Clemons v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 28 September 1950
• Citation: 222 P.2d 439,36 Cal.2d 95
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: CLEMONS v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al. L. A. 20873.

Page 439

222 P.2d 439

36 Cal.2d 95

CLEMONS v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.

L. A. 20873.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Sept. 28, 1950.

E. H. Delorey and Harold L. Newman, Los Angeles, for appellant.

O'Melveny & Myers, Louis W. Myers, W. B. Carmen, Jr., Sidney H. Wall and William W. Alsup, all of Los Angeles, amici curiae on behalf of appellant.

Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Bourke Jones, Roger Arnebergh, Assistant City Attorneys, Lester L. Lev and Alan G. Campbell, Deputy City Attorneys, all of Los Angeles, for respondents.

SPENCE, Justice.

This action for declaratory and injunctive relief was brought to test the validity of an ordinance of the city of Los Angeles limiting the subdivision of property to certain minimum lot requirements. The trial court held that the ordinance was 'constitutional, valid and enforceable,' and that certain transactions concluded by plaintiff in violation thereof were 'null and void.' The propriety of such adjudication cannot be successfully assailed in the light of settled legal principles.

It appears from the agreed statement of fects that within two years prior to the commencement of this action on December 12, 1946, plaintiff purchased the property in question, a bungalow court of nine units which had been built some twenty years previously and had been used continuously for residential purposes. Located in zone C-2 on Beverly Boulevard, the property was subject to section 12.21-C of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (Ordinance No. 77,000 adopted September 28, 1936, as amended by Ordinance No. 90,500, adopted March 7, 1946) providing that no lot 'held under separate ownership' at the law's effective date and 'used * * * for dwelling purposes' shall be 'reduced in any manner below the minimum lot area, size or dimensions' prescribed 'a minimum average width of fifty (50) feet and a minimum area of five thousand (5000) square feet.'

Following his purchase, plaintiff subdivided the property into nine separate parcels, each averaging 925 square feet (25 37 ) and having a bungalow thereon. Through sale or 99-year lease arrangements plaintiff conveyed eight of these parcels to various individuals transactions contrary to the minimum lot area and width requirements of the ordinance as a zoning regulation. Each parcel was conveyed with an easement to Beverly Boulevard over the walkways within the bungalow court. Two of the parcels had no frontage on any street or alley. The entire property was serviced by only one incinerator and two sewer connections.

Threatened with arrest and prosecution for violation of the ordinance, plaintiff instituted this action for declaratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement of such municipal regulation against him as a property owner, charging that it transcended the legitimate scope of the exercise of the police power and constituted 'an unwarranted and arbitrary interference with (his) constitutional rights.' Several persons intervened in this action, among whom were Joseph Girofilo and Blanche M. Girofilo, who filed a 'cross-complaint in intervention.' The trial court upheld the validity of the ordinance both in its general aspects and in its application to plaintiff's property, and declared that certain transactions made contrary thereto were 'null and void.' Plaintiff has appealed from the adverse judgment accordingly entered and also from the court's order denying his motion for a new trial. Since said order is not appealable, Code Civ.Proc. § 963; Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 368, 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515, plaintiff's purported appeal therefrom must be dismissed and only the appeal from the judgment remains for consideration.

The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 488-490, 234 P. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 497, 503, 234 P. 388, affirmed 274 U.S. 325, 328, 47 S.Ct. 594, 71 L.Ed. 1074; Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 337, 175 P.2d 542. Such an enactment is considered with every intendment in favor of its validity, and a court will not, except in a clear case of oppressive and arbitrary limitation, interfere with the legislative discretion which has been exercised in the adoption of the regulation. Jardine v. City of Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 72, 248 P. 225, 48 A.L.R. 509. It is presumed that the measure as a whole is justified under the police power and adapted to promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 460, 202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990. The courts may differ with the zoning authorities as to the 'necessity or propriety of an enactment', but so long as it remains a 'question upon which reasonable minds might differ,' there will be no judicial interference with the municipality's determination of policy. Miller v. Board of Public Works, supra, 195 Cal. at page 490, 234 P. at page 386; see, also, Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal.2d 341, 344, 115 P.2d 455. The mere fact that some hardship may be experienced is not material, for '(e)very exercise of the police power is apt to affect adversely the property interest of somebody.' Zahn v. Board of Public Works, supra, 195 Cal. at page 512, 234 P. at page 394. Consonant with these established principles, the zoning ordinance here involved is not vulnerable to plaintiff's attack.

