City of Worcester v. New England Institute & New England School of Accounting, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 March 1957
• Parties: CITY OF WORCESTER v. NEW ENGLAND INSTITUTE AND NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF ACCOUNTING, Inc., et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 470

140 N.E.2d 470

335 Mass. 486

CITY OF WORCESTER v. NEW ENGLAND INSTITUTE AND NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF ACCOUNTING,

Inc., et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued Sept. 24, 1956.

Decided March 1, 1957.

Francis H. George, Worcester, for Myles Morgan et al.

Philip H. Breen, Worcester, for New England Institute and New England School of Accounting, Inc.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, COUNIHAN and WHITTEMORE, JJ.

WHITTEMORE, Justice.

On this bill in equity for a declaratory decree the judge in the Superior Court in 'Findings of Fact and Declaratory Judgment' filed May 13, 1955, ruled that the defendant New England Institute and New England School of Accounting, Inc. (New England Institute), is a school within the meaning of § 8, clause (6), ¹ of Article III of the zoning ordinance of the city of Worcester (Revised Ordinances, 1951, as amended), and hence that its use of premises at 251 Salisbury Street, Worcester, located in one of the 'Residence 'A' districts' as defined by § 8 is lawful. The individual defendants are owners of property abutting the subject premises and by their appeal they present the correctness of the final decree entered in accordance with the ruling.

The findings of fact show as to New England Institute as follows: It is a nonprofit corporation, incorporated in 1932 under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 180 which regulates the organization of corporations for educational, charitable, benevolent and religious purposes and certain other purposes. It has been held to be exempt from municipal, State and Federal taxation. Conforming to its purposes, it uses the subject premises 'for the teaching of the principles of the science of accounting in all its branches to post high school graduates which includes business law, business mathematics, business English, taxes and typing as incidental to accounting.' It conducts both a day and a night school on the premises. It charges tuition to its students generally, although it grants annually to a few students full or part tuition exemption. A student satisfactorily completing its two year course receives a diploma. The administration is conducted on the premises and books and supplies are sold there. The administration is by three trustees, one of whom is also educational director, business manager and instructor in accounting, and another of whom is secretary and instructor in business law. Each of these two receives compensation as instructor. There is no finding that the school has any endowment. ²

The case was heard in the Superior Court prior to the enactment of St.1956, c. 586, amending G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 40A, § 2, inserted by St.1954, c. 368, § 2, to provide 'that no ordinance or by-law which prohibits or limits the use of land for any church or other religious purpose or for any educational purpose whether public, religious, sectarian or denominational shall be valid.' This statute was approved August 2, 1956, and became applicable to the Worcester zoning ordinance on October 31, 1956, notwithstanding the prior enactment of the ordinance. Attorney General v. Inhabitants of Town of Dover, 327 Mass. 601, 100 N.E.2d 1. The statute is decisive of this case.

It is not necessary to determine if the clause 'whether public, religious, sectarian or denominational' limits the preceding generality. See Gaynor's Case, 217 Mass. 86, 89, 104 N.E. 339, L.R.A.1916A, 363, and cases cited; Thorp v. Lund, 227 Mass. 474, 479-480, 116 N.E. 946; Central Trust Co. v. Howard, 275 Mass. 153, 158, 175 N.E. 461; State ex rel. and to Use of Berra v. Sestric, 349 Mo. 182, 189, 159 S.W.2d 786 ('whether' clause construed not to be a limitation); Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 401-402, 177 N.E. 656; Tilton v. City of Haverhill, 311 Mass. 572, 577-578, 42 N.E.2d 588. It is sufficient to hold, as we do, that the 'educational purpose' of New England Institute is 'public' within the meaning of that word as used in the statute.

The promotion of education by nonprofit institutions not maintained at public expense has from early times been often asserted, recognized or reaffirmed as a public purpose. 43 Eliz. c. 4. Mass.Col.St.1671, 4 Mass.Col.Rec. Part II, 488 (all gifts and legacies ' to the college, schooles of learning, or any other publicke use'). Constitution of Massachusetts, Part II, c. 5, §§ 1, 2. In re Lowell, 22 Pick. 215. Dexter v. President, etc., of Harvard College, 176 Mass. 192, 194-195, 57 N.E. 371, 372, ('That a gift for the promotion of education in Harvard College is a public charity is a proposition too plain to need discussion' citing American Academy of Arts & Sciences v. President, etc., of Harvard College, 12 Gray 582, 594). Minns v. Billings, 183 Mass. 126, 131-132, 66 N.E. 593, 5 L.R.A., N.S., 686; Richardson v. Essex Institute, 208 Mass. 311, 317-318, 94 N.E. 262; Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass. 599, 601, 102 N.E. 464; Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Home Making, 296 Mass. 378, 385, 6 N.E.2d 374, and cases cited. Assessors of Lancaster v. Perkins School, 323 Mass. 418, 422, 82 N.E.2d 883.

