Clarke v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 30 November 1929 |
| Citation | 269 Mass. 335,168 N.E. 806 |
| Parties | CLARKE v. TAYLOR. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Bristol County; Wilford D. Gray, Judge.
Action by Harriet Clarke, per pro ami, against Arthur S. Taylor. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled.M. Entin, of Fall River, for plaintiff.
T. F. O'Brien, of New Bedford, for defendant.
The plaintiff brought two actions of tort for injuries sustained as a result of a collision of automobiles. One action was against Sarah L. Harrington, the owner, and Paul Harrington, the operator, of the automobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger. The other was an action against the defendant Taylor, whose automobile the plaintiff contended was parked without lights in the nighttime. The evidence tended to prove that the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding ran into this parked automobile of Taylor. At the trial of the latter case the plaintiff's attorney discontinued the action against Sarah L. Harrington and Paul Harrington.
The plaintiff, in the trial of the case against Taylor, took the position that the automobile in which she was riding was going at a reasonable rate of speed, and that the driver was not careless in failing to see the standing automobile under the control of Taylor. The defendant Taylor introduced in evidence, without objection, the declaration in the case that had been discontinued. In that case specifications had been filed on motion to the effect that the manner in which the defendant was negligent and grossly negligent was in ‘going too fast and in failing to see the automobile which was stopped.’ Counsel for the plaintiff assented to a statement by the judge that the plaintiff's position was that the car in which she was riding was going at a reasonable rate of speed and that the driver was not careless in failing to see the automobile. The judge then admitted the specifications for the limited purpose of aiding the jury in determining what weight they would give the present contention of the plaintiff in view of the fact that she made a different contention in the action which had been adjusted.
[2] The provision of G. L. c. 231, § 87, that ‘pleadings shall not be evidence on the trial, but the allegations therein shall bind the party making them,’ was intended to apply to the trial of the case in which the pleadings were filed. When offered in the trial of another case the...
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