Claybon v. Dall. Cnty. Criminal Court #1

• Decision Date: 22 February 2022
• Docket Number: 3:21-CV-1864-L-BH
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas
• Parties: GREGORY ALLEN CLAYBON, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT #1, et al., Defendants.

GREGORY ALLEN CLAYBON, Plaintiff,
v.
DALLAS COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT #1, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:21-CV-1864-L-BH

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

February 22, 2022

Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge^[1]

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the plaintiff's claims should be DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2021, Gregory Allen Claybon (Plaintiff) sued Dallas County Criminal Court # One and the Dallas District Attorney's Office, alleging violations of his rights under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution based on the actions of the presiding judge, his defense attorney, and the District Attorney (DA) during probation revocation proceedings that occurred between 1998 and 2000. (See doc. 3 at 2.)^[2] In a Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire (MJQ) to obtain more information about his claims, he was advised that the defendants appeared to be non-jural entities that were not subject to suit, and he was given the opportunity to name different defendants. (See doc. 6 at 2.) He responded to the MJQ and named an Assistant District Attorney (ADA), in her official capacity, as the sole defendant. (See doc. 7.) He subsequently filed two amended complaints, which appear to be supplements to his MJQ response, in which he named a second ADA and the DA as defendants. (See docs. 10, 11.) He contends that the DA is responsible for all actions

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of his subordinates; one of the ADAs recommended that he be sentenced to an illegal 10-year prison term, and the other submitted allegedly fabricated documents to the appellate court to keep him in prison illegally. (See doc. 7 at 2-3, 5, 6; doc. 10 at 4; doc. 11.) He seeks monetary damages and to “overturn the illegitimate conviction and sentence.” (See doc. 7 at 2, 6.)

II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). It provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

III. SECTION 1983

Plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States” and “afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the

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United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).

A. Heck v. Humphrey

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the Supreme Court held that to recover damages for an allegedly “unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determinations, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus [under] 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Where the issues are appropriate for early and final determination, however, consideration of whether Heck bars a plaintiff's claims is not required. See Patton v. Jefferson Correctional Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 462 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) (when an action raises an issue of immunity, the court to the extent it is feasible to do so should determine that issue as early in the proceedings as possible); Little v. Board of Pardons and Parole Division, 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Even if a complaint is subject to dismissal under Heck, it remains appropriate for district courts to resolve the question of immunity before reaching the Heck analysis.”)(citing Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994)); Smithback v. Cockrell, No. 3:01-CV-1658-M, 2002 WL 1268031, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2002) (accepting recommendation that “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks relief unavailable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or sues individuals or entities who are not proper parties under § 1983, it also seems appropriate to have an early determination of those issues”).

Here, although Plaintiff's claims appear to be barred by Heck because their success would imply the invalidity of his probation revocation and conviction, consideration of whether Heck bars

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those claims is not required because his claims are appropriate for early and final determination.

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Based on his MJQ response, Plaintiff appears to sues the DA and ADAs in their official capacities.^[3] (See doc. 7 at 2.) An official capacity claim is merely another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the individual defendant is an agent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). When acting in their official prosecutorial capacities, Texas district attorneys and assistant district attorneys are considered agents of the State, so any suit against the DA and ADAs in their official capacities is a suit against the State of Texas. See Neinas v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2000); Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1997); Quinn v. Roach, 326 Fed.Appx. 280, 292-293 (5th Cir. May 4, 2009).^[4]

The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” “This

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withdrawal of jurisdiction effectively confers an immunity from suit.” P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). Therefore, “an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). This immunity applies to both federal and state law claims brought in federal court. See Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2013) (determining that sovereign immunity bars both federal and state law claims brought in federal court); Roberson v. McShan, No. 05-20055, 2005 WL 2673516, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2005) (per curiam) (finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear federal and state law claims).

Although Congress has the power to abrogate that immunity through the Fourteenth Amendment, Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-76 (2000), and the State may waive its immunity by consenting to suit, AT&T Commc'ns v. BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir....