Clifton v. United States Dep't of Justice
| Decision Date | 14 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00089-DAD-EPG |
| Parties | DOMINIQUE CLIFTON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the court on the motion to dismiss filed by defendants the United States Department of Justice, the Acting Attorney General, the United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and the directors of the ATF and the FBI in their official capacities (collectively “defendants”).[1] (Doc No. 13.) In light of the ongoing public health emergency posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, defendants' motion was taken under consideration based on the papers. (Doc. No. 14.) For the following reasons, the court will grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of defendants.
This case arises out of plaintiff's inability to purchase a firearm because federal law prohibits him from doing so. On January 21, 2021, plaintiff Dominique Clifton filed this action against defendants. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges as follows in his complaint.
In 2001, plaintiff was in eighth grade at Mt. Vernon Middle School in Los Angeles, California. (Id.) He was thirteen years old at the time. (Id.) Because plaintiff's mother had passed away and he never knew his father, plaintiff then lived with his grandmother. (Id. at ¶ 14.) His grandmother's husband-plaintiff's step-grandfather-was physically and mentally abusive toward both plaintiff and his grandmother. (Id.) One day in June of 2001, while at an afterschool program, plaintiff made comments about “what he would like to do toward his stepgrandfather in order to protect himself and his grandmother.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff never directly threatened anyone nor took any action to harm his step-grandfather. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Nevertheless the school called a Psychiatric Emergency Team (“PET”), which consisted of licensed mental health clinicians approved by the County of Los Angeles Department of Mental Health to provide Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 5150 and 5585 evaluations. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Upon evaluation by the PET, plaintiff was hospitalized for mental health treatment at Gateways Hospital and Mental Health Center in Los Angeles, California for 15 days-from June 12 through June 27, 2001. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Although plaintiff was initially hospitalized for only 72 hours pursuant to § 5150, his hospitalization was extended by 14 days for intensive treatment pursuant to § 5250. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 19, 35.)
Upon his release from the hospital, plaintiff was not prescribed any continuing medication, nor was he required to receive any further psychiatric treatment, including therapy or counselling. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that he was never notified of his right to seek judicial review of an involuntary hold and that he was never informed of any long-term repercussions as a result of his psychiatric hold. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Nevertheless, plaintiff lost his private capacity to own a firearm as a result of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits an individual who has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution from owning, possessing, using, or purchasing a firearm or ammunition. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Notably, 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) provides an exception to this firearms ban under federal law for state actors acting in their official capacity.
Plaintiff went on to graduate from high school and enlist in the United States Marine Corps in 2005. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Under § 925(a)(1), plaintiff was permitted to handle a firearm during his time with the marines. (Id.) Plaintiff completed three combat deployments before leaving active duty in 2013 and received an Honorable Discharge as a Sergeant. (Id.) Subsequently, plaintiff was hired by the Federal Bureau of Prisons as a corrections officer in 2015. (Id. at ¶ 28.) He remained in that position until April 2019, when he resigned in good standing. (Id.) Plaintiff is informed and believes that both his service in the marines and his employment as a federal correctional officer required a complete background investigation that would have revealed his past hospitalization. (Id.)
On April 8, 2019, the Fresno County Sheriff's Office hired plaintiff as a correctional officer at the Fresno County Jail. (Id.) Prior to being hired in this role, plaintiff underwent and passed a full psychological evaluation that confirmed he is mentally fit to possess and use a firearm. (Id. at ¶ 31.) Then, in 2020, plaintiff applied for a “Deputy Sheriff I” position in the Fresno County Sheriff's Office. (Id. at ¶ 32.) This time, when Fresno County ran a background check, the California Department of Justice statewide telecommunications system reported plaintiff's prior hospitalization implicating his lifetime firearms ban under federal law. (Id.)
As a result of plaintiff's federal firearms restriction, the Fresno County Sheriff's Office declined to sponsor plaintiff's entry into the “Basic Academy under the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training” (i.e., “POST Academy”) and represented that it will not consider plaintiff for a sworn deputy sheriff position. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Thus, although 18 U.S.C. § 925(a) provides an exception to the firearms ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) for state or federal actors operating in their official capacity, Fresno County has declined to seek to apply that exception to plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 45.) Under state and federal law, there is no other proceeding that plaintiff can bring to expunge or extinguish his lifetime firearms restrictions under federal law. (Id. at ¶ 41.)
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) Second Amendment as-applied violation against all defendants; (2) Fifth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process violations against all defendants; and (3) Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process violations against all defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-79.) Plaintiff requests that this court declare 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) to be unconstitutional as applied to him. Further, plaintiff seeks an order from this court enjoining defendants from enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) against plaintiff “unless [plaintiff] is afforded an opportunity to demonstrate his fitness and thereby seek relief from 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) and all related laws, derivative regulations, policies, and procedures.” (Id. at 14.)
On August 2, 2021, defendants filed their pending motion, seeking dismissal of plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. (Doc. No. 13.) On September 7, 2021, plaintiff filed his opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, and on September 23, 2021, defendants filed their reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 16, 19.)
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Though Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). It is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). “Dismissal without leave to amend is proper if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). To the extent that the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, courts will generally grant leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
Federal law prohibits a person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective[2] or who has been committed to a mental institution” from possessing a firearm or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Federal law has provided two potential avenues for relief from this lifetime ban, but both have been foreclosed to all California residents. See Stokes v. United States Dep't of Justice, 551 F.Supp.3d 993, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
First prior to 1992, a person in plaintiff's position could have applied to the United States Attorney General for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), which provided “for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the . . . possession of firearms.” Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2020). Under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), the Attorney General may, but is not required to, grant relief “if it is established to his...
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