Clifton v. Vill. of Blanchester

• Decision Date: 01 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2010–1196.,2010–1196.
• Citation: 964 N.E.2d 414,2012 -Ohio- 780,131 Ohio St.3d 287
• Parties: CLIFTON, Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF BLANCHESTER, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

131 Ohio St.3d 287

2012 -Ohio- 780

964 N.E.2d 414

CLIFTON, Appellant,

v.VILLAGE OF BLANCHESTER, Appellee.

No. 2010–1196.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 6, 2011.Decided March 1, 2012.

[Ohio St.3d 287] Syllabus of the Court

A property owner lacks standing to bring a regulatory-taking claim against a municipality when the affected property is outside the municipality's corporate limits.

Fowler, Demos, & Stueve, William G. Fowler, and Gregory J. Demos, Lebanon, for appellant.

Schroeder, Maundrell, Barbiere & Powers, Lawrence E. Barbiere, and Robert S. Hiller, Mason, for appellee.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, and Laura Eddleman Heim, Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, state of Ohio.LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.

I. Introduction

{¶ 1} The issue before the court is whether a property owner has standing to compel a government entity to initiate appropriation proceedings for an alleged regulatory taking when the affected property lies outside the limits of the government entity. Because we hold that a property owner does not have standing to bring such a claim, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

II. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} J & M Precision Machining, Inc. (“J & M”) owns 23 acres of property in Clinton and Warren Counties. Robert Clifton, appellant, testified that prior to 1989, approximately two acres of J & M's property was zoned “roadside business” and contained a house and barn. Clifton also testified that J & M had operated a machine shop on its property since the 1970s.

{¶ 3} In 1993, Clifton purchased approximately 99 acres of property that is contiguous to J & M's property. Clifton testified that his property is zoned for agricultural and residential use. Clifton has farmed this property since he purchased it in 1993 and has usually made a profit in doing so.

{¶ 4} In 1997, Clifton sold approximately two acres to J & M pursuant to a contract, which indicated that J & M would use the property for drainage for its factory operation.

[Ohio St.3d 288] {¶ 5} Clifton testified that in 1998, Clinton County rezoned eight acres of J & M's 23 acres to “business industrial,” which included the two acres that had previously been zoned “roadside business.” Clifton testified that the operation of the machine shop made no noticeable noise.

{¶ 6} In 2002, appellee, the village of Blanchester, annexed J & M's entire 23–acre parcel and rezoned all 23 acres for “general industrial” use. Because Clifton's property is not within the village's corporate limits, the rezoning did not apply to his 97–acre parcel.

{¶ 7} On March 29, 2002, Clifton filed a complaint and notice of an administrative appeal regarding the rezoning of J & M's property. Clifton alleged that the rezoning of J & M's property was unconstitutional and that the rezoning resulted in a taking of his property. The court dismissed Clifton's administrative appeal.

{¶ 8} The village filed a motion for summary judgment as to Clifton's remaining claims, which the court granted in part and denied in part. The trial court found that Clifton had not presented evidence that the rezoning of J & M's property was unconstitutional and granted summary judgment to the village on this issue. However, the court also concluded that Clifton had raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the rezoning resulted in a taking of his property and denied the village summary judgment on that issue. Subsequently, Clifton voluntarily dismissed his complaint.

{¶ 9} On April 3, 2006, Clifton refiled a complaint alleging that the rezoning of J & M's property had resulted in a regulatory taking of his property without just compensation. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the rezoning of J & M's property interfered with the enjoyment of his property and resulted in a diminution in its value. The trial court granted summary judgment to the village, finding that the village's rezoning of J & M's property did not result in a taking of Clifton's property, because his property retained economic value.

{¶ 10} The court of appeals affirmed the decision that the rezoning did not result in a total taking of Clifton's property. Clinton App. No. CA2007–09–040, 2008-Ohio-4434, ¶ 12, 14. However, the court found that the trial court had failed to inquire as to whether the rezoning resulted in a partial taking under Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York (1978), 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631. Id. at ¶ 13. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the trial court to undertake a partial-taking analysis under Penn Central.

{¶ 11} While the case was pending on remand, the village filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the court of appeals had erred in remanding the case for a Penn Central analysis and that Clifton lacked standing to bring a taking claim in the first place. The court of appeals granted the village's motion [Ohio St.3d 289] in part and ordered the trial court to also consider the issue of standing on remand. (Nov. 3, 2008), Clinton App. No. CA2007–09–040.

{¶ 12} On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the village, finding that Clifton had no standing to bring a takings claim and that even if he had, the rezoning of J & M's property did not result in a partial taking of Clifton's property. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. Clinton App. No. CA2009–07–009, 2010-Ohio-2309, ¶ 7–8.

{¶ 13} Clifton's appeal is before this court pursuant to the acceptance of his discretionary appeal. 126 Ohio St.3d 1597, 2010-Ohio-4928, 935 N.E.2d 44.

III. Analysis

{¶ 14} Clifton's first proposition asserts that a nonresident contiguous property owner has standing to litigate a claim for a partial regulatory taking against an adjacent political subdivision. Clifton's second proposition asserts that a partial-taking claim based upon significant negative economic impact does not fail as a matter of law even though the regulatory action does not deprive the claimant of all economically viable use of his property. Because our resolution of the standing issue is dispositive, there is no need for us to address Clifton's second proposition regarding a takings claim.

A. Standing Generally

{¶ 15} “It is well established that before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking relief must establish standing to sue.” State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 469, 715 N.E.2d 1062. “ ‘Standing’ is defined at its most basic as ‘[a] party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.’ ” Ohio Pyro Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1442. “ ‘ “[T]he question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy * * * ’ as to ensure that ‘the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.’ ” ' ” Id., quoting State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 178–179, 64 O.O.2d 103, 298 N.E.2d 515, quoting Sierra Club v. Morton (1972), 405 U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, quoting Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, and Flast v. Cohen (1968), 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947.

B. Standing to Challenge Government Action

{¶ 16} “When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary [Ohio St.3d 290] judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, * * * a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction—and perhaps on the response of others as well. The existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing ‘depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict,’ and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” (Emphasis sic; citations omitted.) Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), 504 U.S. 555, 561–562, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351.

{¶ 17} In this case, the regulation (i.e., the zoning) was not directed at Clifton's property. Therefore, the analysis in Lujan regarding causation and redressability is instructive in determining whether Clifton has standing to bring a regulatory-taking claim against the village.

1. Causation

{¶ 18} “[I]n ruling on standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues * * * to determine whether there is logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated * * * to assure that [the litigant] is a proper and appropriate party to invoke” legal proceedings. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947.

{¶ 19} “For a takings claim to prevail against a motion to dismiss in this court, the action complained of must be attributable to [a government entity].” May v. United States (2008), 80 Fed.Cl. 442, 445, citing Erosion Victims of Lake...