Zoning is an essential part of a city's overall master plan for community development, Planning Act of 1929, Stats.1929, p. 1805, as amended, 2 Deering's Gen.Laws, Act 5211b; later superseded by Conservation and Planning Act, Stats.1947, ch. 807, p. 1909, as amended, 2 Deering's Gen.Laws, Act 5211c, and a city is vested with control of 'the design and improvement of subdivisions', subject to judicial review as to reasonableness. Subdivision Map Act, Stats.1937, p. 1864, as amended, now Bus. & Prof.Code, sec. 11500 et seq.; sec. 11525. The word 'design' is defined in the latter Act to include, among other things, provision for 'minimum lot area and width', Bus. & Prof.Code, sec. 11510, by 'local ordinance.' Ibid. secs. 11506, 11526. Consistent with this state recognition of municipal functions and in line with its autonomous character, Cal.Const. art. XI, sec. 6; West Coast Advertising Co. v. San Francisco, 14 Cal.2d 516, 519-521, 95 P.2d 138, the city of Los Angeles adopted the zoning ordinance prohibiting the reduction of residential lots below the specified minimum of 5,000 square feet in area and 50-foot frontage. The city's charter expressly contemplates the adoption of regulations pursuant to the authority granted by the Subdivision Map Act, charter, sec. 95(g), and on this point the trial court found that the ordinance '* * * constitutes an essential part of the master plan for the comprehensive development of the City of Los Angeles in that it is designed to prevent the cutting up of lots into unduly small areas and into parcels of economically unusable widths; that the ordinance * * * supplements the California Subdivision Map Act in that it prevents lots sold pursuant to said Act from being further subdivided, and in so doing, the ordinance prevents or diminishes the possibility of circumvention of (said) Act.' In support of its view that the 'ordinance is an important factor in the orderly development of the city,' the trial court found that the 'attempted cutting up' of such property as plaintiff's bungalow court would 'tend to create and accelerate the creation of slum conditions' and 'overcrowd(ing),' thus 'militating against orderly, quiet and peaceful living'; that 'health and sanitary regulations and laws would be more difficult to enforce' if the bungalow units 'were sold to various separate owners'; and that therefore 'said ordinance has a reasonable relation to the public health, safety and general welfare, and was enacted for the public good.'

Where from a consideration of the evidence the trial court has found certain physical facts and conditions to exist in relation to the particular property restriction involved as would justify regulation by the city through the exercise of its police power, all intendments must be indulged to sustain such findings and resulting judgment. Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 39, 207 P.2d 1, 11 A.L.R.2d 503. So significant are these factors in accord with the objectives found by the trial court to be within the design of the ordinance. The benefits of the Subdivision Map Act would be of little practical value in aid of desirable community planning if following the subdivider's compliance for the terms of the initial sale, the purchasers of the lots could erect multiple dwellings thereon according to authorized specifications and then 'cut up' the units for separate sale. In this regard the ordinance clearly appears to supplement the state Act and to operate in avoidance of its circumvention as the trial court found. Likewise appropriate for consideration here is the memorandum opinion filed by the trial judge and included in the record, Rules on Appeal, rule 5(a), 22 Cal.2d 1, 4, as bearing on the interpretation of the findings. Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. Santa Barbara, 85 Cal.App.2d 776, 790, 194 P.2d 148. The comment is there made that according to the view of experts in the field of community development, the subdivision of 'bungalow courts into separate parcels' tends 'to create slum conditions' because it would be unlikely that a uniform state of repair would be maintained by the various owners and a 'hodge-podge appearance' would result, with a consequent depreciation in value of the entire property; 'overcrowding' develops because where it is 'a common ...