Clayton v. Jars TD, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | ED 110122 |
| Citation | 654 S.W.3d 726 |
| Parties | Jonathan CLAYTON, Appellant, v. JARS TD, INC., and Division of Employment Security, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
FOR APPELLANT: Jonathan Clayton, pro se.
FOR RESPONDENT: Jars TD, Inc., pro se., Bart A. Matanic, PO Box 59, Jefferson City, Missouri 65104-0059.
In this unemployment compensation case, Jonathan Clayton appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission disqualifying him from unemployment benefits because he voluntarily quit his job at Jars TD, Inc., without good cause. Clayton argues on appeal: (1) that the Commission erred by considering Jars TD's objection to Clayton's claim for benefits because Jars TD was not his employer during the period of time, called the "base period," which the Missouri Employment Security Law uses to calculate benefits; (2) that there was not competent and substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding that Clayton "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work or to [his] employer," as that disqualifying phrase is used in section 288.050.1(1)1 ; and (3) that certain facts set forth in the Commission's decision are contrary to the evidence in the record.
We affirm. With respect to Point I, Jars TD, as Clayton's last employer, properly protested Clayton's claim, irrespective of whether Jars TD employed him during the statutory "base period." As to Point II, there was competent and substantial evidence before the Commission that by giving his employer just ten to fifteen minutes to resolve the safety issue he had raised before walking off the job, Clayton failed to act in good faith, which is disqualifying. Finally, we dismiss Point III as multifarious and thus in violation of Rule 84.04(d).2
On November 5, 2019, Clayton was hired by Jars TD, a delivery service contractor, to deliver packages for Amazon, an online retailer. On the mornings he was scheduled to work, Clayton arrived at Jars TD's lot at 6:15 a.m. and was assigned a delivery vehicle. Before departing for the Amazon warehouse, Clayton was expected to inspect his assigned vehicle and report any problems to Jars TD. Vehicle maintenance or safety issues could be reported electronically or by directly notifying the Jars TD dispatcher located inside the Amazon facility.
On December 15, 2019, the weather forecast called for snow. That morning, Clayton inspected his assigned vehicle and found that it had two tires with poor tread. He requested a different vehicle from the Jars TD employee in charge of vehicle assignment that morning. After this request was refused, he telephoned Jars TD's manager, Steven Powell, and reiterated his concerns and his request for a different vehicle. Powell instructed Clayton to stand by while he looked into the matter. Clayton waited ten to fifteen minutes and then left before receiving a response. He texted his resignation to Powell and then departed the workplace at approximately 7:10 a.m. It began to snow around 10:00 a.m.
On March 22, 2020, Clayton filed his claim for unemployment compensation with the Missouri Division of Employment Security. Jars TD objected to Clayton's claim on the basis that he was disqualified because he voluntarily quit his employment. On June 6, 2020, a deputy of the Division determined that Clayton was disqualified for benefits because he voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the work or to the employer. The deputy reasoned that Clayton "did not want to drive due to a snow forecast and the station was not closed."
Clayton appealed the deputy's determination to the Division's Appeals Tribunal. An appeals referee conducted a telephone hearing attended by Clayton. Jars TD did not participate. On February 8, 2021, the Appeals Tribunal issued its decision affirming the deputy's determination. Clayton filed his application for review to the Commission. On October 22, 2021, the Commission affirmed and adopted the Appeals Tribunal's decision. Clayton appeals.
Our review of the Commission's decision is governed by the Missouri Constitution and section 288.210. We review whether the Commission's decision is "authorized by law" and "supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." Mo. Const. art. V, § 18. Under section 288.210, we may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the Commission's decision if it is found (1) that the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) that the decision was procured by fraud; (3) that the facts found by the Commission do not support the decision; or (4) that there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the decision. When, as here, the Commission adopts the decision of the Appeals Tribunal, we consider that decision to be the Commission's for purposes of review. Ekres v. Div. of Emp't Sec. , 641 S.W.3d 411, 417 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022).
In the absence of fraud, we accept the Commission's factual findings so long as they are supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record. Mickles v. Maxi Beauty Supply, Inc. , 566 S.W.3d 274, 277 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). We give deference to the Commission's "resolution of conflicting evidence regarding a factual issue, the weighing of the evidence, and the credibility of witnesses." Smith v. Greyhound Bus Company , 477 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (citation omitted). Therefore, "[i]f the Commission has reached one of two possible conclusions as to a finding of fact, the reviewing court will not reach a contrary conclusion even if the court could reasonably do so." Hoeft v. True Manufacturing Company, Inc. , 604 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020).
Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Cap. Corp. , 271 S.W.3d 594, 595 (Mo. banc 2008).
In his first point, Clayton argues that since Jars TD was not his employer during the statutory "base period" used to calculate unemployment benefits, the Commission erred by allowing Jars TD to protest his claim. We disagree because there is no statutory requirement that an employer be included in the base period of a claim in order to be entitled to protest the claimant's allowance of benefits. Section 288.070. To the contrary, section 288.070.1 provides that notice of the initial unemployment benefits claim shall be given (1) to any base period employer and (2) to the claimant's last employer, and that each of those employers has ten days to protest in writing the allowance of benefits.
Here, Clayton reported to the Division that Jars TD was his last employer. In accordance with section 288.070.1, the Division in turn notified Jars TD of Clayton's claim. Jars TD then filed its protest against Clayton's claim within ten days as required.
Point I is denied.
To resolve Clayton's second point on appeal, we must determine whether there was competent and substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's statutory finding that Clayton's voluntary departure from work on December 15, 2019 was "without good cause attributable to the work or to [his] employer." Section 288.050.1; Shields v. Proctor & Gamble Paper Products Co. , 164 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005). It is uncontested that Clayton voluntarily quit his job at Jars TD on December 15, 2019.3 The Commission found that Clayton quit because "he did not want to drive in inclement weather in a van that had two tires with poor tread."4 The issue before us, however, is whether he had good cause to quit, which depends in part on whether he acted in good faith.5 We agree with the Commission's conclusion that he did not.
The determination of good cause in this context is a question of law that we review de novo. Darr v. Roberts Mktg. Grp., LLC , 428 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). The legislature has defined good cause as that "which would compel a reasonable employee to cease working or which would require separation from work due to illness or disability." Section 288.050.1. Consistent with this definition, good cause has long been understood to mean circumstances that "would motivate the average able-bodied and qualified worker in a similar situation to terminate his or her employment." Hessler v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n , 851 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo. banc. 1993). It is an objective measure based on two elements: reasonableness and good faith. Drake v. Lengel , 403 S.W.3d 688, 691 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). The employee's voluntary termination is reasonable if he proves "[his] concerns are real or that a reasonable worker would have them." Firmand v. Univ. of Mo. , 628 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021). Good faith requires the employee to "prove an effort was made to resolve the dispute before resorting to the drastic remedy of quitting his or her job." Drake , 403 S.W.3d at 691 (internal quotation omitted).
We find that there was competent and substantial evidence supporting the Commission's conclusion that Clayton failed to act in good faith because he waited only ten to fifteen minutes for his manager Powell's response before abandoning the workplace. The record establishes that Clayton called Powell to complain that the van he was assigned that day had bald tires and was unsafe to drive in the forecasted winter weather. During the call, Powell told Clayton to ...
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