Clark v. Smith, 24802

• Decision Date: 07 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 24802,24802
• Parties: William Patrick CLARK v. Lamont SMITH, Warden.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 790

164 S.E.2d 790

224 Ga. 766

William Patrick CLARK v. Lamont SMITH, Warden.

No. 24802.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 7, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1968.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Constitutional questions made by the appellant in regard to the composition of the grand and traverse juries indicting and trying him were decided, adversely to his contentions, in Massey v. Smith, 224 Ga. --, 164 S.E.2d 786.

2. The appellant's death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment, and questions in connection with the imposition of a death sentence have no relevancy to his case.

3. The removal for cause of jurors conscientiously opposed to capital punishment does not render a sentence illegal, where the death penalty has subsequently been commuted to life imprisonment.

4. The confession of the appellant, which was introduced in evidence on his trial for the crime of rape, did not raise a clear inference of his insanity, and did not require a charge on insanity. Since this confession is the only basis for the questions made on the laws of Georgia pertaining to competency in criminal cases, he has no standing to question the constitutionality of these laws. A deposition excluded from evidence, relating to his sanity, was not relevant to the questions made in the habeas corpus action.

5. No question was made by the appellant on his trial that his confession was coerced. He was apprised of substantially all of his rights as outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, prior to giving his confession, and to strictly apply to his case the rules of the Miranda case, which was announced one day prior to his trial, would impose an unjustifiable burden on the administration of justice.

(a) The voluntariness of the appellant's confession was not challenged, and there was no necessity for a separate hearing before the trial judge on the question of voluntariness.

6. The appellant's appeal is proceeding in forma pauperis in this court and he does not show that he was denied due process of law or equal protection of the laws by the order of the trial judge denying his right to appeal in forma pauperis.

7. There was no error in remanding the appellant to the custody of the warden.

Peter E. Rindskopf, Howard Moore, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, B. D. Dubberly, Jr., Glennville, Courtney Stanton, Deputy Asst. Attys. Gen., Marion O. Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

MOBLEY, Justice.

William Patrick Clark was convicted of the offense of rape and sentenced to death, and on appeal to this court his conviction was affirmed. Clark v. State, 222 Ga. 802, 152 S.E.2d 692. His sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. Thereafter he filed a petition for habeas corpus. After a hearing, he was remanded to the custody of the warden, and he appeals from this order, enumerating fourteen alleged errors.

1. Some of the alleged errors are almost identical with some of those enumerated in Massey v. Smith, 224 Ga. 721, 164 S.E.2d 786. The appellant here, as in the Massey case, is a white male. The Massey case decided, adversely to the contentions of the appellant in the present case, questions identical with alleged errors 1 and 2, complaining of the exclusion of persons of the Negro race, indigents, and women from the grand and traverse juries indicting and trying the appellant (see Headnote 1 in the Massey case); and alleged error 14, complaining that the court refused to admit certain evidence relating to the composition of the jury (see Headnote 2 in the Massey case).

2. Alleged error 4, contending that the sentence of death for the crime of rape is unconstitutional; 6, complaining that the Code section fixing the punishment for rape as death, unless the jury recommends mercy, is unconstitutional; and 7, contending that the sentencing of a white man to death for rape is arbitrary and erratic, were all decided, adversely to the contentions of the appellant, by rulings in the Massey case, supra. (See Headnotes 3 and 4). Furthermore, in the present case the appellant's death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment, and questions in connection with the imposition of a death sentence have no relevancy to his case.

3. In alleged error 3 the appellant contends that his sentence was illegal because the jury which sentenced him was composed exclusively of persons having no scruples against the imposition of capital punishment, all of those with such scruples having been eliminated pursuant to Code § 59-806(4). In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, it was held that a death sentence cannot constitutionally be executed if imposed by a jury from which have been removed for cause those who are opposed to capital punishment or have conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty. This case did not hold that the judgment of conviction was illegal, but only that the sentence of death returned by such a jury could not be executed. The appellant in this case has had his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment, and the sentence under which he is now serving is not illegal under the rulings in the Witherspoon case. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797.

4. In assignments of error 5, 8, and 9, the appellant contends that he was denied due process of law and equal protection of the laws under the Federal Constitution because: he could only have been found fit to stand trial or be convicted under Code § 26-301, which is unconstitutionally vague and uncertain; he was directly tried on the issue of rape, when his confession raised clear inferences of lack of capacity and sanity, instead of being first tried on the issue of sanity alone; and the trial judge failed to charge the jury on the general issue of sanity despite the fact that his confession raised clear inferences of lack of capacity and sanity. Assignment of error 12 Contends that his conviction violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution because the trial judge refused to admit into evidence the deposition of Dr. C. Downing Tait on the question of the appellant's sanity.

The denial to an accused person of the right to an adjudication as to whether he was insane at the time of the commission of an offense, or is insane at the time of the trial, is the denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 71 S.Ct. 146, 95 L.Ed. 141; Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 75 S.Ct. 145, 99 L.Ed. 135; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1967 (Ga.L.1967, pp. 835, 836, Code Ann. § 50-127) provides: 'Rights conferred or secured by the Constitution of the United States shall not be deemed to have been waived unless it is shown that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege which relinquishment or abandonment was participated in by the party and was done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.' We will therefore consider these enumerations of error to determine whether the appellant has been denied any right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. See Mobley v. Smith, 224 Ga. 297, 161 S.E.2d 834.

The appellant was defended by court appointed counsel on his trial for rape. No plea of insanity was filed, no evidence was introduced on the question of his sanity, and no question was made on the appeal to this court as to the sanity of the appellant. There is no allegation in the petition for habeas corpus that the appellant was not adequately represented by counsel at the trial, or that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, or insane at the time of his trial. The contention made is that his confession, which was introduced in evidence, raised clear inferences of lack of capacity and sanity, and that it was therefore erroneous for the trial court to fail to try him separately on the issue of his sanity alone, and to fail to charge the jury on the issue of sanity. These assignments pertain only to the legality of the conviction under the evidence before the trial court.

The excerpts from the confession which are asserted to raise clear inferences of the appellant's insanity are as follows: 'I refused on the ground that she would call the police and that I had already decided to commit the heinous crimes with which I now stand accused * * * This part of the crime was committed with the express intention of receiving the supreme penalty of the State of Georgia for this type of crime.' Counsel for the appellant argues that these excerpts show that the appellant committed a capital felony for the purpose of receiving a death penalty, and that this suicidal intent raises an inference that he was insane.

This court has held in a civil case that: 'Suicide will raise no presumption of insanity, and standing alone will not authorize a finding of insanity.' Boney v. Smallwood, 202 Ga. 411, 415, 43 S.E.2d 271, 274. The appellant made a coherent and intelligent confession of the crime committed. The statement in the confession evidencing a suicidal intent was not, within itself, sufficient to raise an issue of insanity so as to require the trial judge to charge on insanity.

Since there was no evidence of insanity on the appellant's trial, and he does not assert in his habeas corpus petition that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense, he was no standing to...