Clayton v. Burch
Decision Date | 29 January 1954 |
Docket Number | No. 754,754 |
Citation | 80 S.E.2d 29,239 N.C. 386 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | CLAYTON et al. v. BURCH et ux. |
Burns & Long, R. B. Dawes, Roxboro, and Royster & Royster, Oxford, for defendants, appellants.
Davis & Davis, Roxboro, for plaintiffs, appellees.
When necessary to accomplish the testator's intent as ascertained from the context of the will, the court may disregard improper use of capital letters, punctuation, misspelling and grammatical inaccuracies, especially where the will is written by an unlearned person. Bell v. Thurston, 214 N.C. 231, 199 S.E. 93; Mewborn v. Mewborn, N.C., 79 S.E.2d 398.
To carry out the testator's intent it is apparent that the words in the will 'if not then if my Grand Sound Silus Daynel Clayton if he a living' should read 'if not then to my Grand Sound Silus Daynel Clayton if he a living.' (Italics ours). The appellants contend this on p. 7 of their brief. It is also apparent that the words in the will 'if Ether one of my grand-Sons Shold die any my grand Soun Stanley be living, etc.' should read 'if Ether one of my grand Sons Shold die and my Grand Soun Stanley be living, etc.' (Italics ours).
This question is presented: Was John W. Clayton devised a life estate in the land in controversy or a defeasible fee? The answer must be sought in the testator's intent as set forth in his will; for under the accepted rules of construction the written and not the unexpressed intent must control. West v. Murphy, 197 N.C. 488, 149 S.E. 731. 'It is elementary that a will must be construed as it is written.' Lide v. Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 56 S.E.2d 404, 410.
In West v. Murphy, supra [197 N.C. 488, 149 S.E. 732], the testator devised land to his granddaughter, Bertie Hill, so long as she should live, and if no children, then to her brother, Frank Hill, the granddaughter being a child at the date of the will. The granddaughter died leaving her surviving a child. We quote from the opinion. .
In Hampton v. Griggs, 184 N.C. 13, 113 S.E. 501, 34 A.L.R. 952, the testator in Item 6 of his will gave 'unto the lawful heirs of my son Nathaniel Pierce Hampton all of the lands and chattel property that belongs to me at the death of me and my wife Nancy and if my son should die without a bodily heir then my property to go back into the Hampton family.' The court said: 'Members of the Hampton family, of course, are potentially among the heirs general of the first taker; but they are not all, and this ulterior limitation would exclude others among his heirs who were not of the blood of the original stock.' The rule in Shelley's Case was held not applicable.
In Williams v. Johnson, 228 N.C. 732, 47 S.E.2d 24, 26, these were the material items of the will. In Item 3 the testator gave a life estate in said tract of land to Mrs. Odie Phillips, wife of Mat Phillips, who was testator's son, provided she remain a widow. In Item 4, after the death of the said Odie Phillips he devised to his grandchildren, to-wit: the children of Mat Phillips, for and during the term of their natural lives the said land, and after the death of the said grandchildren, then to their bodily heirs, or issue surviving them, and in the event any of said grandchildren shall die, without leaving him surviving issue or issues, then to his next of kin in fee simple forever. In this case the Court said: 'The term 'next of kin', when used in a deed or will in connection with a limitation over upon the failure of issue, nothing else appearing to the contrary, means 'nearest of kin' or 'nearest blood relation', and restricts its meaning to a limited class of nearest blood relations, to the exclusion of those enumerated as next of kin in the statute of distribution.' Citing authorities. The Court held that the rule in Shelley's Case did not apply.
Stacy, C. J., speaking for the Court in Welch v. Gibson, 193 N.C. 684, at page 691, 138 S.E. 25, at page 28, says: 'When there is an ulterior limitation which provides that, upon the happening of a given contingency, the estate is to be taken out of the first line of descent and then put back into the same line, in a restricted manner, by giving it to some, but not to all, of those who presumptively would have shared in the estate as being potentially among the heirs general of the first taker, this circumstance may be used as one of the guides in ascertaining the paramount intention of the testator, and, with other indicia, it has been held sufficient to show that the words 'heirs' or 'heirs of the body' were not used in their technical sense.' The Chief Justice then goes on to state that herein lies the distinction between Rollins v. Keel, 115 N.C. 68, 20 S.E. 209; Puckett v. Morgan, 158 N.C. 344, 74 S.E. 15; Jones v. Whichard, 163 N.C. 241, 79 S.E. 503; Pugh v. Allen, 179 N.C. 307, 102 S.E. 394; Blackledge v. Simmons, 180 N.C. 535, 105 S.E. 202; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N.C. 158, 106 S.E. 501; Reid v. Neal, 182 N.C. 192, 108 S.E. 769, and Hampton v. Griggs, supra, and Benton v. Baucom, 192 N.C. 630, 135 S.E. 629.
In Tynch v. Briggs, 230 N.C. 603, 54 S.E.2d 918, 919, the testator devised to his wife S., all the remainder of his real estate for the term of her natural life and after her death to my son J., for the period of his natural life, in remainder to his lawful heirs, and in the event the said J. should die without lawful heirs then in remainder to my daughter Sallie Ann for her life, and after her death to the heirs of her body lawfully begotten--and in the event of the death of the said Sallie Ann without heirs of her body lawfully begotten then said lands shall be exposed to public sale and the proceeds from the sale shall be equally divided among all my children then alive and the lawful heirs of any child that may be dead. The Court went on to say that our first concern is to determine who were meant by the testator as 'lawful heirs' of J. as second takers, and that J. could not die without heirs in the general sense as long as Sallie Ann his sister lived. The Court said: ...
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