Clarahan v. Cosper

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MILLARD, J. BEALS, J.
• Citation: Clarahan v. Cosper, 160 Wash. 642, 296 P. 140 (Wash. 1931)
• Decision Date: 13 February 1931
• Docket Number: 22644.
• Parties: CLARAHAN v. COSPER.

296 P. 140

160 Wash. 642

CLARAHAN v. COSPER.

No. 22644.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 13, 1931

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Walla Walla County; E. V. Kuykendall Judge.

Action by E. C. Clarahan against Cecil Cosper. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

P. L Pendleton and W. G. Palmer, both of Tacoma, for appellant.

Herbert C. Bryson, of Walla Walla, for respondent.

MILLARD J.

Alleging that Lillian Drenkhahn was engaged to marry him and was maliciously induced by the defendant to breach that contract plaintiff seeks in this action to recover damages for humiliation, mental anguish and loss of time claimed to have been suffered by him as a result of that breach of contract. Defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained. The appeal is from the judgment of dismissal.

The complaint, the allegations of fact therein being admitted by the demurrer to be true, discloses that on September 19 1928, Lillian Drenkhahn entered into an oral engagement to marry the appellant. At that time appellant's fiancée was employed by the respondent at a salary of $150 monthly. Respondent learned of the engagement of appellant to marry Miss Drenkhahn whose salary was increased by respondent to $250 monthly to induce her to breach the contract to marry the appellant. The respondent, a married man, became unduly attentive to appellant's fiancée, showering her with flowers, gifts of automobile trips, all for the purpose of inducing her to breach the marriage contract. On August 19, 1929, respondent met appellant's fiancée at Vancouver, Wash., and transported her by automobile to some point near Underwood, Wash., where they were accosted by appellant, to whom respondent admitted that he had induced appellant's fiancée to breach the marriage contract.

If the respondent by slanderous or libelous statements had induced the breach of the contract, a different question would be presented than the one now before us. The general rule is that the prevention of a marriage by the interference of a third person cannot, in general, in itself be a legal wrong. The conduct of the respondent was exceptionally shameful in view of the fact that he was a married man. That he desired to retain an efficient employee is no excuse for his behavior. However, his soliciting and inducing appellant's fiancée to breach her contract to marry the appellant cannot impose upon him any legal liability. A wrong has been done to the plaintiff for which the law provides no remedy.

"The prevention of a marriage by the interference of a third person cannot, in general, in itself, be a legal wrong. Thus if one, by solicitations, or by the arts of ridicule or otherwise, shall induce one to break off an existing contract of marriage, no action will lie for it, however, contemptible and blamable may be the conduct.' 1 Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.) p. 494, and cases cited.

'See, also, Homan v. Hall, L. R. A. 1918C, 1195, and note, 102 Neb. 70, 165 N.W. 881.

'This is an exception to the general rule. The general rule is stated in Martens v. Reilly, 109 Wis. 464, 84 N.W. 840, to the effect that the violation of a contract is an unlawful act, and that a conspiracy or combination to bring about the doing of the unlawful act is a wrong for which the person injured may maintain an action for damages. The reason for the exception is stated in Homan v. Hall, supra: 'The right of engaged parties to ask the advice of their friends and the right of the friends to give advice have never been denied. To hold that a third party may be subject to answer in damages for advising or inducing an engaged person to break the engagement might result in a suit by every disappointed lover against his successful rival. The state has an interest in the marriage relation, and, until the marriage is solemnized, no domestic rights exist, and therefore cannot be violated.'

'If however, breach of contract is induced by slanderous or libelous statements or brought about by duress or other unlawful means, an action will lie for the wrongs thus committed, and the special injury that the party sustained by reason of the breaking off of the engagement may be considered in determining the damages. 1 Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.) p. 494. There is no allegation in the complaint charging slander, libel or coercion with respect to the plaintiff. The complaint contains certain allegations as to what was done by the defendant in furtherance of the conspiracy as that the defendants or some of them assaulted and threatened the plaintiff in a public place with intent to injure and degrade her and to get her to give up her said promise of marriage, but it is not charged that the defendant Kalk did these things, nor does the case appear to have been tried upon any theory other than that of conspiracy to induce the defendant Holman to breach his contract, which as we have pointed out, cannot be the subject of a conspiracy under the circumstances alleged and established in this case.' Ableman v....