Clark v. Small

Decision Date25 October 1926
Docket Number11674.
Citation250 P. 385,80 Colo. 227
PartiesCLARK v. SMALL.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Department 1.

Error to District Court, Rio Grande County; Jesse C. Wiley, Judge.

Action by Perry G. Small against W. J. Clark. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error and applies for supersedeas.

Supersedeas denied, and judgment affirmed.

George M. Corlett and James P. Veerkamp, both of Monte Vista, for plaintiff in error.

Moses &amp Ellithorp, of Alamosa, for defendant in error.

BURKE J.

These parties appeared in reverse order in the trial court and will be hereinafter so designated. Plaintiff brought this action demanding $1,756.60 actual damages and $1,500 exemplary damages, for injuries received to person and property arising from an automobile collision. The jury returned a verdict in his favor for $1,250 actual damages and $100 exemplary damages. To review the judgment thereupon entered, defendant prosecutes this writ, and asks that it be made a supersedeas.

The rules of the road governing automobile travel on public highways in this state provide, among other things:

'(b) Vehicles shall travel upon the right side of public highways unless the road ahead on the left side is clear and unobstructed for at least 100 yards. * * *
'(c) Vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the right. * * *
'(d) Vehicles overtaking other vehicles proceeding in the same direction shall pass to the left thereof. * * * It shall be the duty of the driver or operator of a motor vehicle about to overtake another to give a suitable signal audible to the driver or operator of the vehicle to be passed. * * *
'(e) Two vehicles which are passing each other in opposite directions shall have the right of way, and no other vehicle to the rear of either of such two vehicles shall pass or attempt to pass such two vehicles, while they are passing * * *'

Section 1270, p. 498, C. L. 1921.

A certain Ford automobile was traveling westward at a low rate of speed. Plaintiff, in his car, was traveling eastward approaching the Ford. Defendant, in his car, was behind the Ford, traveling west. In this situation defendant, it was charged, attempted to pass the Ford while plaintiff was within the forbidden 100-yard limit, and the collision resulted. The principal question, of course, was the alleged negligence of defendant; but the specific question was whether or not plaintiff, at the time of defendant's passage, was within 100 yards of the Ford car.

It seems perfectly clear, from an examination of the record that this is but another case of a disputed question of fact, decided by a jury upon conflicting evidence, and, as it is not contended that the trial court committed any...

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19 cases
  • Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • February 4, 1987
    ...See also Foster v. Redding, 97 Colo. 4, 45 P.2d 940 (1935); Millington v. Hiedloff, 96 Colo. 581, 45 P.2d 937 (1935); Clark v. Small, 80 Colo. 227, 250 P. 385 (1926). In Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir.1977), we referred to part of the foregoing language in Fanstiel and app......
  • Falls v. Mortensen
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • March 21, 1956
    ...(defendant) knew, or should have known, that the injury would probably result, the requirements of the statute are met.' Clark v. Small, 80 Colo. 227, 250 P. 385, 386. * * * * * 'One who is willfully and wantonly negligent may not be intoxicated, but one who, sufficiently under the influenc......
  • Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp.
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • December 2, 1985
    ...from his acts." Frick, 198 Colo. at 511, 602 P.2d at 854, citing Foster v. Redding, 97 Colo. 4, 45 P.2d 940 (1935); Clark v. Small, 80 Colo. 227, 250 P. 385 (1926). The question of whether the evidence is sufficient to support an award of exemplary damages is one of law; whether such damage......
  • Bradley v. Guess
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • September 14, 1989
    ...party's rights and feelings." The term "wanton," in this context, means nothing more than "willful and intentional." See Clark v. Small, 80 Colo. 227, 250 P. 385 (1926). In its amendments to the exemplary damages statute, Colo.Sess.Laws 1986, ch. 106, § 13-21-102 at 675, the General Assembl......
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