "until terminated by law."

The employer agreed that Replogle suffered a compensable injury due to mental impairment, but contended that his temporary total disability benefits were limited to twelve weeks. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office and the court of appeals rejected the employer's argument and affirmed the holding of the ALJ. The court of appeals held that the mental impairment provision did not contain any express limitation on awards for temporary disability benefits. Under this interpretation, Replogle was entitled to mental impairment benefits until he reached maximum medical improvement. We affirm the court of appeals' holding that mental impairment benefits in this case for temporary total disability benefits may continue beyond twelve weeks.

II.

A.

The employer asks this court to hold that the ALJ, the ICAO, and the court of appeals incorrectly interpreted section 8-41-301(2)(b), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). The employer argues that the statute limits all benefits recoverable by a claimant for injuries to a total of twelve weeks, including both temporary and permanent disability benefits. We disagree.

In interpreting a comprehensive legislative scheme, the supreme court must give meaning to all portions thereof and construe statutory provisions to further legislative intent. A.B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 806 P.2d 917, 920 (Colo.1991). The first goal of the court in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent. To ascertain the legislative intent, courts must look to the statutory language in question. Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v. Saddoris, 825 P.2d 39 (Colo.1992). Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to interpretative rules of statutory construction. Griffin v. S.W. Devanney & Co., Inc., 775 P.2d 555 (Colo.1989). If the language is ambiguous or unclear, we may resort to the legislative history to interpret the statutory language. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo.1990). With these principles in mind, we will turn to the case before us.

B.

Under the workers' compensation statute, a worker suffering a disability is entitled to two general types of coverage: temporary disability benefits (sections 8-42-105 & 106, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.)), and permanent disability benefits (section 8-42-107 & 111, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.)).

Temporary disability benefits typically terminate when a claimant attains maximum medical improvement or when other statutorily specified conditions occur. See § 8-42-105(3) and § 8-42-106. ¹ When temporary disability benefits end, the claimant may become eligible for permanent disability benefits, which are determined pursuant to section 8-42-111, section 8-42-107(2) and section 8-42-107(8). Section 8-42-107(2) is a schedule defining the maximum length of time for which compensation will be awarded for particular injuries. See generally Duran v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 883 P.2d 477 (Colo.1994) (upholding constitutionality of scheduled benefits). Section 8-42-107(8) addresses permanent medical impairment for other injuries not covered under the schedule. This subsection outlines a complex calculation for determining the time period for which permanent medical benefits are available after maximum medical improvement has occurred. Although "medical impairment" is not specifically defined under the statute, it is a term used to describe permanent disability. See § 8-42-107. Indeed, that section often refers to "permanent medical impairment."

Some confusion arises in this case because of the legislature's usage of two very similar terms: "medical impairment," discussed above, and "mental impairment," a new term introduced by the 1991 statutory amendments. Section 8-41-301(2)(b), the mental impairment subsection, was added as part of a major revision to the Workers' Compensation Act. See 1991 Sess. Laws p. 1294. Ch. 219, S.B. 91-218. The mental impairment subsection allows both permanent and temporary disability benefits to be awarded upon a finding of mental impairment. Section 8-41-301(2)(b) provides:

The mental impairment which is the basis of the claim must have arisen primarily from the claimant's then occupation and place of employment. Notwithstanding any other provision of articles 40 to 47 of this title, where a claim is by reason of mental impairment the claimant shall be limited to twelve weeks of medical impairment benefits which shall be in an amount not less than one hundred fifty dollars per week and not more than fifty percent of the state average weekly wage, inclusive of any temporary disability benefits. This limitation shall not apply to any victim of a crime of violence.

§ 8-41-301(2)(b) (emphasis added).

"Mental impairment," under the statute, is defined as:

... a disability arising from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment when the accidental injury involves no physical injury and consists of a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside of a worker's usual experience and would evoke significant symptoms of distress in a worker in similar circumstances.

§ 8-41-301(2)(a), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.).

The employer claims that the clause "inclusive of any temporary disability benefits" in subsection 301(2)(b) quoted above limits temporary disability benefits for mental impairment to twelve weeks. It puts particular emphasis on the introductory "notwithstanding" phrase. We disagree with the employer's analysis. In our view, it improperly construes "medical impairment benefits" and fails to treat the statute as a whole.

Initially, we note that "mental impairment" and "medical impairment" are not synonymous. Rather, both are terms of art in the Workers' Compensation Act. By the express terms of section 8-41-301, mental impairment is a condition eligible for medical impairment benefits. Mental impairment qualifies for both temporary and permanent disability benefits. See § 8-41-301(2)(b) and (2)(d). Medical impairment, as discussed above, is used only to describe permanent disability benefits.

The overall scheme of the Act provides different limitations of coverage for permanent disability benefits and for temporary disability benefits. Section 8-42-107(2) limits the time period for which permanent medical impairment benefits are available according to the type of injury. The rationale for such a limitation on permanent medical impairment benefits, as both parties have agreed, is to limit costs. According to its legislative...