Poore v. State
| Decision Date | 29 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 29S05-9708-PC-470,29S05-9708-PC-470 |
| Parties | Floyd P. POORE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
This case presents the narrow question whether the time limits prescribed by Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(B) apply to a retrial of a habitual offender finding. Because we hold that the time limits are applicable, we grant transfer, vacate the habitual offender finding and accompanying sentence enhancement, and reverse for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On April 6, 1983, defendant Floyd P. Poore set out with Herbert Goodwin to commit a burglary. The two stole several items from a house in rural Hamilton County, but were arrested soon after making their getaway. Poore has been in continuous custody since that day. On April 7, 1983, Poore was charged with aiding, inducing, or causing burglary; and aiding, inducing, or causing theft. Later that year, a jury convicted Poore on both counts and found him to be a habitual offender. On December 22, 1986, this Court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial. Poore v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind.1986). On November 13, 1987, Poore was again convicted of aiding, inducing, or causing burglary, but was acquitted on the theft charge. This jury also found him to be a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Poore to twenty years enhanced by thirty years for the habitual offender finding, for a total term of fifty years imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Poore v. State, 577 N.E.2d 277 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (unpublished table decision).
In 1990, a postconviction court vacated Poore's 1970 conviction for theft, which was one of the predicate felonies used to support Poore's habitual offender enhancement. On October 24, 1991, Poore filed a "motion to correct erroneous sentence" in which he attacked the enhancement as invalid due to the vacation of one of its predicate felonies. Finding that this was not the proper procedural mechanism for Poore's claim, a trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals upheld this determination on the merits, but remanded and ordered that Poore's motion be dismissed without prejudice so that Poore could challenge the enhancement in postconviction relief. Poore v. State, 613 N.E.2d 478 (Ind.Ct.App.1993).
On November 30, 1993, Poore petitioned for postconviction relief on the ground that the habitual offender enhancement was no longer valid as a result of the vacation of the 1970 theft conviction. On April 11, 1994, the postconviction court granted Poore's petition for relief, vacated the enhancement, and ordered the habitual offender count set for retrial. On May 10, 1994 Poore, acting pro se, moved for a speedy trial and asserted that he had a right under Criminal Rule 4(B) to a trial within seventy days. 1 On May 16, 1994, the court set the case for trial on August 9, 1994--ninety-one days after Poore's May 10th motion. On June 6, 1994, Poore objected to this trial date, noted the date of his speedy-trial request, and again demanded an early trial under Rule 4(B), but the motion was denied. On July 12, 1994, Poore filed yet another pro se motion objecting to the August trial date and asserted:
On July 19, 1994--seventy days after his speedy trial request--Poore filed a motion for discharge in which he argued that he was being incarcerated illegally. Poore contended that, as of April 6, 1993, he had completely served his sentence on the underlying burglary conviction and therefore was being held only under the vacated enhancement. The trial court orally denied the motion from the bench on the first day of the retrial. At that point, an attorney had been appointed to represent Poore. In a colloquy with the court on the first day of trial, counsel maintained that Rule 4 should have been available to Poore because he was incarcerated and being tried under an information. The court rejected this argument and stated that Poore's speedy-trial request under Rule 4(B) was "somewhat dubious" because, in the court's view, the seventy-day time limit did not apply to retrials. On August 10, 1994, a jury found Poore to be a habitual offender. On October 21, 1994, the trial court sentenced Poore to twenty years on the burglary charge enhanced by thirty years for the habitual offender finding. The court gave Poore 4219 days credit for continuous time served since April 6, 1983. Poore appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Poore v. State, 660 N.E.2d 591 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), reh'g denied.
Applicability of Criminal Rule 4(B)
Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(B) provides that "[i]f any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion...." Ind.Crim.Rule 4(B)(1). The Rule then details a number of conditions that excuse the failure to bring the defendant to trial within seventy days. Concisely stated, the exceptions are: (1) the defendant caused the delay; or (2) the court's calendar was too congested to hold the trial during that time. Id.; Jackson v. State, 663 N.E.2d 766, 767-68 (Ind.1996). There are no signs in the record that either of these exceptions explains the delay in this case and the parties do not contend otherwise. If the trial court had made a finding of congestion as required by Rule 4(B), that determination would be presumed to be valid on appeal. Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind.1995). However, this did not occur and Poore, far from delaying the proceeding, appears to have done all he could to expedite it. The State does not contend that Poore's motion was untimely. Poore argues that he was entitled to the benefit of Rule 4(B) and that he must be discharged because the Rule was not complied with here. The State responds that Rule 4(B) does not apply to retrials and that Poore, in any event, received a trial within a reasonable time. 2
The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, held that Rule 4(B) was not available to Poore because the rule is inapplicable to sentencing proceedings. Poore, 660 N.E.2d at 594-95. In reaching a different result today, we emphasize function over form. A habitual offender determination, although relating to sentencing in terms of its result and technically not a separate offense, is a pending criminal proceeding that has several hallmarks of a trial. And the restraint on Poore's liberty that was imposed pending the outcome of that determination is precisely why Rule 4(B) guarantees a speedy trial to an incarcerated defendant.
First we deal with the plain language of the Rule. The parties have not directed us to any cases, and the Court of Appeals cited none, elaborating the meaning of the phrase "held in jail on an indictment or affidavit" as used Rule 4(B). Although not entirely without ambiguity, this element clearly contemplates a defendant in custody on a pending criminal charge. Poore's circumstances satisfied this requirement. Indeed, the State maintained at trial that Poore was being tried under the original information that was filed in 1983. This issue arose in the context of Poore's contention, originally made in his motion to discharge and renewed at trial, that a new information had to be filed and a new arraignment had to be held on the habitual offender count. The trial court denied Poore's motion on the ground that Poore was being tried under the original information and had been arraigned when he was first charged. The court referred to the habitual offender retrial as a "continuation" of the initial prosecution. At the State's request, the vacated 1970 theft conviction was stricken from the information and the trial proceeded under the information as amended. We agree with the dissent in the Court of Appeals that Poore was "being held upon the habitual charge as set forth in the indictment or information." Poore, 660 N.E.2d at 597 (citation omitted).
The more vexing question is whether the retrial of the habitual offender count was a "trial" within the meaning of Rule 4(B). We find no authority on what constitutes a "trial" in this context and application of Rule 4(B) to habitual offender proceedings is a question of first impression in Indiana. Nonetheless, this issue is decided against the backdrop of several settled and basic principles. For example, it is well established that a habitual offender finding is neither a separate offense nor a separate conviction. Rather, it is merely an enhancement of a sentence for one felony due to the defendant's commission of at least two prior unrelated felonies. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 439 N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ind.1982), modified on other grounds by Bailey v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1260 (Ind.1985), reh'g denied. Although habitual offender proceedings ultimately relate to the length of the sentence, the determination that a defendant is a habitual offender carries with it certain protections normally associated with trials. One feature is the heightened burden of proof; the State must prove the existence of two prior unrelated felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. IND.CODE § 35-50-2-8(d) (Supp.1995). As the Court of Appeals here observed, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars reprosecution of a habitual offender charge where the State has failed to prove that status due to insufficient evidence. 3 See, e.g., Bell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind.1993), reh'g denied. And...
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