Clark v. County of Placer

• Decision Date: 19 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. Civ. S-93-1047 LKK.,Civ. S-93-1047 LKK.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: Earlyn CLARK, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF PLACER, et al., Defendants.

923 F. Supp. 1278

Earlyn CLARK, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF PLACER, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ. S-93-1047 LKK.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

April 19, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ann Perrin Farina, Eisen & Johnston Law Corporation, Sacramento, CA, for plaintiff.

William P. Brodbeck, Sacramento, CA, for defendants.

ORDER

KARLTON, Chief Judge Emeritus.

This matter is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. After hearing, and supplemental briefing, the motions were taken under submission and are now resolved on the record, briefs, and arguments of the parties.¹

I. FACTS²

Plaintiff is a female race car driver. The All American Speedway ("AAS"), located on the Placer County fairgrounds, is a track on which plaintiff raced from approximately 1985 to 1992. The name All American Speedway is a fictitious business name employed by defendant Placer County Fair Association ("PCFA").

The PCFA is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the state of California. Any resident of Placer County may become a member of the association and its board of directors is elected by its members. Pursuant to a contract with the county, PCFA manages and controls the county fairgrounds. Because Placer County owns the fairgrounds upon which the AAS sits, see Defendants' Answer ¶ 7, there is no dispute that the fairgrounds are public property. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 28 attached to Declaration of Ann Perrin Farina ("Plaintiff's Ex."), AAS 1992 Rules and Regulations P.R. 2.1 (representing that the AAS track is public property). The contract between the county and the PCFA was entered into in accordance with the provisions of a California statute permitting counties to delegate to nonprofit corporations the conduct of a county fair. See Cal.Govt.Code § 25905. The statute requires, inter alia, that any profits derived from any activity on the fairgrounds must be utilized in furtherance of the county event. See id.³ The county and the PCFA operate a joint complaint committee which resolves disputes concerning the PCFA's operations. Under state law, the county of Placer must approve the PCFA's budget and its contracts. Cal.Govt.Code § 25905. Accordingly, under the County's agreement with PCFA, contracts pertaining to vehicle racing events require County approval. See Plaintiff's Ex. 1, at ¶ 13. Finally, California law provides that should PCFA dissolve the county would succeed to the association's assets. Cal.Govt.Code § 25906.

II. THE PLEADINGS

Plaintiff sues pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated her right to equal protection and due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Specifically, she claims that certain racetrack rules were not applied evenhandedly and that she was treated unfairly because she is female. She also alleges that she has suffered a pattern of harassment and discrimination at the hands of other race car drivers, and that race track officials refused to take action against those individuals who intimidated, accosted and threatened her. See First Amended Complaint filed September 20, 1993 ("Amended Complaint"), at pp. 7-13.

In a separate cause of action, plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a litigation waiver that all members of the AAS were required to sign as a condition of racing at AAS. The rule requiring the waiver also provides for the immediate suspension of any individual who challenges the AAS or its officials in court. See Plaintiff's Ex. 29, AAS 1993 Rules and Regulations, General Rules 1.3(b) and 1.3(c). The 1993 rules were drafted and released in November 1992, and became effective in January 1993. See Plaintiff's Ex. 29.

In addition to the causes of action predicated on the Constitution of the United States, plaintiff alleges sixteen claims premised on state law, ranging from claims based on the state constitution's equal protection and due process provisions to state statutory and common law prohibitions against discrimination, breach of contract, negligence, emotional distress, and other tort recovery theories.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is based on the proposition that the County Supervisors are immune from suit and that there is no state action within the meaning of § 1983 jurisprudence. Defendants also assert that judgment on the pleadings should be granted as to most of the state law claims. I resolve these issues herein.⁴

III. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Owens v. Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir.1992).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

Always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. "A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); See also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 1600, 63 L.Ed.2d 786 (1980).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 1355 n. 11; See also First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289, 88 S.Ct. at 1592; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir.1973). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11; see also Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290, 88 S.Ct. at 1593; See also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to `pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see also International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir.1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per curiam)); see also Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 208 (9th Cir.1979). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.Cal.1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken...