Clark v. Del. Valley Sch.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 3:18-cv-00660,3:18-cv-00660
• Citation: 450 F.Supp.3d 551
• Parties: Rebecca CLARK, Scott Siegfried, and Ivan Santiago, Plaintiffs, v. DELAWARE VALLEY SCHOOL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

450 F.Supp.3d 551

Rebecca CLARK, Scott Siegfried, and Ivan Santiago, Plaintiffs,

v.DELAWARE VALLEY SCHOOL, Defendant.

No. 3:18-cv-00660

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed March 30, 2020

Gerald John Hanchulak, Hanchulak Law Offices PC, Clarks Summit, PA, for Plaintiffs.

John G. Audi, Jr., Sweet Stevens Katz & Williams LLP, Pittston, PA, Justin D. Barbetta, Sweet Stevens, Katz & Williams LLP, New Britain, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR., M.J.

This matter is before the court on the cross motions for partial summary judgment filed by the defendant, Delaware Valley School District, and by the plaintiffs. (Doc. 20; Doc. 22). On March 23, 2018, the plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint seeking relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. and under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 260.1.

I. Statement of Facts

The defendant Delaware Valley School District (the "District") is a school district within the Middle District of Pennsylvania where its principal place of business is located in Milford, Pennsylvania. The District authorized the creation of a school police force in the fall of 2007. The plaintiffs are Rebecca Clark, Scott Siegfried, and Ivan Santiago, and at all relevant times, they were school police officers employed by the District. The plaintiffs regularly worked five eight-hour shifts weekly, plus an uncompensated half-hour lunch each day, and the plaintiffs were not completely released from their duties during the lunch half-hour. In late November 2017, the police officers began working eight-hour days, rather than the eight and one-half hour days. In addition, the plaintiffs were not provided lockers and as a result they were required to spend approximately thirty minutes of uncompensated time daily changing into and out of their uniforms and protective gear before and after work. Plaintiff Clark alleged that she accumulated approximately 120 of uncompensated lunch time while the plaintiffs Siegfried and Santiago accumulated approximately 285 hours of uncompensated lunch time through March 23, 2018. The plaintiff Clark accumulated approximately 100 hours of uncompensated time dedicated to covering special events while the plaintiffs Siegfried and Santiago accumulated approximately 180 hours of uncompensated time dedicated to covering special events. Plaintiff Clark has accumulated 52 hours of uncompensated time donning and doffing her uniform and gear while plaintiffs Siegfried and Santiago have accumulated approximately 270 hours of uncompensated time donning and doffing their uniforms and protective gear. All three plaintiffs accumulated approximately 75 hours of uncompensated travel time going to and returning from uncompensated after-school events. The plaintiffs’ complaint consists of a claim for unpaid overtime compensation, an additional amount as liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. , and under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 260.1. The plaintiffs alleged that on November 22, 2017, the District provided the plaintiffs with a memorandum dated February 15, 2007 which stated that the plaintiffs are exempt employees under the FLSA.

The District filed its motion for partial summary judgment seeking determinations from this court that (1) the FLSA does not apply to this case until August 22, 2016, because prior to that date, the plaintiffs were part of a school police force of less than five officers; (2) The plaintiffs’ claims for liquidated damages are precluded because the district reasonably sought out the advice of counsel, explained the facts to counsel, and relied on counsel's advice in maintaining the plaintiff's classification as exempt employees; and (3) that the plaintiffs be precluded from seeking damages for time related to "donning and doffing" their uniforms and gear.

II. Legal Standards

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" only if the evidence "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences "should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. , 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).

The party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that "the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

"The rule is no different where there are cross-motions for summary judgment." Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia , 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008).

Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist.

Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc. , 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968). Thus, "when presented with cross motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider the motions separately, and view the evidence presented for each motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ. , 63 F. Supp. 3d. 418, 433 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). "[E]ach movant must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists; if both parties fail to carry their respective burdens, the court must deny [both] motions." Quarles v. Palakovich , 736 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc. , 542 F.3d 1007, 1023 (3d Cir. 2008) ).

III. Discussion

A. The District's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

The District seeks the following rulings from the court: (1) The FLSA does not apply to this case until August 22, 2016, because before that date the plaintiffs were members of the school police force which consisted of less than five officers; (2) the plaintiffs’ claims for liquidated damages are precluded because the District reasonably sought the advice of counsel and relied on counsel's advice when it classified the plaintiffs as exempt employees; and (3) the plaintiffs are precluded from seeking damages for time related to "donning and doffing" of their uniforms and gear.

1. The Application of the FLSA

The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") was enacted in 1938 to protect covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours. Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp., 308 F. Supp. 3d 831, 840 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (citations omitted). To accomplish this goal, "[t]he FLSA establishes federal minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be modified by contract." Id. Among these guarantees is a section stipulating that covered employers may not employ any employee "for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment ... at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." Id. An employer who violates this section may be held liable for backpay, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees.

The District maintains that its school police force was comprised of less than five officers until August 22, 2016, and therefore the FLSA's maximum hour requirements in any workweek did not apply until that date. The plaintiffs argue that the District employed five officers at all times material to the plaintiffs’ complaint, i.e. March 23, 2015, through August 22, 2016. The FLSA states in pertinent part as follows:

The provisions of [ 29 U.S.C. § 207 ] shall not apply with respect to—

(20) Any employee of a public agency who in any workweek ... is employed in law enforcement activities ... if the public agency employs during the workweek less than 5 employees ... in law enforcement activities....

29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(20).

Before a public employer may qualify for the § 207(k) exemption, however, two things must be true: "(1) the employees at issue must be engaged in fire protection or law enforcement within the meaning of the statute and (2) the employer must have established a qualifying work period." Calvao v. Town of Framingham , 599 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing O'Brien v. Town of Agawam , 350 F.3d 279, 290 (1st Cir. 2003) ). The employer bears the burden of proving that these conditions are satisfied. Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc. , 722 F.2d 1141, 1143 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that "[t]he burden of proof is on the employer to establish an [FLSA] exemption"); see also Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. , 361 U.S. 388, 392, 80 S.Ct. 453, 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960). To meet this burden, the employer must demonstrate "that the employee and/or employer come ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the exemption's terms." Lawrence , 527 F.3d at 310 (observing that FLSA exemptions should be construed narrowly and against the employer (citing Arnold , 361 U.S. at 392, 80 S.Ct. 453 )).

The District contends that its school police force was comprised of...