Clarkson v. Union Mut. Cas. Co.
| Citation | 207 N.W. 132,201 Iowa 1249 |
| Decision Date | 09 February 1926 |
| Docket Number | No. 36990.,36990. |
| Parties | CLARKSON v. UNION MUT. CASUALTY CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Madison County; W. S. Cooper, Judge.
Action upon an accident policy. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Harold S. Thomas, of Des Moines, for appellant.
A. W. & Phil R. Wilkinson, of Winterset, for appellee.
This is an action upon an accident policy providing compensation for disability “resulting directly and exclusively of all other causes from bodily injury sustained during the life of this policy, solely through external, violent, and accidental means.” Appellee testified that, while in the act of loading a heavy log upon a wagon and after he had placed it upon his shoulder, he felt something give way, and he fell with the log against the wagon and to the ground. The principal point urged by appellant is that the injury, which is not denied, did not “result solely through external, violent, and accidental means,” and that, therefore, appellee is not entitled to recover compensation under the policy. The testimony of appellee was neither disputed nor supplemented by that of other witnesses, except Dr. Fedders, a chiropractor, testified that appellee had a badly sprained back and a misplacement of the fourth lumbar vertebra. The various terms employed in the clause quoted from the policy have led to much discussion and apparent contrariety of opinion by the courts of this country. The difficulty does not arise so much from mere definitions of what constitutes accidental means as it does from the application of accepted definitions thereof to the facts of each particular case. Counsel cite many cases, which, apparently, sustain their respective contentions.
[1] All of our cases hold that it is not sufficient that there was an accidental and unusual or unanticipated result only, but that the means must have been accidental; that is, involuntary and unintentional. If the injury suffered by appellee resulted from an act intentionally and purposely done, without more, then the disability that followed does not come within the plain terms of the policy. Many cases are cited by appellant, but we shall refer to but a few of them.
Carnes v. I. S. T. M. Ass'n., 106 Iowa, 281, 76 N. W. 683, 68 Am. St. Rep. 306, affords little or no assistance in the decision of this case. There the insured died from the effects of morphine voluntarily taken by him. It was uncertain, however, whether he took more than he intended, or whether he misjudged the effect of the quantity taken. The court held that, if it was the former, his death was accidental, but, if the latter, it was not.
In Smouse v. Traveling Men's Ass'n., 118 Iowa, 436, 92 N. W. 53, the insured was ordinarily in good health, but, at the time of the injury resulting in his death, he was convalescing from an attack of pneumonia. He arose in the morning, putting on his trousers and slippers, without removing his nightshirt. Later he lay down on a couch and fell asleep. He was aroused suddenly by his wife, who informed him that some of his friends were coming, and requested that he hurry and dress. Arising from the couch in a somewhat dazed condition, he attempted to remove his nightshirt over his head. While his arms were raised above his head, he became entangled in the garment, exerted himself with some violence, and, while thus engaged, sustained a rupture of a blood vessel, which filled his lungs with blood and caused his death within a few minutes.
In Feder v. I. S. T. M. A., 107 Iowa, 538, 78 N. W. 252, 43 L. R. A. 693, 70 Am. St. Rep. 212, the death of the insured resulted from a ruptured artery, the rupture occurring while he was standing, reaching over a chair towards the shutters on a window which he attempted to raise. He was at the time suffering from tuberculosis.
[2]Lehman v. Acc. Ass'n, 155 Iowa, 737, 133 N. W. 752, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 562;Payne v. Fraternal Acc. Ass'n, 119 Iowa, 342, 93 N. W. 361, and other cases are cited and relied upon by appellant. In the case at bar appellee had raised the log to his shoulder preparatory to placing it on the wagon. The fall occurred at the time he felt something give way. The strain of lifting the log was apparently over, and all that remained for him to do was to put it on the wagon. Just what appreciable instant of time elapsed between the sensation described by him and the fall cannot be determined, but the question presented, we think, was for the jury. The court instructed that, if appellee's injuries were the result of the exertion put forth in placing the log upon his shoulder, he could not recover. The clause in the policy has many times been before this court, and it...
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