Mickles v. Maxi Beauty Supply, Inc., ED 106696

• Decision Date: 29 January 2019
• Docket Number: No. ED 106696,ED 106696
• Citation: 566 S.W.3d 274
• Parties: Kyesha MICKLES, Appellant, v. MAXI BEAUTY SUPPLY, INC. and Division of Employment Security, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

566 S.W.3d 274

Kyesha MICKLES, Appellant,
v.
MAXI BEAUTY SUPPLY, INC. and Division of Employment Security, Respondents.

No. ED 106696

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION THREE.

Filed: January 29, 2019

FOR APPELLANT: John J. Ammann, 100 North Tucker, Suite 704, St. Louis, Missouri 63101.

FOR RESPONDENTS: Bart Anton Matanic, 421 East Dunklin Street, P.O. Box 59, Jefferson City, Missouri 65104.

OPINION

James M. Dowd, Judge

Kyesha Mickles appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission) disqualifying her from unemployment benefits because she voluntarily quit her job at Maxi Beauty Supply, Inc. (Employer) without good cause. Mickles argues that the Commission erred because she had good cause to quit. Because we find that Mickles had good cause to quit, we hold that the Commission erred when it determined that Mickles quit without good cause, which is a question of law we review de novo. Darr v. Roberts Mktg. Grp., LLC , 428 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Mo.App.E.D. 2014). Consequently, we reverse and remand with directions to award Mickles unemployment benefits.

Factual and Procedural Background

Mickles, a licensed cosmetologist with a bachelor's degree in business management, began working at one of Employer’s beauty stores in January of 2015 as a salesperson. By early 2017, she had become store manager at Employer’s Hazelwood, Missouri location, and her rate of pay was $11.25 an hour. She also earned commissions for eyelash services she performed at the store. However, in March 2017, Employer discontinued the eyelash service, and Mickles lost that source of income.

At that time, Mickles was pregnant with less than two months before the birth of her first child, so she asked Employer whether there were work opportunities within the company to make up for the lost income. In fact, she told Employer she may not be able to continue working for the company after her maternity leave without an increase in her income due to her family’s increased economic needs.

Employer initially declined to address Mickles’s request. However, a few months later, Employer offered to make Mickles the company’s general manager and human resources director, a position for which she would be paid $12.50 an hour and would be responsible for hiring, firing, scheduling, managing social media, creating job descriptions and a filing system, and settling disputes between employees. Mickles would have the keys to three of Employer’s five stores, and would be "on call" to Employer at all times. She would also be permitted to bring her child to

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work with her, which saved her childcare expenses.

Mickles accepted the new position when she returned from maternity leave in early summer 2017. Over the course of the next few months, she worked 20 to 35 hours a week in the position, averaging about 24 hours per week. There is no indication that Employer was dissatisfied with her work performance. However, on September 17, 2017, Employer sent Mickles a text message stating that Employer no longer needed Mickles’s general manager-human resources position, and that Employer wanted Mickles to return to being a regular employee working weekends at $10 an hour.

Immediately after receiving the text message, Mickles contacted Employer’s vice president, Eric Yoon, who spoke on Employer’s behalf, to seek clarification regarding her job status. Mickles also met with Yoon in person the day after she received the text message. Mickles asked for an explanation why her position was no longer needed. She also stated that she would like to stay on with the company but could not accept a regular-employee position or the reduced pay rate or hours offered. No other offer was made by Employer, however, beyond the offer made in the text message.

When Mickles requested to be returned to one of Employer’s store manager positions, Employer refused. Yoon stated that store managers were required to work 60 hours a week and that Mickles was not able to do so. At the hearing in this case, Mickles questioned the veracity of Employer’s purported manager-hours requirement, and Yoon admitted that Employer has a store manager position at one of its locations that requires only "30 plus" hours of work per week. There is nothing in this record demonstrating that this particular store manager position or any other manager position was ever offered to Mickles.

Ultimately, Mickles declined to accept Employer’s text-messaged offer. She filed for unemployment benefits, and a deputy for the Missouri Division of Employment Security determined that she was qualified to receive benefits, because she quit with good cause attributable to her work. The deputy noted that Employer’s demotion "no longer allowed [Mickles] to use her managerial skills," and that "the reduction in pay was substantial." Employer appealed.

The Appeals Tribunal conducted a telephone conference hearing at which Mickles and Eric Yoon testified. The Appeals Tribunal agreed with the deputy’s decision that Mickles was not disqualified for benefits, finding that Mickles met her burden of proving good cause to quit because her "change in salary was significant enough to compel a reasonable person to cease working" for Employer.

Employer then appealed to the Commission, which reversed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal and found that Mickles voluntarily quit her job without good cause. The Commission concluded that Mickles failed to show good cause because she did not "explore the changed conditions of the revised employment arrangement with the employer," and because, in the Commission’s view, a reasonable person would have maintained the employment relationship for as long as it took to seek other employment.

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Our standard for reviewing decisions of the Commission in unemployment compensation cases is found in

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Article V, § 18 of the Missouri Constitution and § 288.210¹ . According to art. V, § 18, we must determine whether the Commission’s decision is "authorized by law" and "whether it is supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." Darr , 428 S.W.3d at 719 (citing Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 596 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Mo.banc 1980) ). Likewise, § 288.210 provides that this Court may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the Commission’s decision upon finding (1) that the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) that the decision was procured by fraud; (3) that the...