Quarles v. Palakovich

Decision Date10 August 2010
Docket NumberNo. 3:07-cv-1905,3:07-cv-1905
Citation736 F.Supp.2d 941
PartiesIan QUARLES, Plaintiff, v. Warden John A. PALAKOVICH, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

Ian Quarles, Huntingdon, PA, pro se.

Gregory R. Neuhauser, Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

YVETTE KANE, Chief Judge.

Presently pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Martin Carlson addressing the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 102), and the objections of Defendants Bigalow, Crum, Heaster, Moschgat, and Workenger. (Doc. No. 103.) The Court will adopt the recommendation in full, but will write briefly to address Defendants' objections.1

This case concerns a civil action for damages brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, Pennsylvania, where Defendants were employed. Plaintiff claims that on October 12, 2005, a portion of the drywall ceiling in the prison shower fell down on him and caused injury to his head and back. Plaintiff contends that Defendants were aware of the shower cell ceiling's deterioration but that they continued to use the shower cell for prisoners until it collapsed and caused Plaintiff's injury.

The factual details and legal standards governing this case are comprehensively set forth in Judge Carlson's report and need not be reproduced here. In his report, Judge Carlson recommends that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendants Palakovich, Smeal, and Reihart but be denied to the remaining Defendants. In denying summary judgment, Judge Carlson finds that pursuant to theEighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard, there is a genuine issue of material fact over whether the remaining Defendants had subjective knowledge of the condition of the shower cell ceiling at the time of its collapse.2

Defendants contend that Judge Carlson erred in finding a genuine issue of material fact over the subjective element of the deliberate indifference standard. Specifically, Defendants assert:

Viewing the material facts of this case in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is apparent that he cannot meet the subjective element of the deliberate indifference standard. Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff is able to prove that he suffered an injury as a result of the drywall falling upon him, he cannot point to evidence demonstrating that the objecting defendants were actually aware of a risk of harm to plaintiff and they chose to ignore that risk. This absence of proof on a critical element of his claim, and upon which he would have the burden of proof at trial, renders all other facts immaterial.

(Doc. No. 104 at 5 (citation omitted).) As a result, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's allegations do not "cross the line from negligence into deliberate indifference." ( Id.)

This line of argument by Defendants is directly addressed by Judge Carlson in his report.3 Disagreeing with Defendants, Judge Carlson concludes that "[o]n the present factual record ... there are unresolved questions concerning the state of knowledge of the remaining corrections Defendants regarding the condition of this shower cell ceiling at the time of the ceiling collapse which preclude summary judgment at this time." (Doc. No. 102 at 19-20.) Specifically, Judge Carlson points to Plaintiff's contention that he personally observed 4 the individually-named Defendants inspecting the sagging ceiling in the shower cell. As a result, Judge Carlson concludes that Plaintiff's statement "creates a factual issue regarding the subjective knowledge of unit staff regarding this dangerous condition, a factual issue that may well turn on credibility determinationsand falls outside the province of a summary judgment motion." ( Id. at 20.)

Therefore, by continuing to assert that Plaintiff relies only on "John Does" who "must have been aware through inmates or their personal observation" of the condition of the shower cell, ( see Doc. No. 104 at 6), Defendants fail to recognize Plaintiff's contention that he personally saw the named Defendants observing the condition of the shower cell. As stated by Judge Carlson, this statement of personal knowledge "creates a factual issue regarding the subjective knowledge of unit staff regarding this dangerous condition...." (Doc. No. 102 at 20.)

AND NOW, on this 10th day of August 2010, upon consideration of Magistrate Judge Carlson's Report and Recommendation and Defendants' objections, it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT the report is adopted in full. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants Palakovich, Smeal, and Reihart but denied as to the remaining Defendants. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the case be REMANDED to Judge Carlson for further pre-trial management.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARTIN C. CARLSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

This case, which comes before us on cross-motions for summary judgment, calls upon the Court to examine the contours of the Eighth Amendment's constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, we are asked to determine the extent to which the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on correctional officials to protect prisoners from physical hazards in jail due to structural flaws in a prison. In this case these constitutional questions are presented against the backdrop of an episode in which the ceiling of a prison shower is alleged to have collapsed upon an inmate causing him physical injuries.

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case
A. Factual Background

The Plaintiff, Ian Quarles, is a state inmate housed at the State Correctional Institution, Smithfield. In the summer of 2005 Quarles was assigned to F block at SCI Smithfield. While in F block, Quarles used shower cell # 5 on F-block.

According to Quarles, from the time he first began using this facility in July 2005, he and other inmates observed that the ceiling in shower cell # 5 sagged severely. (Docs. 1, 83-3.) Although Quarles acknowledges that he never complained to staff about the condition of the shower ceiling, (Doc. 83-3, p. 32a), Quarles contends that other inmates notified staff on F block of the deteriorating condition of the shower cell ceiling. (Doc. 1.) Quarles also asserts that numerous prison staff were personally observed by him inspecting the sagging ceiling from August through October 2005. (Doc. 86.) Furthermore, Quarles asserts that the subjective awareness of unit staff regarding the decaying condition of the shower cell ceiling was documented by prison officials on October 2, 2005, when prison staff submitted to request for ceiling repairs in this shower unit. (Doc. 1, ¶ 24.)

Despite the fact that corrections officials were allegedly aware that the cell ceiling was sagging, prison staff continued to use shower cell # 5 for inmates up through October 12, 2005. On October 12, 22005 Quarles was using this shower cell to bathe when the sagging ceiling collapsed, striking him and causing injuries to his head and back. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 15-25.)

B. Litigation History

On October 19, 2007, Quarles filed a complaint in federal court arising out of this shower cell ceiling collapse incident. (Doc. 1) In his complaint, Quarles named the warden, deputy warden, prison facility manager, unit manager and four correctional officers as Defendants. ( Id.). Liberally construed, Quarles' complaint alleges that these Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment by exposing him to a foreseeably dangerous physical condition, the sagging shower cell ceiling. ( Id.) The complaint also contains an allegation of negligence on the part of the Defendants. ( Id.) In his complaint Quarles seeks declaratory relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages as a result of the injuries he alleges that he suffered as a consequence of this incident. ( Id.)

On November 10, 2009, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on Quarles' constitutional claims. (Docs. 83, 84.) In their summary judgment motion, the Defendants contend that in this correctional context an Eighth Amendment claim requires a showing of deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety, which in turn requires proof that the individual Defendants were personally and subjectively aware of an excessive risk to inmate safety but knowingly exposed Quarles to that risk. ( Id.) Asserting that Quarles has completely failed to show subjective awareness of the danger of this sagging ceiling by any named Defendant, the Defendants contend that Quarles' complaint fails as a matter of law. ( Id.) Thus, the claimed lack of subjective knowledge of this danger by prison staff is the legal lynchpin of the Defendants' summary judgment motion.

For his part, Quarles has filed his own motion for summary judgment, asserting that he is entitled to a judgment in his favor as a matter of law. (Docs. 86, 88, 89, 94.) In his pleadings Quarles appears to concede that the Eighth Amendment requires proof of deliberate indifference by corrections officials to a physical danger, and acknowledges that such proof requires that prison staff be subjectively aware of some danger to inmates. Quarles argues, however, that "the defendants, except [warden] John A. Palakovich, [Deputy Warden] Paul K. Smeal, and [facilities manager] Donald Reihart, were personally observed entering shower # 5 on unit F for various inspections in the months of August-October 2005." (Doc. 86.) Having asserted in this fashion that the personal knowledge requirement is met as to these Defendants through their inspection of the sagging shower cell ceiling, Quarles seeks a judgment on his behalf as a matter of law. (Doc. 88.)

These cross motions for summary judgment have been fully briefed by the parties (Docs. 84, 86, 93 and 94) and are now ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that summary judgment be GRANTED as to Defe...

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