Snyder v. Compton

• Decision Date: 10 December 1894
• Citation: 28 S.W. 1061
• Parties: SNYDER v. COMPTON.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

28 S.W. 1061

SNYDER v. COMPTON.

Supreme Court of Texas.

December 10, 1894.

Certified questions from court of civil appeals of Third supreme judicial district.

Appeal by D. H. Snyder from a judgment in favor of W. Y. Compton.

A. S. Fisher and Fisher & Townes, for appellant. U. S. Hearrell, for appellee.

GAINES, C. J.

The following questions are certified for our determination by the court of civil appeals of the Third supreme judicial district: "(1) Is so much of the act of July 14, 1879 (Sayles' Civ. St. art. 3976a), entitled `An act to provide for the sale of a portion of the unappropriated public lands of the state of Texas and the investment of the proceeds of such sale' (Laws Called Sess. 16th Leg. p. 48), and the act of March 11, 1881 (Laws 17th Leg. p. 24; Sayles' Civ. St. art. 3976a), amendatory of the aforesaid act, as attempts to create a reservation, obnoxious to section 35, of article 3 of the constitution of the state of Texas, and therefore null and void? (2) Is so much of the act of January 22, 1883, entitled `An act to withdraw the public lands of the state of Texas from sale' (Laws 18th Leg. p. 2), as undertakes to continue the supposed reservation therein referred to, in contravention of section 35 or 36 of article 3 of our state constitution? (3) If the last-named act is not obnoxious to said sections of the constitution, had the legislature the power to declare the legal effect of a repeal of the acts of July 14, 1879, and March 11, 1881, and to bind the courts by a declaration that the repeal of said acts should not be construed to return the land reserved by said acts to the mass of the public domain? (4) If it be held that the acts of July 14, 1879, March 11, 1881, and January 22, 1883, are free from constitutional objections and valid, then must they, and the act of April 10, 1883, entitled `An act to provide for the permanent endowment of the University of Texas,' etc. (Laws 18th Leg. p. 71), be construed in pari materia, and should the last act be given the effect of a proviso ingrafted upon the previous acts, and as limiting the quantity of land reserved to two million acres?"

1. We think that the creation of a reservation in the act of July 14, 1879, is within the purview of the title of that act, and that, therefore, it is not repugnant to section 35 of article 3 of our constitution. The purpose of the law, as expressed in the title, is "to provide for the sale of a portion of the unappropriated public lands of the state of Texas," etc. To provide for a sale of a part of the public domain implies reasonably, if not necessarily, a provision that it shall not be subject to appropriation in any other manner. If the act had merely declared that the public lands in certain counties should be sold, and the proceeds applied, one-half to the public debt and the other to the school fund, we apprehend that a reservation would have been as effectually created as if the intention to make it had been conveyed in express words. The legislature might have provided that the lands, although set apart for sale, should be subject to location by virtue of any valid certificates at any time before sales were actually made. In fact, the act does expressly declare that the lands set apart for sale under its provisions shall be subject to appropriation under the existing pre-emption laws of the state. But without such express provision no such right would have existed. The subject of the act, as expressed in the title, is broad enough to warrant the legislature in providing that the lands should be sold, and, such provision implying that they should not be disposed of or appropriated in any other manner, it also warranted it in so declaring. In Davey v. Galveston Co., 45 Tex. 291, this court, in construing section 35 of article 3 of the constitution, which directs that a statute shall have but one subject, which shall be expressed in the title, say: "The number of cases in which the court has been called upon to consider similar objections to other laws renders it unnecessary to say little more than that this objection cannot be maintained. The act embraces, as we think, but one leading object. All its provisions are subsidiary to and legitimately connected with, and tend to effect and enforce, this main object, which is sufficiently clearly and definitely expressed in the title." Here, although the subsidiary provision is not express, it is legitimately connected with the main subject, and tends to effect and enforce the main object of the law. "Any provision calculated to carry the declared object into effect is unobjectionable, although not specially indicated in its title." 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 28, quoted with approval in Johnson v. Martin, 75 Tex. 33, 12 S. W. 321.

2. We are also of the opinion that so much of the act of January 22, 1883, entitled "An act to withdraw the public lands of the state of Texas from sale," as undertakes to continue the reservation of the former laws upon the same subject, is repugnant neither to section 35 nor to section 36 of article 3 of the constitution. Considered in the light of legislation upon the same subject-matter, enacted at the same session of the legislature, it is evident that the purpose was not to annul the reservation, but to suspend the sale of the lands until such time as the legislature might see fit to subject them to a similar disposition. Although the reservation was originally an incident of the provision for...