City of Washington v. Warren County

• Decision Date: 30 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 77541,77541
• Citation: 899 S.W.2d 863
• Parties: CITY OF WASHINGTON, Missouri, Respondent, v. WARREN COUNTY, Missouri, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 863

899 S.W.2d 863

53 A.L.R.5th 767

CITY OF WASHINGTON, Missouri, Respondent, v. WARREN COUNTY, Missouri, et al., Appellants.

No. 77541.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

May 30, 1995.

Jay L. Levitch, Henry F. Loepke, St. Louis, for appellants.

Mark C. Piontek, Gael D. Wood, Washington, for respondent.

David G. Beeson, Jackson, for amicus City of Perryville, et al.

LIMBAUGH, Judge.

Warren County appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of Washington on the City's claim that improvements to its airport, located in Warren County, were immune from Warren County's zoning ordinance. The Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed the trial court's decision, and thereafter, this Court granted transfer. ¹ The trial court's entry of summary judgment is affirmed.

I.

The City of Washington (the City), located in Franklin County, owns and operates the Washington Memorial Airport, located in Warren County (the County). In 1985, the County amended its zoning ordinance, which, in part, reclassified the airport property as part of a flood plain district. Pursuant to this classification, expansion of the airport would be prohibited. Subsequently, in 1988, the City filed with the County commissioners an application for rezoning along with an application for a conditional use permit to expand the airport's runway. The application for rezoning, however, was filed "under protest" as the City contended that any development of the airport property was immune from the County's zoning ordinance. The County agreed to rezone the airport property as a commercial and industrial development district and issued a conditional use permit for the runway expansion. The permit contained a clause stating: "[t]here will be no further expansion of the airport or any other improvements to the airport without the prior approval of the [county]...." In 1991, the City again applied for a conditional use permit as well as a development permit to construct an additional hanger on the airport property. In response, the Warren County Commission issued a "zoning order" denying the application.

The City then filed a petition that sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the airport property was exempt from the zoning order. In support of its petition, the City alleged that the zoning order infringed upon the City's power to condemn property outside its corporate boundaries for the construction and expansion of an airport. Thereafter, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that the City operated a regional airport for the benefit of the public and that construction of an additional hanger was necessary for the continued viability of the airport. Given these facts, and relying on City of St. Louis v. City of Bridgeton, 705 S.W.2d 524 (Mo.App.1986), the court held that the City was immune from the zoning order. This appeal followed.

II.

As a threshold issue, the County contends that the City has no power to condemn the property in question. The relevant statutes empowering cities to condemn property for airports provide, in part, as follows:

305.170. The local legislative body of any city ... in this state is hereby authorized to acquire, by purchase or gift, establish, construct, own, control, lease, equip, improve, maintain, operate, and regulate, in whole or in part, ... airports or landing fields for the use of airplanes and other aircraft either within or without the limits of such cities ... and may use for such purpose or purposes any property suitable therefor that is now or may at any time hereafter be owned or controlled by such city, village or town.

305.190. Any lands acquired, owned, controlled or occupied by such cities ... for the purposes enumerated in sections 305.170 and 305.180 hereof shall and are hereby declared to be acquired, owned, controlled, and occupied for a public purpose and as a matter of public necessity, and such cities ... shall have the right to acquire property for such purpose or purposes under the power of eminent domain as and for a public necessity.

The County argues that the words "by purchase or gift" in § 305.170 are words of limitation--they are the exclusive means by which a city may acquire property for an airport outside its city limits. Furthermore, the County contends that the condemnation power authorized in § 305.190 is limited to condemnation of property within the city's borders. To adopt the County's position, however, would require this Court to construe each statute individually, without regard to the other. In fact, both sections relate to the same subject matter and were enacted in 1929 as part of the same bill. As such, they are in pari materia and, to arrive at the true legislative intent, they must be construed together. State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Mo. banc 1992).

Section 305.170 authorizes numerous actions with regard to airports: to acquire, by purchase or gift; to establish; to construct; to own; to control; to lease; to equip; to improve; to maintain; to operate; and to regulate. Furthermore, the statute authorizes cities to undertake any of these actions either within or without the city limits. Section 305.190, by express reference to § 305.170, declares that the acquisition, establishment, condemnation, etc. of airports is a public purpose and a public necessity. To accommodate that purpose, § 305.190 then authorizes cities to condemn property. Reading these statutes together, we hold that the legislature has authorized cities to construct airports outside their city boundaries and to condemn property for that construction. To suggest otherwise would render § 305.190 meaningless.

III.

Having determined that the City has the power to condemn property outside its borders, we next address whether that power immunizes the City from the zoning laws of the County. In resolving claims of governmental immunity from zoning regulations, this Court has applied two tests: 1) the "power of eminent domain" test, State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss, 304 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. banc 1957); State ex rel Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo.1960); and Appelbaum v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.1970); and 2) the "balancing of interests" test, St. Louis County v. City of Manchester, 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. banc 1962).

In Ferriss, the Ladue School District initiated condemnation proceedings to acquire property in the City of Ladue for purposes of constructing a school. The city sought a writ of prohibition to curtail the condemnation hearings, contending that a local zoning ordinance prohibited erection of a school at the proposed site. Applying the "power of eminent domain" test, this Court held that §§ 165.100 and 165.370, enacted pursuant to Art. IX, § 1(a), of the Missouri Constitution, vested overriding power in the school district to condemn property for public schools. Implicit in the holding is a finding that Ladue's zoning ordinance, enacted solely pursuant to chapter 89 and without any specific constitutional authority, could not restrict the school district's constitutionally-grounded power of eminent domain.

In Kopp this Court again applied the "power of eminent domain" test in review of Jackson County's decision to approve construction of a sewer treatment plant by the City of Raytown. The plant was to be located in an unincorporated area of the county, 2 1/2 miles outside the city limits. The Court determined that §§ 71.680 and 79.300, the enabling statutes for Art. IV, § 37, of the Missouri Constitution, expressly authorized the city to condemn land within five miles outside its borders for construction of a sewer treatment plant. In the absence of a comparable constitutional source for Jackson County's zoning power to offset the city's condemnation power, the Court concluded that the county's zoning laws did not control.

Distinguishing Ferriss and Kopp, this Court held in the Manchester case that the construction of a sewer treatment plant by the City of Manchester in an unincorporated area of St. Louis County was subject to the county's zoning laws. In reaching this result, the Court applied a modified "balancing of interests" test, focusing on the nature of the use and the justification for locating that use in a residential district of the county. The court was not bound by Ferriss and Kopp in that St. Louis County, unlike Ladue and Jackson County, is a special charter county, with zoning powers specifically authorized by Art. VI, § 18(c), of the Missouri Constitution.

The "power of eminent domain" test was applied once more in Appelbaum v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.1970), in which the towns of St. Johns and Bel-Ridge sought to prevent St. Louis County from constructing an incinerator and land fill within their corporate boundaries. This Court, relying on Ferriss, held that the county was not subject to the municipalities' zoning laws. The Court distinguished Manchester by noting that St. Johns and Bel-Ridge's zoning ordinances, unlike those of St. Louis County, had no specific constitutional authorization.

The common focus of these cases is on the source of the powers in conflict. Under the "power of eminent domain" test, if a power has its source in the constitution, although delegated by statute, then it prevails over and cannot be limited by another government entity's power, such as zoning, that is delegated solely by statute and without any specific constitutional authority. City of Kirkwood v....