Clark v. Finley

• Decision Date: 14 December 1899
• Citation: 54 S.W. 343
• Parties: CLARK, Sheriff, v. FINLEY, Comptroller.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 343

54 S.W. 343

CLARK, Sheriff, v. FINLEY, Comptroller.

Supreme Court of Texas.

December 14, 1899.

Original proceeding for mandamus by Sterling P. Clark, as sheriff, to compel R. W. Finley, as comptroller, to draw his warrant for the amount of relator's fees. Writ denied.

A. T. Watts, E. G. Senter, Wallace & Hendricks, and Tarlton & Ayres, for petitioner. T. S. Smith, Atty. Gen., and R. H. Ward, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

GAINES, C. J.

At the called session of the 25th legislature a statute was enacted for the purpose of limiting the compensation of certain officers and reducing the fees of office. It specially reduced certain fees of sheriffs and constables in certain counties of the state. Laws 1897, p. 5. Tarrant county belonged to the class to which the law applied. Sterling P. Clark is the sheriff of that county, and, having rendered services as such for which he was entitled to be paid by the state, he made out account therefor, charging the fees allowed by the law as it existed before the act was passed. His account was approved by the district judge, and was presented to the comptroller, who refused to allow the same for the fees as charged, but offered to draw his warrant for the amount authorized by the new law. The sheriff, as relator, has filed in this court this, his original petition for the writ of mandamus against the comptroller, as respondent, to compel the latter to draw his warrant for the amount of the account as charged by him and as allowed by the district judge. The respondent has demurred to the petition. If the act of June 16, 1897, is valid, the mandamus must be denied; if invalid, the writ should issue. Therefore the validity of the act is the question for our determination.

The validity of the statute is assailed upon several grounds. First, it is contended that it is in conflict with section 35 of article 3 of the constitution. This section provides that "no bill, except general appropriation bills, * * * shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." The evident purpose of the act is to reduce fees, and to limit the compensation of district attorneys and of certain county officers in certain of the larger counties of the state. The underlying theory of the law was that in the more populous counties of the state the officers named in it were receiving a compensation in excess of the value of their services. It reduces fees throughout the state for certain services, and fees of the sheriffs in certain counties, and limits the compensation of other county officers and district attorneys. It also attempts to regulate the appointment of deputies in certain cases. All these matters have one general object, and relate to the one subject of the compensation of the state's officers, except, possibly, the last. It matters not, in our opinion, that the act prescribes fees both in criminal cases and in civil actions, and that since the adoption of our Code of Criminal Procedure these two classes of fees have usually been provided for in separate enactments. The title of the act is as follows: "An act to fix certain civil fees to be charged by certain county and precinct officers, and to fix and limit the fees and compensation of clerks of the district court, district attorneys, county attorneys, sheriffs and constables in felony cases, to be paid by the state, and to fix the compensation of assessors and collectors of taxes, and to limit and regulate the compensation of the sheriff, clerk of the county court, county judge, district and county attorney, clerk of the district court, assessor and collector of taxes, justices of the peace and constables, and to prescribe penalties for the violation of this act, and to repeal all laws in conflict herewith." Laws 1897, p. 5. With the exception of the appointment of deputies, the subject-matter of the bill seems to us very fully expressed in the title. The provision in regard to deputies was intended to limit their number and fix their compensation, but whether it is germane to the subject of the act, and sufficiently within the purview of the title as to bring it within the rule of the constitution under consideration, we need not pause to inquire. No question in regard to that provision is directly involved in this proceeding. The section of the constitution from which we have already quoted has this additional provision: "But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed." It follows that, if the matter of the appointment of deputies does not come within the compass of the title, it goes for naught; but the vice does not otherwise affect the law. The act stands as if the obnoxious provision had never been inserted. Our conclusion is that the statute in question, in so far as it regulates the compensation of officers and their fees, is not in conflict with section 35 of article 3 of the constitution. The cases of State v. Shadle, 41 Tex. 404, and Bills v. State, 42 Tex. 305, relied on by counsel for the relator, are not at all satisfactory to us. In the former the statute was held inoperative before they reached the constitutional question, and, when reached, the court merely say, "It also embraces more than one object, and is repugnant to the provisions of the constitution on this subject." What the two or more objects were is not pointed out by the court, and they are not apparent to us. In the latter case (which, by the way, was dismissed for the want of jurisdiction) the court simply refer to the decision in the former case.

It is also insisted that the act in question is an amendment to various provisions of our Revised Statutes which prescribe the fees and fix the compensation of the officers named therein, and that it is, therefore, prohibited by section 36 of article 3 of the constitution. That article provides that "no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title; but in such case the act revived or the section or sections amended shall be reenacted and published at length." A similar question was certified for the decision of this court in the case of Snyder v. Compton, 87 Tex. 374, 28 S. W. 1061, and in disposing of it the court say: "It is not meant by this provision that every act which amends the statutory law shall set out at length the entire law as amended. Under such a rule, legislation would in many instances be impracticable. This is especially the case in this state, where the existence of the common law is due to statutory enactment. The practice which it was the purpose of the provision in question to prohibit was that of amending a statute by referring to its title, and by providing that it should be amended by adding to or striking out certain words, or by omitting certain language and inserting in lieu thereof certain other words. It was not intended to prohibit the passage of a law which declared fully its provisions without direct reference to any other act, although its effect should be to enlarge or restrict the operation of some other statutes. Similar provisions in other constitutions have been construed not to apply to implied amendments." There is no attempt in the act in question to amend any law "by reference to its title," and hence it would seem that section 36 has no application whatever.

In the next place, it is urged that the act in question is repugnant to that section of the constitution which prohibits the passage of special or local laws in certain specified cases, and in every case where a general law may be made applicable. Article 3, § 56, Const. 1876. The ground of the contention is that most of the vital provisions of the act are, by its terms, made applicable to a minority only of the counties in the state. Its most important provisions do not apply to counties in which the vote at the last election for president was less than 3,000. Does this make a local or special law, within the meaning of section 56 of article 3 of the constitution? We might rest our determination of the question upon a former decision of this court. A similar provision to that embraced in the section in question was incorporated in the constitution of 1869 by an amendment which took effect by ratification of the two houses of the legislature in January, 1874. Sayles' Const. 476. On the 23d day of March, 1874, the same legislature which ratified the amendment (as was required by that constitution) passed an act "to encourage stock raising, and for the protection of stock raisers," which contained many important provisions, and from the operation of which more than 50 counties of the state were exempted by name. The question of the validity of the act came before the court in Beyman v. Black, 47 Tex. 558, and it was held valid. The court, in their opinion, say: "The act in question is general in its terms and in its operation, save in certain specified counties, and can with no propriety be termed a local or special law. Indeed, it has not been argued that the act violates any of the provisions of the constitutional amendments of January, 1874, forbidding local or special laws in certain enumerated cases, and providing that `in all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted,' and that `the legislature shall pass general laws providing for the cases before enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which, in its judgment, may be provided by general laws.' Laws 14th Leg. p. 235." If that act was not a local or special law, clearly the statute under consideration is not.

But we do not find it necessary to repose upon the former ruling of the court. A law is not special because it does not apply to all persons or things alike. Indeed, most of our laws apply to some one or more classes of...