Clark v. Marietta

• Decision Date: 16 November 1965
• Docket Number: No. 51893,51893
• Parties: Edna CLARK, Administratrix of the Estate of Sharon Clark, Deceased, Appellant, v. Ronald J. MARIETTA, Paul Olson and Clifford E. Mathews, Executor of the Estate of Christopher O. Olson, Deceased, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 107

138 N.W.2d 107

258 Iowa 106

Edna CLARK, Administratrix of the Estate of Sharon Clark, Deceased, Appellant, v. Ronald J. MARIETTA, Paul Olson and Clifford E. Mathews, Executor of the Estate of Christopher O. Olson, Deceased, Appellees.

No. 51893.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 16, 1965.

Miller, Miller & Miller, Cherokee, for appellant.

Mack, Mack & Hansen, Storm Lake, for appellee Ronald J. Marietta.

James R. Hamilton, Storm Lake, for appellee Clifford E. Mathews, Executor of Estate of Christopher O. Olson, deceased.

C. W. Pendleton, Storm Lake, and John A. Malone, Sioux Rapids, for appellee Paul Olson.

LARSON, Justice.

This is a law action in which plaintiff-administratrix seeks damages for the death of her decedent resulting from a collision at a rural intersection between a car owned and operated by defendant Ronald J. Marietta, with whom decedent was riding, and an automobile operated by Paul Olson and owned by the estate of Christopher Olson, deceased.

Plaintiff's petition, in three divisions, sought recovery against Marietta on the grounds that he operated his vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and in a reckless manner (section 321.494), against Paul Olson on the ground of negligent operation of his vehicle, and against both defendants, jointly and severally, on concurring recklessness and intoxication of Marietta and the concurring negligence of Olson. That the deceased Sharon Clark was a guest in the Marietta automobile is not disputed.

The case was tried to the court without a jury, and it entered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff's motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were overruled and plaintiff has appealed.

Plaintiff-appellant's sole contention is that the trial court should have ruled as a matter of law that at the time of the collision the defendant Marietta was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and was operating his vehicle in a reckless manner, and that the defendant Olson was negligent in the operation of his vehicle at that time and place. We hold under this record these issues were ones of fact for a jury, not ones of law for the court, and affirm the judgment.

I. Some general observations at the outset seem appropriate. Generally, questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are for the jury; it is only in exceptional cases that they may be decided as matters of law. Bartels v. Cair-Dem, Incorporated, 255 Iowa 834, 837, 124 N.W.2d 514; rule 344(f) 10. This rule also applies to the allegations of recklessness and intoxication.

It was, of course, plaintiff's burden to prove her allegations by a preponderance of the evidence and, while they may be proven by circumstantial evidence, this evidence must be sufficient to make the theory of causation reasonably probable, not merely possible, and more probable than any other theory based on the evidence. Usually it is for the jury to say whether such circumstantial evidence meets this test. Even when facts are not in dispute or contradicted, if reasonable minds might draw different inferences from them, a jury question is engendered. Rule 344(f) 16, 17.

II. This being a law action tried to the court, it is reviewable on errors assigned and is not triable de novo on appeal. Rule 334, Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the findings of fact by the trial court have the effect of a special verdict and are equivalent to the verdict of the jury. If supported by substantial evidence and justified as a matter of law, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal. McCune v. Muenich, 255 Iowa 755, 757, 124 N.W.2d 130, and citations; rule 344(f) 1. Furthermore, we must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment (Staley v. Fazel Bros. Co., 247 Iowa 644, 648, 75 N.W.2d 253, 255, and citations), and this court will not weight the evidence or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. Phoenix v. Stevens, Iowa, 127 N.W.2d 640, 642.

