Clark v. Nashville Machine Elevator Co.

• Decision Date: 10 March 2004
• Docket Number: M2003-01568-SC-R3-CV.
• Citation: 129 S.W.3d 42
• Parties: Linda F. CLARK, et al. v. NASHVILLE MACHINE ELEVATOR COMPANY INCORPORATED.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

129 S.W.3d 42

Linda F. CLARK, et al. v. NASHVILLE MACHINE ELEVATOR COMPANY INCORPORATED.

M2003-01568-SC-R3-CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

February 12, 2004 Session.

March 10, 2004.

Branch H. Henard, III, and Mark A. Baugh, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Nashville Machine Elevator Company, Incorporated.

Donald S. Caulkins, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellees, Linda F. Clark and Brandon W. Clark.

OPINION

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JANICE M. HOLDER, and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.

In this workers' compensation case, the employer, Nashville Machine Elevator Co., Inc., has appealed the trial court's award of death benefits to the widow and son of the employee, Eddie W. Clark, Jr., who suffered a fatal heart attack while driving the employer's vehicle home from work. The employer contends generally that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee suffered an injury causally related to his employment activities, and specifically argues that the heart attack was not compensable because the employee was not physically exerting himself when he suffered the heart attack. The appeal was argued before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), but the appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision. The question before this Court is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's heart attack arose out of his employment. After carefully examining the record and the relevant authorities, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. We further hold that physical exertion or strain is not required at the instant an employee's heart attack occurs, provided there is evidence linking the physical activities of the employment with the heart attack.

Factual and Procedural Background

The employee, Eddie W. Clark, Jr., age 41, was employed by Nashville Machine Elevator Company, Incorporated as an elevator mechanic. He worked for the employer for approximately eight years before his death from complications stemming from a heart attack suffered on March 7, 2002, while driving home from work in the employer's van.

The employee's typical work routine was to leave his house in Fairview at 6:30 a.m. and drive a company van to Brentwood where he would begin his assigned route servicing and repairing elevators. He would normally return home by 5:30 p.m., although he often worked more than forty hours a week and was frequently on call. If he received a call after returning home on days that he was on call, he would leave his house and return to work to perform the necessary service or repair.

On March 6, 2002, the day before the employee suffered his heart attack, he told his wife before leaving for work that he was short of breath and that he was tired, aching, and thought that he might be coming down with the flu. Two or three weeks previously he had difficulty breathing while at work. According to the employee's wife, the employee enjoyed his job and was not the type of person to complain about being sick. He would go to work even if he was not feeling well, as was the case on March 6, 2002. He arrived home at 4:15 p.m. that afternoon. However, he was on call that night, and was home little more than one hour before being called out to work again. He arrived home at about 2:00 a.m. on March 7, 2002, got back up at 5:00 a.m., and returned to work for another full shift. While driving home that afternoon in a company van, the employee had a heart attack and veered off the road. He was taken to a hospital where he died several days later. He had serviced or repaired twenty-two elevators on March 6 and 7, 2002.

The employee's duties as an elevator mechanic required him to, among other things, climb stairs, get on top of elevator cars, inspect hydraulic, electrical, and mechanical systems, lubricate belts and chains, and check the condition of elevator shafts by climbing in and out of them using a ladder. The employee's wife described her husband's job as "heavy labor." She testified that he always carried his toolbox from his assigned van to the job site where he needed his tools. The employee's wife went to work with him on approximately fifty occasions, although she was not with him on March 7, 2002. She testified that because he worked so much she would accompany him while he was on call so that they could spend time together.

The employee's teenage son, Brandon Clark, who sometimes accompanied his father to work, likewise testified that the employee would carry his toolbox from his van to the place where he was working. The son testified that his father's toolbox weighed approximately twenty-eight pounds, as he had weighed it himself on three occasions. He saw his father carry the toolbox up the stairs of buildings many times in order to perform his job. He further testified that his father would sometimes "have to hurry up and run" because people were stuck on an elevator that had malfunctioned.

A co-worker of the employee similarly testified that the employee typically carried his toolbox from his van to where he needed his tools. Another individual, the employee's supervisor, testified that he did not know whether the employee carried his toolbox with him whenever he went into a building to service or repair an elevator. The supervisor had no evidence to refute the testimony of the employee's wife, son, and co-worker, that he did so. The supervisor acknowledged that if he had to make a repair, he was "pretty sure I'd carry my toolbox in." The supervisor further testified that being an elevator mechanic was sometimes stressful work, but that it usually did not involve heavy labor. The supervisor had not worked on an elevator in eight years.

The only medical proof came from the testimony of the employee's treating physician, Dr. Quinn Capers, a cardiologist. Dr. Capers first met the employee when he was admitted to the emergency room following the accident. He diagnosed the employee as having acute myocardial infarction and cardiac arrest. Dr. Capers testified that the employee had coronary artery disease, which is a disease that develops over time. Dr. Capers further testified that although he did not know for certain what precipitated the heart attack, it was "possible" the physical demands of the employee's job caused it. When Dr. Capers was asked the question, "Even though you are not certain his physical activities that day caused the myocardial infarction, could his work activities have caused it?" he answered "Yes." Dr. Capers testified at least four different times that the employee's work activities could have caused his heart attack, although "we never know for certain." Dr. Capers also stated that the employee was at risk for heart disease because he smoked cigarettes, was on medication for elevated cholesterol, and had a family history of heart problems.

The trial court found that the employee's job entailed carrying a heavy toolbox from his vehicle to the elevator power facility or the location of a stalled elevator. The trial court also found that in order for the employee to perform his job he had to climb stairs, climb on top of elevator cars, and climb in and out of elevator shafts. The trial court further found that the employee serviced or repaired nine elevators on the day that he suffered the heart attack and thirteen elevators the day before. Relying upon Dr. Capers' testimony that the employee's heart attack could have resulted from the physical exertion of his job, the trial court determined that the employee's death arose out of his employment. Accordingly, the employee's widow and son were awarded death benefits, funeral expenses, and medical expenses. The employer's appeal was argued before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3), but transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision.

The employer contends before this Court that the plaintiffs are not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because the employee was not physically exerting himself when he suffered the heart attack, but was merely driving home in clear weather. The employer argues that there is no proof of a specific act that precipitated the employee's heart attack while he was driving, and that his work activities the day of the attack and the day prior to the attack did not include physically strenuous activity. The employer further argues that Dr. Caper's testimony is insufficient to causally connect the employee's heart attack to his employment activities given that Dr. Capers testified that the cause of the heart attack was coronary artery disease and that the precise triggering event was unknown. The employer contends that allowing the trial court's judgment to stand would be tantamount to adopting a rule allowing any employee to recover who happens to suffer a heart attack while on the job. For the reasons explained below, we disagree.

Analysis

The standard of review in a case such as this is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2) (2003 Supp.). When issues regarding credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are before a reviewing court, considerable deference must be accorded the trial court's factual findings. Krick v. City of Lawrenceburg, 945 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tenn.1997). However, this Court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and credibility of expert testimony when the medical proof is presented by deposition, as it was here, since we are in the same position as the trial judge to evaluate such testimony. Id.

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