Clifford S. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 25 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. D023832,D023832
• Citation: 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 333,38 Cal.App.4th 747
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7512, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,827 CLIFFORD S., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent; SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.

Page 333

45 Cal.Rptr.2d 333

38 Cal.App.4th 747, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7512,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,827

CLIFFORD S., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.

No. D023832.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Sept. 25, 1995.

Certified for Partial Publication ¹.

Steven J. Carroll, Alternate Public Defender, Jacqueline C. Crowle and Dale Santee, Deputy Alternate Public Defenders, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., County Counsel, Susan Strom, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Gary C. Seiser, Deputy County Counsel, for real party in interest.

HALLER, Associate Justice.

This case presents the issue of whether a de facto parent has standing to challenge the denial of reunification services or contest the reasonableness of services offered. Because a de facto parent, like a stepparent, has no right to reunification services, we conclude that a de facto parent lacks standing to raise reunification issues.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Clifford S. and his wife Rita have four children together; Rita has three children by previous relationships, including Chantella, the minor in question here. The Department of Social Services (Department) filed a dependency petition on August 6, 1993, alleging Chantella had suffered accidental burns several months earlier and had not received proper medical care. An allegation the other children were at risk was dismissed. The matter was submitted, and the petition was sustained on August 19, 1993.

According to the social services report for the dispositional hearing on September 15, 1993, a parent search had been initiated the preceding month for Chantella's presumed father, Jack L. The Department also reported that because Rita now suggested Clifford might be Chantella's father, a paternity test was ordered. Notwithstanding the question of paternity, Clifford was, at that time, offered reunification services, including participation in medical appointments, services of a public health nurse, therapy and visitation. As to those services specifically relating to Chantella, that had to do with medical appointments and medical care, the reunification plan designated the minor as "stepchild."

At the time of the six-month hearing, stepfather Clifford, was participating in therapy; however, his visitation was not regular since he often stayed home with the other children so Rita could visit. The Department also reported Chantella was healing.

On July 1, 1994, the juvenile court found Clifford was not the biological father. That same day, he filed to become a de facto parent, a request that was granted on August 5, 1994. In the meantime, Anthony, three months old, had been removed from the home for failure to thrive. In connection with Anthony's adjudication hearing on August 5, the parents signed the reunification plan with both Clifford and Rita signing for Anthony, and Rita, alone, signing as to Chantella. The following spring, another of Clifford's stepchildren, Mercy, became the subject of a dependency petition based on allegations of sexual molestation.

At the 18-month hearing, the court found reasonable services had been provided and there was a substantial risk of harm in returning the minor to the home. The court terminated services and referred the matter to the WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE SECTION 366.26² hearing. Clifford sought writ review of that reference, contending he was in substantial compliance with the reunification plan, reasonable services were not offered, and the court improperly denied a mistrial.

We review the petition under section 366.26, subdivision (1) and rule 39.1B. We decline to reach the merits on the issues involving reunification services since Clifford lacks standing to pursue them. ³ In that the Department does not contest Clifford's standing to challenge the denial of a mistrial, we address the question on the merits and deny the petition finding there is no prejudice.

DISCUSSION

I. Standing

In order to question the services offered or the conduct of the proceedings, one must have standing.

Without standing, there is no actual or justiciable controversy, and courts will not entertain such cases. (3 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Actions, § 44, pp. 70-72.) "Typically, ... the standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted." (Allen v. Wright (1984) 468 U.S. 737, 752, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3325, 82 L.Ed.2d 556.) In other words, whether one has standing in a particular case generally revolves around the question whether that person has rights that may suffer some injury, actual or threatened. Thus, we examine whether Clifford, as a de facto parent, has sufficient rights at stake with respect to reunification services to confer standing upon him.

A person becomes a de facto parent by application to the court when he or she has participated in the day-to-day care and rearing of the child over an extended period of time. (In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 692, fn. 18, 114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244; rule 1401(a)(4).) As a de facto parent, the person becomes a party and is permitted to participate in the dependency proceedings to assert and protect his or her own " 'interest in the companionship, care, custody and management' of that child." (11 Cal.3d at p. 692, 114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244 fn. omitted.) Because of the close contact with and interest in the child, participation of de facto parents in the proceedings helps the court in making determinations with regard to the minor's future. (Id. at p. 693, 114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244.)

De facto parents have the right to be present at the dependency proceedings, to have retained or, at the discretion of the court, appointed counsel and to present evidence at the hearings. (Rule 1412(e).) However, the status of de facto parenthood does not give de facto parents the rights and responsibilities of parents or guardians. (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 77, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290.) Specifically, they do not have the right to reunification services, custody, or visitation. (Id. at p. 82, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775, 859 P.2d 1290 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)

The same is true of stepparents. A person becomes a stepparent by marrying In either instance, as stepparent or de facto parent, the person has the right to appeal certain issues. However, because neither has a right to reunification services, there is no standing to challenge the failure of the court to order such services. If a person is given services to which he or she is not entitled, there is no right to complain on appeal of the court's findings. (In re Jamie G. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 675, 683-684, 241 Cal.Rptr. 869.)

the natural biological parent and loses stepparent status should the marriage be terminated. A stepparent has no legal obligation to support his or her stepchild. Likewise, absent a formal adoption of the child, a stepparent has no right to any reunification services. (In re Jodi B. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1322, 1328-1329, 278 Cal.Rptr. 242.)

Here, Clifford entered the dependency proceedings as a stepfather. As a stepfather, he had no right to reunification services. Because Rita suggested he might be the biological father, testing was ordered at the dispositional hearing. We do not know with certainty whether reunification services were ordered at that time because of Clifford's possible paternity. Whatever the reason, it is irrelevant for our purposes since he had no right to complain of the court's findings. The fact he "substantially complied" with the offered services and the fact he thought the services he received were unreasonable are both issues that Clifford has no standing as a stepparent to raise.

After the court found that Clifford was not the biological father, Clifford sought and was granted de facto parent status. As a de facto parent, he again had no right to visitation, custody or reunification services and consequently no standing to seek review of the court's orders or lack thereof with regard to these services. At that point in time, reunification services were properly terminated as to Chantella. This is reflected in the new reunification scheme, where both parents were given a plan to reunify with Anthony but only Rita was given a plan to reunify with Chantella. As a de facto parent, Clifford has no standing to challenge reunification or custody orders with regard to Chantella. Accordingly, his assertions of substantial compliance with the plan and unreasonableness of the services offered are irrelevant.

Clifford, in his reply brief, points out that as a de facto parent he is a full party to the proceeding--not merely an amicus curiae. He reiterates the important role a stepfather plays in maintaining familial bonds. He suggests there are numerous reasons why he should be accorded full "standing" and should be given full review on the merits.

First, he asserts that he is the only father Chantella has known. At the time of the dependency proceedings, both he and Rita believed Clifford was her biological father. After testing showed he was not, he promptly filed for de facto status. From this point on, he was referred to as "stepfather." Clifford says he has been taking care of Chantella since she was 18 days old. He is married to Rita, and has taken Chantella into his home and held her out as his child. He has drawn no distinction between Chantella and his own biological children. He provides the financial support and is primary caretaker for all the children--including Chantella. He urges he is the strongest kind of de facto parent since he is not an outsider, but rather is a person who is a member of the immediate family, who is related by marriage and who has taken...