Claudio-Martinez v. State

• Decision Date: 30 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2D19-3639,2D19-3639
• Citation: 324 So.3d 45
• Parties: Jorge Luis CLAUDIO-MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

324 So.3d 45

Jorge Luis CLAUDIO-MARTINEZ, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D19-3639

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 30, 2021

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Jean Marie Henne, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and William Stone, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

Jorge Luis Claudio-Martinez appeals from his conviction and fifteen-year prison sentence entered after a jury found him guilty of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. Because we find Mr. Claudio-Martinez's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance on the face of the record by failing to obtain a jury instruction on the justifiable use of nondeadly force, we reverse and remand for a new trial.¹

This case arose out of a physical altercation between Mr. Claudio-Martinez's cousin and a neighbor, the victim. The details of the fight were disputed, but it is clear that at some point during the fight the victim armed himself with a broomstick, while the cousin may have been armed with a screwdriver. At some point, Mr. Claudio-Martinez joined the fight, after which the victim was stabbed in the back. While the victim invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, Mr. Claudio-Martinez testified.

Mr. Claudio-Martinez testified that he came to the defense of his cousin after an altercation ensued between his cousin and the victim. He testified that he was inside when he saw his cousin being beaten with a broomstick by the victim. The victim was physically bigger than both Mr. Claudio-Martinez and his cousin. Mr. Claudio-Martinez remembered grabbing the first things he saw in the kitchen and running outside to defend his cousin, but he could not remember what happened next. The altercation was broken up after the police were called.

Mr. Claudio-Martinez was charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon under section 784.045(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2018). His theory of defense at trial was that he acted in defense of his cousin during the altercation. Standard jury instructions for both the justifiable use of deadly and nondeadly force, Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f), (g), are to be given as applicable under such circumstances. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(g) ("[U]nless the evidence establishes the force used was deadly or non[ ]deadly as a matter of law, both 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) must be given.").

At the jury instruction conference, however, neither the issue of self-defense nor the defense of another was raised. When the jury instructions were discussed after the defense rested, the trial court announced that it had included the standard instruction related to the justifiable use of deadly force. There was no mention of the justifiable use of nondeadly force, and defense counsel did not request an instruction on the justifiable use of nondeadly force.

During the State's closing argument, the prosecutor began giving the jury an explanation of justifiable use of nondeadly force. Counsel for Mr. Claudio-Martinez objected, and a sidebar conference was held whereby everyone agreed that the jury instructions included only an instruction on deadly force. Again, defense counsel did not request an instruction on the justifiable use of nondeadly force. As a result, the jury was instructed only on the justifiable use of deadly force. On appeal, Mr. Claudio-Martinez argues defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on the justifiable use of nondeadly force, and we agree.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel Mr. Claudio-Martinez must show: "(1) that counsel's performance was outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and (2) that such conduct prejudiced the outcome of the trial because without it, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different." Mathis v. State , 973 So. 2d 1153, 1156–57 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (first citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; then citing Spencer v. State , 842 So. 2d 52, 61 (Fla. 2003) ; and then citing Betts v. State , 792 So. 2d 589, 589–90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) ). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome [of the trial]." Id. at 1157 (quoting Spencer , 842 So. 2d at 61 ). It is undisputed that Mr. Claudio-Martinez's counsel failed to request the standard instruction on the justifiable use of nondeadly force or otherwise object when it was not included within the jury instructions. On the face of this record it is clear that Mr. Claudio-Martinez was entitled to this instruction and that the failure to request it prejudiced him.

In Florida, a person is justified in using deadly force if that person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another person or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. § 776.012(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). Whereas nondeadly force is justified if the person reasonably believes that the use of force is necessary to defend himself or another against the imminent use of unlawful force. § 776.012(1). "Deadly force" is defined as force likely to cause death or great bodily harm. § 776.06(1). "[T]he use of a deadly weapon in self-defense does not summarily equate to the use of deadly force." Copeland v. State , 277 So. 3d 1137, 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (citing DeLuge v. State , 710 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ). In fact, "[t]he only act that has been deemed deadly as a matter of law is that of firing a firearm." Caruthers v. State , 721 So. 2d 371, 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (citing Stewart v. State , 672 So. 2d 865, 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ).

Where the evidence at trial does not establish that the force used by the defendant was deadly or nondeadly as a matter of law, the question is a factual one to be decided by the jury, and the defendant is entitled to jury instructions on the justifiable use of both types of force.

Cruz v. State , 971 So. 2d 178, 182 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ; see also Caruthers, 721 So. 2d at 371–72 ("[W]hen the evidence fails to establish whether the force used was deadly or nondeadly as a matter of law, the question must be determined by the jury.").

When focusing on the nature of the force used by a defendant, "even a deadly weapon, such as a knife, can be used without deadly force." See DeLuge , 710 So. 2d at 84. In the instant case, the victim was stabbed in the back near his shoulder blade. These facts, as a matter of law, do not constitute deadly force, and the question of whether the force used was deadly or nondeadly was then a question for the jury. See McComb v. State , 174 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the record where counsel's failure to request an instruction on the justifiable use of nondeadly force deprived the defendant of a defense); Michel v. State , 989 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (same).

Counsel therefore should have requested the standard instruction on the justifiable use of nondeadly force. We can conceive of no reasonable tactical decision that would justify counsel's acquiescing to the omission of an instruction when doing so would make it more difficult for Mr. Claudio-Martinez to prove that he was justified in his actions under his theory of defense. See McComb , 174 So. 3d at 1113 ("[T]his was ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the record because 'it is patently unreasonable to fail to request an instruction that provides a legal defense to undisputed facts.' " (quoting Michel , 989 So. 2d at 681 )). Accordingly, the face of the record shows that counsel was deficient for failing to request an instruction on the justifiable nondeadly use of force.

We next consider whether defense counsel's failure to request the instruction on the justifiable use of...