City of Wichita v. White

Decision Date09 May 1970
Docket NumberNo. 45676,45676
Citation469 P.2d 287,205 Kan. 408
PartiesCITY OF WICHITA, Appellee, v. Richard C. WHITE, Appellant.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. An ordinance, consistent with K. S.A.1967 Supp. (now 1969 Supp.) 8-574b, requiring the wearing of a crash helmet or other adequate protective headgear by the operator of a motorcycle on a public street or highway bears a real and substantial relationship to public safety, is a valid exercise of state police power, and is not an improper restraint upon personal liberty.

2. Determination of the overall preferability of alternative solutions to problems arising from the operation of motorcyles upon public highways is a legislative and not a judicial function.

S. A. Issinghoff, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Arthur G. Johnson, Wichita, argued the cause, and John Dekker, Wichita, was with him on the brief for appellee.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

The constitutionality of an ordinance requiring the operator of a motorcycle or one riding as a passenger to wear a crash helmet is the subject of this appeal. The trial court upheld the conviction of the defendant on stipulated facts that the defendant did, on May 1, 1968, and on May 14, 1968, operate a motorcycle without headgear as required by the ordinance.

The ordinance provides:

'No person shall operate or ride as a passenger on a motorcycle or motor driven cycle unless he is wearing a crash helmet or other adequate protective headgear of a type authorized and approved by the State Highway Commission of the State of Kansas. * * *'

The ordinance became effective on July 14, 1967, and was enacted just after July 1, 1967, the effective date of a state statute (K.S.A.1967 Supp. (now 1969 Supp.) 8-574b) worded in almost identical language to the ordinance.

The enactment of the ordinance in question was in keeping with the rule set forth in City of Kansas City v. Tipton, 193 Kan. 651, 396 P.2d 350.

We shall treat the question here presented as one dealing with the state legislative enactment.

In reviewing questions of constitutionality courts are not to be concerned with the wisdom, expediency, necessity or desirability of a legislative enactment. The legislative history of these laws, in this state and others, demonstrates that they have dedicated proponents and equally dedicated opponents. The question before us is not what the legislature should do but what the legislature can do.

In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954), the United States Supreme Court said:

'* * * Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, * * *.' (p. 32, 75 S.Ct. p. 102.)

In reviewing statutes such as these, the court begins with the proposition that all presumptions are in favor of their validity. (State ex rel. Smith v. Fairmont Foods Co., 196 Kan. 73, 77, 410 P.2d 308; and Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128.) The court does not sit in judgment on the merits of such legislation. If the statute here challenged does not contravene significant constitutional or inherent rights of individuals, if the classification on which it is based is reasonable, if it is within the scope of the police powers of the state, if it is appropriately related to a proper purpose of such police power, the statute is not to be invalidated by the judicial arm of government.

It appears from the appellant's brief that two basic challenges are made to the validity of the statute: (1) That it protects the motorcycle driver or rider only against himself and is therefore beyond the scope of the police powers of the state; and (2) that it transgresses constitutional or inherent rights of the appellant without corresponding benefit accruing to the general welfare of the public. Both contentions rest upon the appellant's interpretation of the statute that it does no more than protect the cycle drivers and riders from the consequences of their own actions.

Can it be said that the statute in no way concerns or benefits other persons, particularly other users of the public highways?

Both the ordinance and the statute require protective headgear for motorcylists. The very term 'protective headgear' implies protection of the head of the wearer. It must be conceded the statute is intended primarily to diminish the severity of the accident upon the victim himself, but can it be said that such safety requirement does not affect or concern at all other users of the public highway?

It is an elementary rule of law that the right to operate a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway is not a natural or unrestrained right, but a privilege which is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the state in the interest of the public safety and welfare. (Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765.)

Statistics for the past few years indicate dramatically that there has been a tremendous increase in the number of motorcycles operated by American motorists. An analysis of the vehicle registration figures establishes that motorcycle registrations have increased 210 percent from 1961 to July, 1967, compared to an increase of only 26 percent for all motor vehicles during that time. (Motorcycle Facts, National Safety Council Statistics Division, July, 1967.)

While motorcycles equal only 2 percent of the registered motor vehicles in the United States, motorcycle accidents account for 3 1/2 percent of all motor vehicle fatalities. (Motorcycle Facts, supra.) On a vehicle-mile basis, a person' chances of being killed while riding a motorcycle are twenty times greater than those of a person riding in another type vehicle. (Dark, Your Youngster and the Motorcycle, Today's Health, May, 1967, p. 21.)

In 1965 the number of persons killed per 100,000 registered motorcycles was two and one-half times that of the corresponding rate for all other motor vehicles. (The Insurance Advocate, August 12, 1967.)

Statistics relating to injuries per accident, comparing motorcycles to all vehicles, are equally grim. As a national average only 9 percent of motor vehicle accidents result in personal injury or death, the balance involving only property damage, while studies show that between 80 and 90 percent of all motorcycle accidents cause death or personal injury to the cyclist. (Motorcycle Facts, supra.)

The fact that motorcycle accidents produce a greater number of injuries than do other vehicle accidents is even more striking when one considers that other vehicles have generally greater passenger capacities and thus expose potentially more passengers to possible injury per accident than do motorcycles. (See, 9 For the Defense No. 1, January, 1968.)

The foregoing statistics emphasize that our public highways are not deserted these days, so it is apparent the legislature was not concerned with a solitary cyclist on a deserted country road losing control of his cycle. If the loss of cyclist control were to occur on a well traveled highway, anything that might cause the driver to lose control may well tragically affect another driver. If the loss of cyclist control occurs on a crowded freeway, with its fast moving traffic, the veering of a cyclist from his path of traffic may pile up a half dozen vehicles. The question that arises is whether the presence of a protective helmet would, in some cases and under some circumstances, make less likely the diverting of attention or loss of control of the cycle by its driver. It cannot be disputed that the driver of a motorcycle is somewhat more exposed to flying objects than someone operating an enclosed vehicle.

It does not tax the intellect to comprehend that loose stones and pebbles on the highway kicked up by the wheels of passing vehicles traveling at high speeds, or fallen objects such as windblown tree branches, against which the operator of a closed vehicle has some protection, could so affect the operator of a motorcycle as to cause him momentarily to lose control and thus become a menace to other users of the highway. (State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, R.I., 241 A.2d 625 (1968).) Cyclists hit with hardshelled flying beetles, bees or birds could possibly lose control of their cycles, causing damage and injuries to others. (People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797.)

A motorcycle is a comparatively light machine which is delicately balanced and operated. There are special conditions, situations or occurrences which could cause a driver to be propelled off the road or into the opposite land causing damage to other vehicles or...

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