Krick v. City of Lawrenceburg
| Decision Date | 12 May 1997 |
| Citation | 945 S.W.2d 709 |
| Parties | Larry KRICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF LAWRENCEBURG, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
James A. Hopper, Hopper & Plunk, P.C., Savannah, for Defendant-Appellee.
Ben Boston, Christopher V. Sockwell, Boston, Bates & Holt, Lawrenceburg, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
We granted the motion for review to determine whether a policeman's coronary artery disease arose out of his employment for the City of Lawrenceburg. The Lawrence County Circuit Court found that the police officer sustained a compensable injury in the course and scope of his employment with the City of Lawrenceburg. On appeal, the Special Workers' Compensation Panel reversed and dismissed the case, finding no compensable injury. After carefully examining the record, we affirm the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case dismissed.
The proof is summarized as follows:
The plaintiff, Larry Krick, aged 44, worked as a police officer for the City of Lawrenceburg since 1981. On August 24, 1993, Krick was on routine patrol when he received a call that a woman had been shot and that her husband was holding a weapon on her. Krick and another police officer went to the residence of the woman and kicked in the front door to gain access to the house. As they entered the house, Krick drew his revolver. He and his fellow officer could only see about two feet in front of them, because the house was littered with boxes and debris. The officers were forced to crawl through the house to try to find the woman because of the accumulated boxes. They found the woman in a back bedroom lying on the bed. The woman had not been shot. No one else was in the house.
After the incident, Krick said that he was "nervous" and "tense." He experienced shortness of breath and had chest pain. Krick reported the pain to his supervisor, who advised him to seek medical attention. Krick then went to Baptist Hospital in Nashville, where he was seen by Dr. Charles Mayes, a cardiologist. Dr. Mayes diagnosed coronary artery disease. Krick later underwent quadruple bypass surgery performed by Dr. Robert Hardin, a cardiovascular surgeon. After approximately nine weeks, Krick returned to work. After returning to work, Krick was promoted to lieutenant, and one month before the trial, he was promoted to captain. At the time of the trial, Krick was the second ranking police officer on the Lawrenceburg force and handled administration for the department when the chief of police was absent.
Krick testified that he had never been told that he had coronary artery disease prior to August 1993. He said that he had some hypertension, which he described as a "borderline thing." Krick was on medication for the high blood pressure, and stated that it was under control most of the time. He also said that he had successfully passed physical examinations before going to work for the police department in July 1981. Approximately one week prior to the incident on August 24, 1993, Krick became extremely hot and experienced shortness of breath, but no chest pain, while mowing grass along a riverbank. He had to lie down in a recliner until he cooled off. He then resumed mowing the yard.
The medical proof consisted of the testimony of several physicians by deposition and is summarized as follows:
Dr. Haresh H. Khatri, a doctor of internal medicine, testified that he had treated the plaintiff since 1988 and that he had prescribed medication for Krick's hypertension. He further stated that the plaintiff smoked one to two packs of cigarettes per day, and as early as 1991, he had diagnosed the plaintiff as having high cholesterol. When asked whether Krick's occupation as a police officer caused the blocked arteries, which resulted in the plaintiff experiencing angina 1, Dr. Khatri stated that the plaintiff had several risk factors for coronary artery disease, including smoking, hypertension and elevated cholesterol. He further stated that activity generally does not cause coronary artery disease, but activity can bring on a heart attack or angina, a symptom of blockage of the arteries. He finally conceded that he did not know what part job stress played in the plaintiff's heart disease.
Dr. H.L. Thomas, a family practitioner, testified that he had treated Krick since 1978 and had not found any evidence that the plaintiff had coronary artery disease. He stated that, in his opinion, stress could lead to a coronary spasm, which could cause a complete blockage of the arteries. He stated that activity does not cause coronary artery disease, but could cause a coronary spasm.
Dr. Robert Hardin, the surgeon who performed Krick's bypass surgery, testified that prior to the surgery Krick had a 90 percent blockage of the left main artery, 70 percent blockage of the mid-left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the first obtuse marginal artery, and complete occlusion of the right coronary artery. He also testified that there were multiple factors involved in Krick's coronary artery disease, and that stress was one of the factors. Dr. Hardin testified that after his recovery, Krick had sustained a 15 percent impairment based on the Fourth Edition of the Guidelines to Permanent Impairment, published by the American Medical Association.
Dr. Laurence A. Grossman, a Nashville cardiologist, did not treat Krick, but reviewed his medical records and the depositions of the plaintiff and Drs. Khatri and Hardin. Dr. Grossman stated that the plaintiff had "long-standing coronary heart disease," as demonstrated by the cardiac catheterization and coronary arteriographic study performed by Dr. Mayes. He testified that the three main factors establishing coronary heart disease are cigarette smoking, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia 2. Dr. Grossman emphasized that Krick did not have a heart attack, but had severe angina, which resulted from the blocked arteries. Dr. Grossman testified that the August 24, 1993 incident did not cause or aggravate Krick's coronary artery disease. The stress may have aggravated the symptoms of the disease, the angina, but did not cause the disease.
After considering the evidence, the trial court found that Krick's coronary artery disease arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment, and that he had sustained a 37 1/2 percent vocational occupational disability.
On appeal, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel found that the evidence preponderates against the finding that the plaintiff's coronary artery disease arose out of his employment. The Panel therefore reversed and dismissed the case. We granted the motion for full court review and now affirm the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law for the reasons articulated below.
In workers' compensation cases, the scope of review in this Court on issues of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2)(Supp.1996); Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn.1989). Considerable deference must be accorded the trial court's factual findings on issues related to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn.1987). However, where the issues involve expert medical testimony and all the medical proof is contained in the record by deposition, as it is in this case, then this Court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and credibility of that testimony, since we are in the same position as the trial judge. Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 676-77 (Tenn.1991). With these principles in mind, we review the record to determine whether the evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court.
In support of his position that his heart disease was an accidental injury suffered during the course of his employment, Krick relies upon the statutory presumption of causation contained in Tenn.Code Ann. § 7-51-201(a)(1). The statute "establishe[s] a presumption that any impairment of health of [a] law enforcement officer[...
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