Nelson v. Melvin

• Decision Date: 27 July 1945
• Docket Number: 45725.
• Citation: 19 N.W.2d 685,236 Iowa 604
• Parties: NELSON v. MELVIN et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

19 N.W.2d 685

236 Iowa 604

NELSON v. MELVIN et al.

No. 45725.

Supreme Court of Iowa

July 27, 1945

Carlos W. Goltz, of Sioux City, for appellant.

Carl R. Jones, of Sioux City, for appellees.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff's petition alleged: On December 31, 1943, Clinton Melvin, son of defendants, made an oral contract to marry plaintiff; by reason thereof he seduced and debauched plaintiff and she is pregnant; plaintiff was chaste and of good moral character and at all times has remained so with the exception of her sexual relations with defendants' son; the contemplated marriage was set for May 31, 1944, and would have taken place but for the acts of defendants; defendants, with knowledge of plaintiff's said seduction, 'by agreement among themselves, working and cooperating together with a common purpose, have since plaintiff's said engagement to their son, Clinton Melvin, wrongfully and maliciously and with intent to injure the plaintiff, conspired together to alienate and destroy the affections of said Clinton Melvin for plaintiff and to bring about a breach of the marriage contract between them, and in accordance with such wicked agreement the defendants have each, separately and jointly annoyed, harrassed and abused plaintiff, made trouble between her and her fiance, telling various and malicious stories about her and maliciously and intentionally continued to poison the mind of said Clinton Melvin against her until she became sick in body and mind and unable to stand such abuse and said defendants pursuing said conspiracy, and in accordance with their agreement, wrongfully and maliciously persuaded and induced said Clinton Melvin to breach his contract of marriage with her and to refuse to carry same out'; defendants sent plaintiff the following telegram 'Miss Arlene Nelson, 1213 1/2 Iowa St., Sioux City, Iowa Mr. and Mrs. Nelson be advised--as guardian of my son. Drastic action will be taken against you for harboring him about your premises--'; the sending of said telegram was preceded by oral, false and defamatory remarks of the defendants to and about her, 'and as part of their intentions to wrongfully and maliciously breach the contract of marriage between Clinton Melvin and this plaintiff, and to maliciously slander and libel her, all of which said defendants succeeded in doing': as a result of the foregoing plaintiff's good reputation has been destroyed, she has lost the consortium and companionship of her expected husband and has lost his love and affection; plaintiff has become grieved and distressed and her nervous system has become impaired. The prayer demanded actual damages of $10,000 and punitive damages of $5,000.

Defendant, J. A. Melvin, filed a special appearance which was sustained and no appeal has been taken therefrom. Defendant, Anna Melvin filed a motion to have the petition of the plaintiff stricken in its entirety for the reason that the petition states no cause of action against defendant and for the same reason moved to have the cause of action dismissed. This motion was sustained and plaintiff appeals to this court. The only question presented by the appeal is whether the petition states a cause of action.

I. The principal ground of the complaint of the appellant is that appellee, as mother of appellant's fiance, caused him to break his contract to marry appellant. In so far as the action is for breach of a marriage contract or for alienation of affections, there is no right to recover on the part of a fiance as distinguished from a spouse. In the case of Homan v. Hall, 102 Neb. 70, 165 N.W. 881, L.R.A.1918C, 1195, the court states:

'Where the marriage relation exists and third parties entice away the spouse or alienate the affections, a recovery is allowed; but the cause of action rests upon the right to the society, companionship, conjugal affections, and fellowship of the estranged spouse. There is no such right in the fiancé. An alienation suit, therefore, is maintainable only for interference with the conjugal rights of the plaintiff.'

The foregoing pronouncement is supported unanimously by the courts of this country where the question has been passed upon. Abelman v. Holman, 190 Wis. 112, 208 N.W. 889, 47 A.L.R. 440; Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 169 N.E. 491, 73 A.L.R. 1448; Lucas v. Tarpilauskas, 266 Mass. 498, 499, 165 N.E. 513; Clarahan v. Cosper, 160 Wash. 642, 296 P. 140; Leonard v. Whetstone, 34 Ind.App. 383, 68 N.E. 197, 107 Am.St.Rep. 252; Davis v. Condit, 124 Minn. 365, 144 N.W. 1089, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 142 Ann.Cas.1915B, 544; Stiffler v. Boehm, 124 Misc. 55, 206 N.Y.S. 187; Minsky v. Satenstein, 6 N.J.Misc. 978, 143 A. 512; Case v. Smith, 107 Mich. 416, 65 N.W. 279, 31 A.L.R. 282, 61 Am.St.Rep. 341; Cooley on Torts, 3d Ed., 494; 9 C.J. 342.

The reason for the rule is well stated in Conway v. O'Brien, supra, as follows [269 Mass. 425, 169 N.E. 492]:

'Upon grounds of public policy we are of opinion that this action cannot be maintained. Although marriage is a civil contract, it is a relation between the parties which intimately concerns the welfare of society and the state, and the parents and other relatives and friends of the contracting parties ought to be free to advise them without incurring a liability to be called upon to respond in damages where such advice results in the breach of the contract to marry.

'Upon consideration of the authorities and of the principles involved, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be best served by holding that no action of this kind can be upheld. To decide otherwise would be to open the door to unwarranted litigation, to promote unfortunate engagements and to encourage unjustifiable attacks upon any relative or friend who could respond in damages. We are of opinion that a plaintiff is given an adequate remedy by having a right of action for slander or libel, as the case may be, whereby a contract to marry has been broken.'

Appellant contends that all of the cases in this country have been decided erroneously. We are not disposed to so hold. On the narrow question of a recovery of damages for a parent such as appellee herein, inducing her child to break a marriage contract, we hold that that alone does not suffice to support a cause of action.

II. Appellant contends that the petition states a cause of action based upon conspiracy and malicious libel and slander. On this feature of the case, in Conway v. O'Brien, supra, the court states:

'It is also held that no one can by the use of slanderous or libelous words concerning one of the parties induce the other party to repudiate a contract to marry. In such a case an action will lie for slander or libel but not for inducing a breach of the contract. Leonard v. Whetstone, 34 Ind.App. 383, 386, 68 N.E. 197, 107 Am.St.Rep. 252; Overhultz v. Row, 152 La. 9, 12, 92 So. 716; Homan v. Hall, 102 Neb. 70, 165 N.W. 881, L.R.A.1918C, 1195; Ableman v. Holman, 190 Wis. 112, 208 N.W. 889, 47 A.L.R. 440.'

In determining whether a civil cause of action has been alleged, the charge of conspiracy alone does not state a cause of action. In Olmsted, Inc., v. Maryland Cas. Co., 218 Iowa 997, 998, 253 N.W. 804, this court stated:

'This court is committed to the rule that a conspiracy cannot be the subject of a civil action unless something is done pursuant to it which, without the conspiracy, would give a right of action. Beechley v. Mulville, 102 Iowa 602, 70 N.W. 107, 71 N.W. 428, 63 Am.St.Rep. 479; De Wulf v. Dix, 110 Iowa 553, 81 N.W. 779; Jayne v. Drorbaugh, 63 Iowa 711, 17 N.W. 433; Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 132 N.W. 371, 36 L.R.A.,N.S., 263.'

Similarly, the allegations that defendant acted maliciously do not suffice alone to state a cause of action. In 34 Am.J. 684, the author states:

'Since malice in law is predicated upon the doing of an unlawful act, or the doing of a lawful act in an unlawful manner, it follows that malice, in contemplation of law, cannot exist where the...