We think that the Legislature, in using the words 'educational purpose * * * [which is] public,' was not intending a more limited category than the well recognized one which the words used aptly describe. For reasons next discussed, there is, we think, no basis for concluding that the exemption is confined to publicly supported or maintained institutions or to 'public schools.'

Prior to the constitutional amendment of 1917 there was no bar to the use of public funds, not 'raised by taxation for the purpose of expenditure within the sphere of the public or common schools,' for the aid of some categories at least of privately operated educational institutions which could be found to be for the benefit of the public under the established rules. Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mass. 599, 601, 102 N.E. 464, 465, and cases cited. Constitution, Part II, c. 5, §§ 1, 2. Art. 18 of the Amendments. (The reference in the opinion is to 'higher educational institutions, societies or undertakings under sectarian or ecclesiastical control' but the underlying principle is of broader scope.) The constitutional prohibition of the use of public funds for educational institutions not publicly owned and maintained, art. 46 of the Amendments, § 2, cut off one of the ways in which the activities of privately maintained educational institutions which are operated so as to benefit the public are of public concern, but it did not change the nature of what they were doing. Both before and after the amendment they were benefiting the public in offering education either to the public generally, or to an 'indefinite class of persons' from among the general public. Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Home Making, 296 Mass. 378, 387-389, 6 N.E.2d 374, 382; Franklin Square House v. Boston, 188 Mass. 409, 410, 74 N.E. 675; Assessors of Dover v. Dominican Fathers Province of St. Joseph, 334 Mass. ----, 137 N.E.2d 225. As the more recent of the cases show, the privately operated institutions have continued to enjoy the tax exemptions for which they qualify because of their public charitable nature. The amendment of course has not made it any less true that education of the public is in the category of general objectives for which public money can be spent. The limitation is only on the way in which public money can be spent for the general purpose.

'[E]ducational purpose * * * [which is] public,' as a category inclusive of the purpose of privately operated institutions which benefit the public, continues therefore to be meaningful and significant, notwithstanding the amendment.

The cases and opinions which apply or expound the principle that it is only for a public purpose that money raised by taxation can be spent or that land can be taken by eminent domain, see Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass. 567, 571-572, 8 N.E.2d 753; Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288, 292-293, 23 N.E.2d 665; Opinion of the Justices, 320 Mass. 773, 775, 67 N.E.2d 588, 165 A.L.R. 807 taken with the amendment, confirm that the purpose of privately maintained educational institutions is not public in this important aspect. However, neither they nor the fundamental principle stated, nor the constitutional amendment, force any limitation on the broad concept of public educational purpose, nor do they make the words used in the subject statute inaccurate to define the concept. We think the implication of the entire context of the Constitution, the statutes and our decisions, is that if the Legislature had intended to limit the exemption to only these educational institutions for which public funds may be spent it would have expressly said so.

It is suggested to us in support of a restricted construction of 'educational purpose' that the result otherwise may be to exempt from zoning ordinances and by-laws operations which are inappropriate and offensive in restricted residence or other districts. But to overcome this objection by imparting an intent to make public support the test, would require that we confine the meaning more narrowly than to the concept 'educational purpose which is publicly supported' since our statutes provide for publicly maintained schools for 'Industrial education,' thereby fitting pupils for 'trades, crafts, and manufacturing pursuits,' as well as for 'Agricultural education' which includes the 'care of domestic animals.' G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 74, § 1. It is apparent that this objection of derogation from the basic zoning purpose would be overcome if it were ruled that 'educational purpose * * * [which is] public' means only the purpose served by 'public schools' in the strict sense, well understood in this Commonwealth and often described, of only those schools, through high school grades, which must be maintained by cities and towns for general education. Cushing v. Inhabitants of Newburyport, 10 Metc. 508,...