Claybourne v. State, 91-1472
| Decision Date | 11 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-1472,91-1472 |
| Citation | 600 So.2d 516 |
| Parties | Tyrone M. CLAYBOURNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. 600 So.2d 516, 17 Fla. L. Week. D1478 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Abel Gomez, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and James W. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
Appealing from his habitual felony offender sentences, Claybourne relies upon our holding in Johnson v. State, 589 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), that Chapter 89-280, Laws of Florida, by which the habitual felony offender statute was amended, violates the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution. Because the prosecution failed to prove that Claybourne qualified for sentencing under the previous version of the statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), Claybourne argues that his sentences should be reversed and the cause remanded for resentencing. The state's only response is that Claybourne is precluded from raising this argument because he neglected to raise it before the trial court. We reverse Claybourne's habitual felony offender sentences, remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing, and certify a question to the supreme court.
Because the state does not question Claybourne's contention that Johnson would entitle him to the relief he requests, we discuss only the state's argument that the single subject challenge to Chapter 89-280 cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution provides in part, "Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title." An almost identical provision appeared in Article III, section 16, of the 1885 Constitution. It has long been recognized that a facial invalidity challenge to an act of the legislature based upon violation of the foregoing provision can be raised for the first time on appeal, so long as the challenged act affects a central issue in the litigation. See Parker v. Town of Callahan, 115 Fla. 266, 156 So. 334 (Fla.1934) (); Town of Monticello v. Finlayson, 156 Fla. 568, 23 So.2d 843 (Fla.1945) (same); and Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134 (Fla.1970) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Brown v. State, 90-3048
...a single subject challenge cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, this point was addressed definitively in Claybourne v. State, 600 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and decided adversely to the state's Although neither party to this appeal has suggested a potential for conflict betwee......
-
Donahue v. State, 91-2313
...status. The state argues that this issue was not properly preserved for appeal. This argument was rejected in Claybourne v. State, 600 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), approved, State v. Claybourne, 616 So.2d 5 (Fla.1993), and Randall v. State, 601 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA Appellant's habitual......
-
McCray v. State, 91-2828
...1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), juris. accepted, Nos. 79,150 and 79,204 (Fla. May 19, 1992). In accordance with Johnson and Claybourne v. State, 600 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), petition for review filed, No. 80,157 (Fla. July 10, 1992), we therefore vacate the sentence and remand for resentenc......
-
Lowe v. State
...offender statute is entitled to raise the propriety of an habitual offender sentence for the first time on appeal. Claybourne v. State, 600 So.2d 516, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). See also Pride v. State, 603 So.2d 24, 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Randall v. State, 601 So.2d 644, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA T......