Cline v. State, 7 Div. 305
Citation | 571 So.2d 368 |
Decision Date | 24 August 1990 |
Docket Number | 7 Div. 305 |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Parties | Hoyt Gary CLINE, alias v. STATE. |
William R. Willard, Gadsden, for appellant.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Cecil G. Brendle, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, Hoyt Gary Cline, was indicted in March 1988, by an Etowah County Grand Jury for attempted murder, a violation of §§ 13A-4-2 and 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975. A trial ensued on April 19, 1989, in which a jury found appellant guilty as charged in the indictment. The evidence established that, during an altercation with the victim, Frank Payne, appellant slashed the victim's throat with a knife, inflicting a five-inch cut from the victim's larynx to the back of his jawbone, which required 52 stitches to close. The wound was "within just millimeters" of the jugular vein and the carotid artery. The evidence of the incident was undisputed and further corroborated by an eyewitness who testified that he saw appellant and the victim struggling and then heard the victim say, "You bastard, you have cut me," and, thereafter, saw appellant fold a knife, put it in his pocket, and go to his car.
On May 18, 1989, the trial court entered judgment and sentenced appellant, who has one prior felony conviction, under the Habitual Felony Offender Act, to 15 years' imprisonment, § 13A-5-9(a)(3). Appellant was ordered to serve three years in the penitentiary, with the remainder suspended and appellant placed on probation for five years. He was also ordered to pay $1125.75 in restitution. On June 2, 1989, the state filed a motion to reconsider appellant's sentence under the mandatory sentencing provision of § 13A-5-6(a)(4), which requires that, for a Class A felony involving the use or attempted use of a firearm or deadly weapon, the minimum punishment is not less than 20 years. The trial court granted the state's motion and resentenced appellant on June 30, 1989, to a 20-year sentence. (Restitution remained the same.) The court order dated June 30 specifically notes that this sentence was pursuant to the mandate of § 13A-5-6(a)(4), but that appellant was being sentenced as a habitual offender. However, appellant was not present for this sentencing; it was apparently by order only. Therefore, another hearing was held on July 13 at which appellant was present and was sentenced in accordance with the court's order of June 30. At this hearing, appellant gave oral notice of appeal.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in resentencing him on June 30, 1989, to 20 years' imprisonment after having sentenced him to a term of 15 years' imprisonment on May 18, 1989, because, he argues, the trial court had no further jurisdiction or power to increase his original sentence. He also contends that his resentencing violated his right not to be twice put in jeopardy.
Clearly, § 13A-5-6(a)(4) is the appropriate punishment provision for appellant's conviction, as we further discuss in part II. Where the requisite circumstances for application of this section are present, see Ex parte McCree, 554 So.2d 336 (Ala.1988), as in this case, the section is mandatory, id.; Clency v. State, 475 So.2d 642, 644 (Ala.Cr.App.1985). Since this section was not followed, appellant's first sentence was void.
."
Hughes v. State, 518 So.2d 890, 891 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (emphasis in original).
3 J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused § 23:40 (1986) (footnotes omitted). An increase in sentence where the original sentence is void is the "most common exception to the general rule prohibiting enhancement of an imposed sentence." A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 59 (1978). For the general rule, see Ex parte Tice, 475 So.2d 590, 591-92 (Ala.1984) ( )(emphasis added). In Baker v. State, 473 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), writ quashed, 473 So.2d 1130 (Ala.1985), the court used this analysis to address the issue of whether the trial court erred in resentencing the appellant on July 27, 1983, to a harsher sentence, pursuant to the firearms enhancement provision, than that imposed on June 9, 1983. The court held that because "no sentence permitted by law had been imposed on him," the later sentence was the first lawful sentence and, hence, no right to due process or protection against double jeopardy was violated. Id. For a like disposition of a very similar case, see State v. Pringle, 83 Wash.2d 188, 517 P.2d 192 (1973).
We further note that, in correcting an illegal sentence, the double jeopardy protection is not violated even if the defendant has begun serving the original sentence. United States v. Ortega, 859 F.2d 327, 335 n. 13 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1027, 109 S.Ct. 1157, 103 L.Ed.2d 216 (1989); United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 347-48 (9th Cir.1982); Stuckey v. Stynchcombe, 614 F.2d 75, 76 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362-63 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975, 97 S.Ct. 1666, 52 L.Ed.2d 369 (1977). Even after the defendant has begun to serve his sentence, the power of the trial court to alter an invalid sentence and its duty to do so continue. Breest v. Helgemoe, 579 F.2d 95, 99 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct. 327, 58 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978).
Finally, we note that appellant failed to timely present, to the trial court, any objection on the specific ground of setting aside the original sentence and increasing the sentence. In Ex parte Yeung, 489 So.2d 1106 (Ala.1986), the appellant contended that the trial court erred in setting aside the original sentence, on motion by the state, and resentencing him to a more severe sentence pursuant to the firearm enhancement provision of § 13A-5-6(a)(4). To this contention, the court stated the following:
Id. at 1110. As did the appellant in Yeung, this appellant timely objected on the ground that the sentence was improperly enhanced, not on the ground here argued, and, as did the Yeung court, we find the present argument to be procedurally barred.
Appellant next contends that he was improperly sentenced by the trial court under § 13A-5-6(a)(5) when the trial court determined, as reflected by its sentencing order, that appellant "used a knife which the Court determines was a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense." More specifically, appellant asserts that the record does not present sufficient facts to support the court's ruling that the knife involved in the incident was a deadly weapon and that the jury did not make a specific finding on that point. Appellant contends that, from the record, one can conclude only that the knife involved was an ordinary pocketknife. For purposes of our discussion, we adopt that assertion.
A "deadly weapon" is defined by § 13A-1-2(11) as "[a] firearm or anything manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury...." Although a pocketknife is not specifically included within the definition of "deadly weapon," as are other types of knives, the definition does not preclude a finding that a pocketknife, in this instance, was a deadly weapon. The statutory definition is not limited to knives of only those types specified. Thatch v. State, 432 So.2d 8, 9 (Ala.Cr.App.1983). While a pocketknife may not be deadly per se and ordinarily has lawful functions and uses, it may or may not be deemed a deadly weapon, depending on the manner of its use. See Jones v. State, 523 So.2d 518 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) ( ); Hill v. State, 516 So.2d 876, 881-82 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) ( ); Baker v. State, 441 So.2d 1061, 1062 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) ( ).
Although, obviously, the following cases were not decided under the present statutory definition, we find them helpful in stressing the deadly manner in which a pocketknife can be used: In Webb v. State, 100 Ala. 47, 14 So. 865 (1893), the court, in affirming a murder conviction for killing the victim by cutting his throat with a pocketknife, held that the pocketknife, as used, was a deadly weapon sufficient to support an inference of malice and upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct that a pocketknife is not, in contemplation of law, a deadly...
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