Clark v. DMV
| Decision Date | 09 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-CV-3086 (JGK) |
| Parties | SEAN A. CLARK, Plaintiff, v. DMV; COMMISSIONER OF OTDA/HRA SOCIAL SERVICES; COMMISSIONER OF SSA; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; NYCHA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
The plaintiff, Sean A. Clark, who appears pro se, brings this action asserting claims for violations of his federal constitutional and statutory rights, as well as claims under New York State law. The plaintiff appears to be asserting claims against each of the following defendants: (1) the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") (2) the Commissioner of the New.York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA"); (3) the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services ("NYCDSS");[1] (4) the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA"); (5) the United States Department of Education ("USDOE") and (6) the New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA").[2] The plaintiff paid the fees to bring this action.
For the following reasons, the Court dismisses this action, but grants the plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead his claims against NYCHA in an amended complaint.
The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the fees to bring a civil action, if the Court determines that the action is frivolous, see Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000), [3] or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011). "Futility is a determination, as a matter of law, that proposed amendments would fail to cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim . . . ." Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikarios Commc'ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2012).
The Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they official capacities. suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006).
In asserting his claims, the plaintiff refers to many of the federal civil actions that he previously filed in this court. The plaintiff has an extensive litigation history in this court; with the exception of NYCHA, the plaintiff has previously brought actions in this court against the agencies named as defendants in this action, their subdivisions, or against the heads of those agencies or subdivisions. It appears that, in this action, the plaintiff is relitigating claims and/or issues that he previously raised (or could have raised) in those actions, and that the court has previously adjudicated. The doctrine of claim preclusion or issue preclusion prevents the plaintiff from relitigating these claims anew. To demonstrate why the plaintiff cannot proceed with many of his claims, the Court recounts the plaintiff s relevant litigation history before describing the allegations in the present complaint.
On December 14, 2015, the plaintiff, appearing pro se, brought an in forma pauperis ("IFF") action in this court against the Commissioner of the New York City Police Department; he later filed a second amended complaint against, among other named defendants, the DMV. See Clark v. NYPD (New York Police Department) Commissioner (DMV I), No. 15-cv-9836 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2015), ECF No. 6. The plaintiff stated that his "case [was] about the inaccurate information that [was] obtained on [his] current drivers license number." Id. at 3. He asserted claims under federal law, including claims for constitutional violations, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), as well as claims for libel and defamation. Id. at 2. By order dated February 10, 2017, Judge Colleen McMahon dismissed DMV I sua sponte for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). DMV I, No. 15-cv-9836, 2017 WL 5508456 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2017). As relevant here, Judge McMahon dismissed the plaintiff's claims against the DMV as barred by the Eleventh Amendment; his claims regarding his driver license number as "lack[ing] an arguable basis either in law or in fact"; and his claims for libel and defamation because there is no federal cause of action for such claims, and supplemental jurisdiction over these state-law claims was inappropriate. Id. at *2-3. The plaintiff appealed. DMV I, No. 15-cv-9836, ECF No. 10. On June 28, 2017, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as frivolous. DMV I, No. 17-659 (2d Cir. June 28, 2017).
Id. at 5. By order dated October 20, 2020, Judge Vernon S. Broderick directed the plaintiff to show cause why DMV II should not be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. DMV II, No. 20-cv-8000, ECF No. 5. After the plaintiff responded to the order to show cause, Judge Broderick dismissed DMV II sua sponte as frivolous. DMV II, No. 20-cv-8000, 2020 WL 6525467 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2020). On May 14, 2021, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. DMV II, 847 Fed.Appx. 92 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order), cert, denied, 142 S.Ct. 341 (2021).
2. HRA
On August 15, 2013, the plaintiff, appearing pro se and proceeding IFF, brought an action against the HRA and then-HRA Commissioner Robert Doar. Clark v. Human Res. Admin. (HRA I), No. 13-cv-5757 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 15, 2013), ECF No. 2. In his HRA I complaint, the plaintiff asserted claims under federal law arising from the 2013 denial of his application for public benefits, including "food stamps." Id. at 3. Almost one month later, on September 11, 2013, the plaintiff filed another pro se action IFF against then-HRA Commissioner Doar. Clark v. Doar (HRA II), No. 13-cv-6460 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 11, 2013), ECF No. 2. In his HRA II complaint, the plaintiff asserted claims relating to the amount of public benefits he had received. Id. at 3. By order dated September 30, 2013, Judge Loretta A. Preska consolidated HRA I and HRA II, and dismissed the actions sua sponte for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii) . HRA I, No. 13-cv-5757, ECF No. 4; HRA II, No. 13-CV-6460, ECF No. 4. Judge Preska dismissed the plaintiff's procedural due process claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 because the plaintiff did not allege that he had taken advantage of all the available state remedies or show that those remedies were inadequate or inappropriate, and she dismissed the plaintiff's" claims under Title II of the ADA because he did not allege facts showing that he had been discriminated against because of his disability. Id. The plaintiff appealed, and on January 23, 2014, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as frivolous. Clark v. Human Res. Admin., Nos. 13-3882, 13-3973 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2014), cert, denied, No. 13-8865 (May 5, 2014).
On January 13, 2014, the plaintiff brought another pro se action against the HRA, proceeding IFF. Clark v. Human Res. Admin. (HRA III), No. 14-CV-0321 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 13, 2014), ECF No. 2. In HRA III, the plaintiff again asserted claims under federal law arising from the denial of public benefits or of the full amount of those benefits to which he believed he was entitled." Id. at 3-4. By order dated April 1, 2014, Judge Preska dismissed HRA III sua sponte for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (B)(ii). HRA III, No. 14-CV-0321, ECF No. 4. Judge Preska again dismissed the plaintiff's procedural due process claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 because the plaintiff did not allege any facts showing that he had fully exhausted state remedies or that those remedies were inadequate or inappropriate, and again dismissed the plaintiff's claims under Title II of the ADA because he did not allege any facts showing that he had been discriminated against because of his disability. Id. Judge Preska also dismissed the plaintiff's claims that he had previously raised under the doctrine of claim preclusion (also known as res judicata) or issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel). Id. The plaintiff appealed, and on August 6, 2014, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as frivolous, and warned the plaintiff as to the consequences of his "continued filing of duplicative, vexatious, or clearly meritless appeals, motions, or other papers," including a possible leave-to-file sanction imposed on his future appeals. HRA III, No. 14-1390 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2014), cert, denied. No. 14-5858 (Oct. 6, 2014), reh'g denied (Feb. 29, 2016) .
The plaintiff sued the HRA yet again on January 21, 2014 appearing pro se and proceeding IFP. Clark v. Human Res. Admin. (HRA IV), No. 14-cv-0447 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 21, 2014), ECF No. 2. In HRA IV, the plaintiff again asserted claims under federal law...
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