Clayton v. the City of Chicago.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1867
• Citation: 1867 WL 5144,44 Ill. 280
• Parties: CHARLES W. CLAYTONv.THE CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

44 Ill. 280

1867 WL 5144 (Ill.)

CHARLES W. CLAYTON

v.THE CITY OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April Term, 1867.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Chicago.

The opinion states the case.

Messrs. E. A. RUCKER and J. S. PAGE, for the appellant.

Mr. S. A. IRVIN, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an application in the Superior Court of Chicago for judgment against certain real estate for the non-payment of taxes. The main question presented by the record is the addition by the assessors of forty per cent to the valuation of property in the south division. We have decided at the present term, in the case of Scammon v. The City of Chicago, 44 Ill. 269, that this addition was legal, and it is only necessary here to refer to the opinion already filed in that case.

The appellant also takes some further exceptions to the judgment.

The ordinance imposing this tax levied “one mill on the dollar for permanent improvements.”

It is objected that this is not a sufficient specification of the purpose of the tax under section 4, chapter 9, of the charter, which requires the object of the levy to be specified. The ordinance levying the tax provides for the levy of four and one-half mills to defray contingent expenses,--one mill for permanent improvements, three mills for public expenses, and various other rates for different purposes which are specified in the ordinance. We are of opinion that the levy of one mill for “permanent improvements,” was a sufficient specification. It would be obviously impossible to specify by ordinance at the beginning of the fiscal year, in a large and rapidly growing city, every permanent improvement that might be required in the course of the next twelve months. Bridges, streets, sidewalks, market houses, and other improvements of like character, might become necessary where no such necessity could have been foreseen; and it was the evident intent of the legislature to grant power, in the 8th clause of the 1st section of chapter 8, to levy a tax under the general head of permanent improvements.

The charter requires that the collector, when he receives a warrant for the collection of taxes, shall make publication of such fact, and give notice that, after the expiration of sixty days, he will levy on the personal property of all persons who have failed to pay. It is objected that the notice in the present case did not state that the collector would make a levy on personal property in case of failure to pay. The notice was, that “in...