Click v. State

• Decision Date: 20 December 1996
• Docket Number: CR-93-1911
• Citation: 695 So.2d 209
• Parties: Jimmy Shane CLICK v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 209

695 So.2d 209

Jimmy Shane CLICK v. STATE.

CR-93-1911.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 20, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 28, 1997.

Certiorari Denied May 9, 1997

Alabama Supreme Court 1961000.

John Mark McDaniel and William P. Burgess, Jr., Huntsville, for Appellant.

Jeff Sessions, Atty. Gen., and Cedric Colvin, Deputy Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

COBB, Judge.

The appellant, Jimmy Shane Click, was indicted for the capital murder of Ginger Roberta McClure, which occurred during the late evening hours of July 24, or early morning hours of July 25, 1990. For ease of reference, the date of the murder will subsequently be referred to as July 24, 1990. On June 18, 1994, the appellant was found guilty of capital murder; he was subsequently sentenced to life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole.

The State's evidence tended to show that on or about July 24, 1990, the appellant, then age 17, and codefendant Scott Carpenter, aged 18, entered the home of Ginger Roberta McClure and beat her to death. Evidence showed that the appellant sprayed mace in the victim's face while she was in her bed and that Carpenter repeatedly struck her with a baseball bat. The motive for the murder appeared to be that the appellant owed the victim money that he did not want to repay.

Ms. Charleen Bottorff, a friend of appellant's and Carpenter's girlfriend, testified that the appellant and Carpenter had been talking about killing the victim and planning the crime for at least a week before the killing. According to Bottorff, she, Click, and Carpenter went to an army surplus store and bought a can of tear gas which was later used in the homicide. She testified that on the night of the killing she drove the two men to a location close to the victim's house and dropped them off. Bottorff testified that she was told to wait by a pay telephone at a local motel until they telephoned her to pick them up and that if the two had not called by a certain time she was to pick them up at a pre-arranged site. (R. 303.) She also testified that when she picked them up later that evening both men had blood all over their arms. According to Ms. Bottorff, the appellant told Carpenter in the car that he had "done a real good job" hitting the victim. (R. 310.) After hiding some things at various locations around Huntsville, all three went to her apartment and slept. Click, she testified, awakened early the next morning because he had to go to his job at a local restaurant. (R. 318.)

The police questioned the appellant based upon information that he had been seen at the victim's house on the evening of the murder. The appellant told the police that he had known the victim for about eight years and that he mowed her grass. During the interrogation, the police determined that Click fit the description of a person who had been seen in the woods behind the victim's house on the day of the crime. The appellant was then informed of his rights. Thereafter, he admitted that he sprayed the victim with mace just before Carpenter beat her to death with the baseball bat. He also stated that he and Carpenter had taken money, drugs, and other items from the victim's house.

The appellant raises 24 issues on appeal.

I.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police. The appellant asserts two grounds upon which his statements should have been suppressed. First he contends that the statements were obtained through duress or improper inducement in violation Article 1, § 5, Constitution of Alabama of 1901 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which protect against illegal searches and seizures. Additionally the appellant asserts that because he suffered from a mental illness when he was advised of Miranda rights, he was unable to understand the nature and quality of the warnings and he could not, therefore, knowingly and intelligently waive them.

A.

The record shows that Investigators Wayne Sharp and Howard Turner went to the appellant's house at 9:30 P.M. on July 25, 1990, the day the murder was discovered, in response to information that Click had been seen at the victim's house the day before. The appellant arrived home at around 10:00 P.M., and, after a brief conversation regarding his acquaintance with the victim, he and his stepfather followed the investigators to police headquarters for questioning. (R. 471-73, 662-65, 714.) Turner testified that interviewing for the purposes of a criminal investigation of this nature always took place at the police station at the request of the investigator. (R. 740.) At police headquarters, beginning around 10:45 P.M., the appellant gave Investigator Sharp an account of what he had done at the victim's house the day before. Nothing he told the investigator at this point indicated any involvement in McClure's death. (R. 476-78, 670-72).

At approximately 11:00 P.M., Investigator Turner came into the interview room where appellant was being questioned and had a conversation with Investigator Sharp. Investigator Sharp then advised appellant of his juvenile Miranda rights. (R. 477-78, 672-73). Investigator Turner testified that the juvenile Miranda rights were read to Click immediately after he received information that the appellant matched the description of a person seen in the woods behind the victim's house the evening of the murder. Testimony of Investigators Sharp and Turner revealed that the appellant was not a suspect before they received this information. (R. 478.)

After the appellant was advised of his Miranda rights at approximately 11:10 P.M., and before approximately 2:50 A.M. the following morning, he gave the investigators two more versions of his activities on the day of the murder. (R. 486-90.) The final version of his statement detailed his involvement in the homicide.

The appellant maintains that he should have been advised of his Miranda rights when the investigators began interviewing him at his house because, he says, he was a suspect at that point. The appellant further alleges that he was in custody for the purposes of Miranda when he was taken into the interview room at the police station, and that his stepfather should have been allowed to be present during the interview or apprised of what was going on during the course of the interview. The appellant also alleges that the investigators questioned him continually until he made the incriminating statement. This allegation was based on testimony by Investigator Sharp that he continued his questioning after he determined that the appellant was tired. (R. 536.) Additionally, the appellant argues that Investigator Sharp improperly induced him into making a confession by improperly giving him legal advice.

It is well established that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, (1966). However, the safeguards required by Miranda are required only if the defendant is in custody when questioned. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Landreth v. State, 600 So.2d 440, 444 (Ala.Cr.App.1992).

We conclude that the appellant was advised of his Miranda rights at the proper time and in the proper manner by the investigators involved in the case. The appellant's interrogation did not become custodial in nature until just before he was advised of his rights. The appellant's initial statement to the police was made at the police station and before he was the focus of the investigation.

It is inevitable that the appellant would have been questioned by the police because they had information that he was one of the last persons to see the victim alive. Nothing in the record suggests that the appellant was not free to leave the police station or that he was in custody until the point at which he became a suspect and was advised of his rights. The record indicates that his stepfather arrived with the appellant and had been waiting outside the interview room to take him home.

Also, the fact that the questioning occurred at the police station does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that appellant was in custody for Miranda purposes.

"[P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect."

Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977).

The appellant's contentions that his incriminating statement was made under duress because his stepfather was not allowed to be present in the interview room and because he was tired when he made the statement are also without merit. The trial record gives no indication that the appellant asked for his stepfather to be present during the interview. To the contrary, the record reflects that the appellant asked investigators to make his stepfather leave the building after he had been read his rights. (R. 675.)

Also missing from the record is any indication that the appellant requested that the investigators stop their questioning because he was tired. The appellant had been advised of his rights and had consented to further questioning; therefore, the statements he subsequently made were properly admitted.

Additionally the appellant's claim that Investigator Sharp gave him legal advice is without merit. This allegation is addressed in the following testimony from Investigator Sharp during the State's direct examination:

"[The appellant] asked me, if someone is present when someone gets killed, but not involved, would he be arrested? I told him it was according to the circumstances. If ...