Clark v. Riehl
| Decision Date | 30 May 1950 |
| Parties | CLARK v. RIEHL et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Ropke, Goldstein, Lampe, & Poynter, Louisville, for appellant.
William F. Clarke, Freeman L. Robinson, Randolph A. Brown, Louisville, for appellees.
VAN SANT, Commissioners.
On September 30, 1949, a group of persons, being the owners of more than fifty one per centum of the property abutting upon Fairy Drive and Elfin Avenues, public, but not County or State, roads in Jefferson County outside of Louisville, filed a petition in the Jefferson County Court for the creation of a public road district under Chapter 184, KRS. The district, if established, would commence on Fairy Drive 140 feet east of its intersection with Chenowith Lane and extend eastwardly to the intersection of Fairy Drive with Chippawa Trail, an approximate distance of 1600 feet, and on Elfin Avenue it would commence at a point approximately 763 feet east of its intersection with Chenowith Lane and extend eastwardly to its intersection with Chippawa Trail an approximate distance of 900 feet. Neither the beginning point of the proposed district on Fairy Drive nor that on Elfin Avenue is at an intersection of either of those streets with any other street, road, or thoroughfare; each beginning point, however commences at the terminal point of an existing pavement in the course of each of the roads mentioned in the description of the district.
Appellants, who are owners of property abutting upon the roads comprising the district, demurred specially to the jurisdiction of the Court, filed a general demurrer to the petition, and answered, protesting the creation of the district. Evidence was heard on the protest and judgment entered by the County Court in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Four arguments are advanced in support of appellants' contention that the judgment should be reversed. In view of our conclusion in respect to the first point argued, it is unnecessary for us to discuss the other three. The first contention is that the petition fatally is defective and the judgment creating the district is erroneous because the district, as described in the petition and which was incorporated by reference in the judgment, does not comply with the requirements of KRS 184.020 in respect to boundary lines. That Section reads:
(Our emphasis.)
In many cases, from the earliest decisions of this Court to now, we have construed the words 'shall' and 'must' as the case may have been, to have the meaning of 'may' and 'might', where the context indicates such was the intention of the Legislature or the draftsman of the instrument under consideration at the time. But where other words are used in connection with 'shall,' 'must,' 'may' or 'might,' which clearly indicate mandatory or directory construction, as the case may be, we have never ignored the force of the descriptive or qualifying language.
KRS 184.020,...
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State v. K.E.L.
...descriptive or qualifying language.’ " Stringer v. Realty Unlimited, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Ky. 2002) (quoting Clark v. Riehl, 313 Ky. 142, 230 S.W.2d 626, 627 (1950) ). In determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory, "it is the legislative intent, rather than supposed words ......
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Wikle v. Boyd
..."may not" have consistently held that the phrase is mandatory and not permissive or discretionary.’) (quoting Clark v. Riehl, 313 Ky. 142, 230 S.W.2d 626, 627 (1950) ); In re Denial of Application for Issuance of One Original (New) On–Premises Consumption Beer/Wine License, 267 Mont. 298, 8......
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In Re Donald Brandt, Bankruptcy No. 3:09-bk-08066.
...‘may not’ have consistently held that the phrase is mandatory and not permissive or discretionary.”) (quoting Clark v. Riehl, 313 Ky. 142, 230 S.W.2d 626, 627 (1950)); In re Denial of Application for Issuance of One Original (New) On-Premises Consumption Beer/Wine License, 267 Mont.298, 883......
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Vandross v. Ellisor
...to the word "must", Bateman v. Smith, 183 Tenn. 541, 194 S.W.2d 336, and is to be given an imperative construction. Clark v. Riehl, 313 Ky. 142, 230 S.W.2d 626; 39 Words and Phrases, Shall at 111. Here, then, the statute regulating the time for filing an intention of candidacy for the offic......