Maney v. Maney

• Decision Date: 05 February 1960
• Citation: 340 Mass. 350,164 N.E.2d 146
• Parties: Laura L. MANEY, Executrix, et al. v. William J. MANEY, Administrator.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 146

164 N.E.2d 146

340 Mass. 350

Laura L. MANEY, Executrix, et al. v. William J. MANEY, Administrator.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 9, 1959.

Decided Feb. 5, 1960.

George A. McLaughlin, Boston (Arthur M. Gilman, Boston, with him), for plaintiff.

Timothy J. McInerney, Boston (Lovell S. Spaulding, Jr., Boston, with him), for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, COUNIHAN, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

This is a bill in equity by Mrs. Maney, executrix of the will of her husband, Clement, and by C. J. Maney Co., Inc. (the corporation), all the shares of which were owned by Clement at his death, against William J. Maney, administrator of the estate of Louis, a brother of Clement. Mrs. Maney intervened as a party plaintiff. Clement died on January 7, 1954. By his will he left $2,500 to Louis. This sum was paid to Louis. The final payment was made in March, 1955, about eleven months prior to Louis's death and about two months after Louis had filed, on January 12 and 17, 1955, in the Probate Court notices of a claim against Clement's estate. On this claim, Louis, new represented by his administrator, brought an action by writ dated January 10, 1955, with an ad damnum of $5,000,000, against the present plaintiffs, Mrs. Maney as Clement's executrix and the corporation, for 'aid, counsel, advice, and assistance' furnished. The present bill was brought to enjoin the prosecution of the action and the claim on the ground that Louis, by taking the $2,500 legacy under Clement's will, elected to receive the benefits of the legacy rather than to prosecute his action and claim. The bill proceeds on the theory that the claim 'if valid * * * will completely wipe out the estate of Clement * * * because the value of the services alleged is greater than * * * the assets in' the estate, that 'the prosecution of the action * * * against the * * * executrix would necessarily thwart the working of the will,' and that Louis's administrator by Louis's 'election * * * is precluded from enforcing any action that would defeat the operation of * * * [the] will.'

Clement's will and the declaration in the action at law brought by Louis were incorporated by reference by the judge in his findings. He also found, in addition to the facts already stated, that the value of Clement's estate was $1,476.064.20 and that counsel for Louis's administrator stated in open court at the trial that the claim of Louis's estate in the action at law under the only remaining counts (counts 1 and 2) against Clement's executrix, in quantum meruit for services, was for $241,000. He concluded that the legacy of $2,500 was 'a benefaction and * * * not in payment of any debt' and that the 'acceptance of the bequest * * * [was] not inconsistent with * * * [Louis's] claim for services * * *. It cannot be said on the record * * * that the claim * * * would * * * defeat the * * * will, although it would * * * diminish the amount received by the executrix in her individual capacity as a legatee * * *.' By the final decree the bill was dismissed. Clement's executrix and the corporation have appealed.

1. Clement's executrix and the corporation contend that Louis's administrator is bound by the allegations or admissions in the declaration in the law action, in the pleadings in the present case, and in the notices of claim filed in the Probate Court stating that the value of Louis's claim for services was $5,000,000. The trial judge was not bound to find that the claim came to this amount, merely because this sum was named as the recoverable damages in the writ, or in a count of a declaration, or in the answer. It is common knowledge that the amounts of unliquidated damages mentioned in writs and declarations are usually purely 'formal allegations by an attorney [which] may be presumed to have been made without special instructions from his client.' See Clarke v. Taylor, 269 Mass. 335, 336-337, 168 N.E. 806, 807; Jennings v. Bragdon, 289 Mass. 595, 598, 194 N.E. 697; Burmon & Bolonsky, Inc. v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., Inc., D.C.Mass., 39 F.2d 619. See also Johnson v. Russell, 144 Mass. 409, 411, 11 N.E. 670; Hobart v. O'Brien, 1 Cir., 243 F.2d 735, 744; Annotation, 63 A.L.R.2d 412, 427. Such allegations of damages have little or no value as an admission or assertion by the person making them except, perhaps, where, because they limit the claim to an amount less than the sum which might reasonably be claimed, they may show a low appraisal by the claimant of the value of his claim. Similar considerations apply to the notices of claim filed in the Probate Court under G.L. c....