City of Yukon v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2055, 72721

• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
• Writing for the Court: SUMMERS
• Citation: 792 P.2d 1176,1990 OK 48
• Parties: 115 Lab.Cas. P 35,360, 1990 OK 48 CITY OF YUKON, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 2055, an unincorporated association; and Mark Casey, Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 72721,72721
• Decision Date: 22 May 1990

Page 1176

792 P.2d 1176 115 Lab.Cas. P 35,360, 1990 OK 48 CITY OF YUKON, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, Appellant,
v.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 2055, an
unincorporated association; and Mark Casey, Appellees. No. 72721. Supreme Court of Oklahoma. May 22, 1990.

Page 1177

Appeal from the District Court of Canadian County; Edward C. Cunningham, District Judge.

Appeal from the ruling of the Canadian County District Court which affirmed the decision of an arbitrator regarding a wage dispute. Firefighter filed a grievance regarding payment of overtime wages. The

Page 1178

arbitrator found in favor of the firefighter and his Union. City sought relief in the District Court, and appeals adverse ruling. Recognizing that this Court has limited power of review with regard to an arbitrator's decision, we find that the decision was within the authority granted to the arbitrator by the collective bargaining agreement. AFFIRMED.

DISTRICT COURT'S RULING AFFIRMED.

Charles W. Ellis, Lawrence, Ellis & Harmons, P.A., Oklahoma City, for appellant, City of Yukon, Okl.

James R. Moore, Horning, Johnson, Rove, Moore & Hulett, Oklahoma City, for appellee International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local No. 2055.

SUMMERS, Justice:

A firefighter in Yukon filed a grievance through his Union that the City had failed to pay him for overtime at the agreed rate of time and a half. The City of Yukon claimed he was being paid exactly what was allowed under the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement. His grievance was submitted to an arbitrator as was required by that Agreement. The arbitrator interpreted the Agreement in favor of the firefighter. The City filed a District Court suit to declare the arbitrator's award void, but the District Court upon motions for summary judgment declined to do so. On the City's appeal we now affirm the lower court, and leave intact the decision of the arbitrator.

The question comes up because in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1010, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) the United States Supreme Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act ¹ (FLSA) applies to cities and towns. The FLSA provides that certain employers must pay their employees a premium rate of one and a half times the employee's regular rate of pay for work in excess of a 40 hour work week. ² Due, however, to the peculiar nature of firefighters' work schedules, under the Act an employer is allowed to select a work period of up to 28 days in which the firefighter may work up to 212 hours before the overtime pay rate kicks in. ³

The City of Yukon, in an understandable effort to avoid paying their firefighters at the higher rate, implemented a plan whereby firefighters would take a certain amount of leave in each work period, and in addition be given four hours of administrative leave with pay in certain work periods where they otherwise would work 216 hours. The effect was to reduce the compensable time worked for each such 28 day period to 212 hours, and avoid payment at time and a half.

A Collective Bargaining Agreement was consummated between the City of Yukon and Local 2055, International Association of Firefighters. It provided that employees "of the Fire Department shall receive time and one-half their hourly rate of pay ... for all overtime ...." (Art. 14, Sec. 3) It also provided that "a work week shall be an average of 56 hours." (Art. 19) A series of 56 hour work weeks will, of course, amount to more than 212 hours in a 28 day span, but the "leave" program referred to in the previous paragraph served generally to allow employees to be paid at the normal rate.

Mark Casey was the firefighter who considered himself aggrieved. In a work period where he was given four hours of administrative leave with pay he was called back due to a snow emergency and worked an extra four hours, making 216 hours worked. The City took the position that since he was compensated for 216 hours in that pay period it owed him an extra one-half times his regular pay for those four hours. Casey and the Union claimed the four hours of overtime work deserved compensation at time and a half the regular rate, and cited Art. 14 Sec. 3 of the Agreement in support.

Page 1179

The Collective Bargaining Agreement expressly provided for mandatory arbitration of employee's grievances. Art. 4, Sec. 5. Such binding arbitration is required by the state Fire and Police Arbitration Act, wherein the employees are denied by law the right to strike. 11 O.S.1981 § 51-101 et seq. and specifically § 51-111. See City of Midwest City v. Harris, 561 P.2d 1357, 1358 (Okl.1977). Thus, as stated in the Agreement, the arbitrator's task was to interpret the Collective Bargaining Agreement and ascertain if Casey was entitled to pay for the extra four hours worked at half time or time and a half. The arbitrator decided it should be at time and a half, and the District Court left that decision undisturbed.

The City urges on appeal that the arbitrator P.M. Williams' decision is not binding because it exceeded the authority given to him by the agreement and the statutes. In support of this argument, the City urges that the state courts apply a stricter standard than that in the federal court. The Union disagrees, pointing out that the agreement provided for final and binding arbitration, and that the arbitrator was interpreting the contract. The Union asserts that this appeal is merely a way for the City to re-litigate the merits of the decision because they are dissatisfied with the results. The parties disagree first as to the extent of this courts' permissible review of an arbitrators' award. Secondly they differ on whether the arbitrators' decision was within his authority.

As to our scope of review, the City argues that this Court has adopted a broader power of review than is present in the federal courts. We must disagree. In Voss v. City of Oklahoma City, 618 P.2d 925, 928 (Okl.1980), we specifically adopted the review standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct....