Clarke v. Ames
Decision Date | 01 April 1929 |
Citation | 267 Mass. 44,165 N.E. 696 |
Parties | CLARKE v. AMES et al. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Weed, Judge.
Action by Charles P. Clarke against Oliver Ames and others, trustees. On plaintiff's exceptions. Exceptions overruled, and judgment for defendants.
J. M. Maloney and M. B. Lynch, both of Boston, for plaintiff.
Peabody, Arnold, Batchelder & Luther, of Boston, for defendants.
This is an action of tort brought by the lessee of an office in a building on Boylston Street, Boston, against the lessors for personal injuries received by the plaintiff by reason of the negligent operation by an employee of the defendants of an elevator in said building in which the plaintiff was a passenger. The case was tried by a judge of the Superior Court without a jury who found the facts, including the fact that the plaintiff, while in the exercise of due care, received injuries due to the negligence of the defendants' agent and servant, and ruled as matter of law that the plaintiff was barred from recovery in this suit by the covenant in the lease. In accordance with this general ruling he denied and granted requests for rulings, and found for the defendants. ‘It was agreed by the parties that if the judge was right in his finding, judgment shall be entered for the defendants on the finding; if he was wrong, judgment shall be entered for the plaintiff for $650 as of the date of the finding.’ The finding for the defendants was right if the judge's ruling that the covenant barred recovery was right. Whether or not this ruling was right is the sole question for determination by this court. This question is here on the plaintiff's exceptions.
For a number of years the plaintiff, who was a dentist, held an office on the third floor of a building on Boylston Street, Boston, under a lease from the defendants. The building was a large office building with numerous tenants. Elevators were provided by the defendants for the use of the tenants and patients or customers of such tenants, and were operated and controlled by the defendants. The original lease to the plaintiff was for a term of one year from April 1, 1924. Each succeeding year it was extended for a term of one year, until finally, under date of February 12, 1927, it was extended to April 1, 1928. This lease provided among other things:
On November 2, 1927, in the afternoon, the plaintiff entered the building on the way to his office, was a passenger in one of the elevators operated by one of the defendants' employees, and was injured by reason of the elevator man's negligence in starting the car as the plaintiff was alighting. The elevator was installed after the last extension of the lease and was of a different type from the previous one.
[1] The judge was right in ruling that the covenant in the lease barred recovery in this suit by the plaintiff.
The language of the lease, given its natural meaning, is broad enough to include an agreement on the part of the lessee to ‘save the Lessor harmless and indemnified’ from liability by reason of the injuries received by the lessee due to the negligence of the defendants' agent and servant in operating the elevator. This language includes expressly liability by reason of ‘any injury, loss or damage’ from ‘any cause’ to ‘any person’ ‘while in transit’ to or from the demised premises upon ‘elevators.’ The words ‘any cause’ are broad enough to include negligence of the lessors or their agents and servants. Nothing in the context indicates a more restricted meaning. On the contrary, if these words were limited to the lessee's neglect or use of the ‘building, or of anything therein,’ they would be superfluous. The words ‘any person’ are broad enough to include the lessee. He was ‘in transit’ to the demised premises upon the elevatorwhen he was injured. The word ‘elevators' included those installed after the last extension of the lease. In respect to its application to the negligence of the lessors and their agents or servants the agreement in...
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...to discharge the right when it arises. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 402, Comment (b). Clarke v. Ames, 267 Mass. 44, 47, 165 N. E. 696. The principle stated in Hastings v. Dickinson, 7 Mass. 153, 155,5 Am. Dec. 34, and quoted and followed in Commissioner of In......
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