III. A brief statement of the facts which were not greatly disputed seems appropriate here. The accident occurred on March 20, 1963, at approximately 10:30 P.M. at a rural intersection of two gravel roads in Buena Vista County, Iowa, about two miles south and one mile east of Linn Grove, where decedent Sharon Clark, age 20, lived with her parents. Ronald J. Marietta, age 21, single, of Marathon, Iowa, called for Sharon at about 7:30 P.M. and they proceeded to go for an automobile ride. Ronald stopped at a tavern and purchased two six-packs of beer, and between 8:30 and 10:30 P.M. Ronald consumed two or three cans of beer, and Sharon had one can opened for her. Several stops were made at Marathon, at Pickerel Lake, and at Sioux Rapids, the latter near 10:30 P.M. to obtain gas. As the Marietta car approached the scene of this accident from the east on an east-west road, there was a clear view of traffic to the north on the north-south road for almost a quarter of a mile. These gravel roads were of equal class and were only in fair condition. There were no stop signs at the intersection. Marietta was driving about 40 to 50 miles per hour and testified he looked to the north when about 340 feet from the crossing and saw nothing, but that when he looked again just before reaching the intersection defendant Olson's car was right there and the collision occurred. Defendant Olson's approach from the right created a situation where there was danger of a collision. Where the paths of these cars would intersect he was entitled to the directional right of way under section 321.319, Code, 1962. He testified he saw the car approaching from his left when he was about 1074 feet from the intersection, that he slowed down to 30 miles per hour, that he estimated the other car's speed at 40 or 50 miles per hour, and that he had that car in his sight the last 300 feet before the collision. He said he assumed the other driver would slow down or stop and yield him the right of way, that he thought he could make it through the intersection and did not apply his brakes. A finding is warranted that very little time elapsed after defendant Olson knew or should have known the Marietta car would not accord him the right of way until the collision occurred.

The impact took place in the center of the intersection. The Olson vehicle struck the right side of the Marietta vehicle at or just in front of the right front door. Both vehicles went into the ditch in the southwest corner of the intersection and were completely wrecked. Sharon, who had been sitting in the front seat partially facing the driver, was seriously injured and died the next morning.

It is appellant's contention that the evidence, fairly viewed, compels findings that the defendant Olson was negligent, that the defendant Marietta was reckless and was then under the influence of intoxicating liquor. While in some respects the evidence is quite persuasive, we cannot say it compels such findings.

IV. In appellant's first assignment of error she contends the trial court erred in not finding the defendant Paul Olson guilty of negligence proximately causing the death of the decedent. She argues, there being no dispute in the testimony, this court is not bound by the findings of fact by the trial court. Olson v. Goodyear Service Stores, 255 Iowa 1112, 1115, 125 N.W.2d 251, is cited in support thereof, but therein we carefully pointed out such a statement is inaccurrate in that it ignores the consideration that reasonable minds may differ on the inferences fairly to be drawn from undisputed facts. Thus, even though this court might arrive at a different conclusion from the evidence, the real test is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conclusion of the factfinder. The same proposition appears in Allied Mutual Casualty Co. v. Dahl, 255 Iowa 208, 218, 122 N.W.2d 270, and in Winter v. Moore, 255 Iowa 1, 11, 121 N.W.2d 82, 87, where it was said: 'Plaintiff's argument the jury should have been instructed as a matter of law she was not within the guest statute is largely based on the claim the evidence on the point is undisputed. * * * However, even when the facts are not in dispute or contradicted, if reasonable minds might draw different inferences from them, the question is for the jury. Rule 344(f), subd. 17, Rules of Civil Procedure.'

Nevertheless, appellant argues that when Olson observed the Marietta car as it approached the intersection at an unreduced speed, he was required to slow up further or stop, and that his failure to do so under these circumstances required a finding of negligence against him as a matter of law, and a further finding that his negligence was a proximate cause of decedent's death. She concedes it was plaintiff's burden to prove Olson was negligent by a preponderance of the evidence, and that Olson, approaching from the right, 'initially' had the right to assume the motorist approaching from his left would yield the right of way at the intersection. This assumption, she contends, ceases to protect a motorist when it becomes apparent, or in the exercise of ordinary care and caution...