Clinton v. National Indem. Co.
Citation | 265 S.E.2d 841,153 Ga.App. 491 |
Decision Date | 15 February 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 59147,59147 |
Parties | CLINTON v. NATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY. |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
William D. Sparks, Macon, for appellant.
J. Clinton Sumner, Jr., Rome, for appellee.
The City of Aragon, Georgia, listed its fire truck on an insurance policy containing no-fault coverage issued by the appellee. Clinton, a volunteer fireman of the municipality, went to the scene of a fire where another fireman had brought the truck and unwound the hose. He held it at the nozzle and played the water on a gas tank to keep it from overheating, then signaled that he needed to readjust the hose to reach another tank. A man at the truck turned off the water pressure and for some reason the hose jerked and snaked loose, throwing Clinton to the ground where he landed on one leg and sustained injuries resulting from the tearing of ligaments at the knee. The court, hearing the case without a jury, decided for the insurer and the plaintiff appeals.
1. The sole question is whether no-fault coverage obtains under the above stated facts. Code 56-3407b(b) affords coverage for accidental bodily injury sustained by one occupying the owner's motor vehicle. Code § 56-3407b(c) affords coverage for such injury resulting from being struck by the owner's motor vehicle while a pedestrian. (Italicized words are those needing construction or which have been given a statutory definition under Code § 56-3402b.) As used in Chapter 56-34 a motor vehicle is a vehicle with more than three wheels required to be registered under the Georgia laws for power driven motor vehicles designed primarily for operation on public streets and highways. The truck was accordingly a motor vehicle and it was insured. "Accidental bodily injury" includes a bodily injury arising "out of the operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" which is accidental as to the person claiming the no-fault benefits. "Operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" means "operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle." Code § 56-3402b(a), (c), (h). "Vehicle" is not defined in the Act but Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. citing Moffitt v. State Automobile Ins. Assn., 140 Neb. 578, 300 N.W. 837, 838, defines vehicle as that "in or on which a person or thing is or may be carried from one place to another, especially along the ground . . . any moving support or container fitted or used for the conveyance of bulky objects; a means of conveyance." Road scrapers and road graders have been held to be vehicles. Peterson v. King County, 199 Wash. 106, 90 [153 Ga.App. 493] P.2d 729; People v. Pakchoian, 114 Cal.App.2d Supp. 831, 250 P.2d 767. The Moffitt case involved a haygrinder. Also held to be a vehicle was an antique dismantled tractor (State v. Johnston, (Id.) 252 Iowa 335, 105 N.W.2d 700 (1960)); a caterpillar tractor (Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. McKinney (Tex.Civ.App.) 114 S.W.2d 338, 340); a house trailer placed on blocks and used as a room (Clark v. Vitz (Tex.Civ.App.) 190 S.W.2d 736). We cannot hold that this vehicle, which is indeed a motor vehicle and which is designed for the use on public roads for carrying persons or things (here a pump and water supply) ceases to be such a vehicle because it has come to a stop and because the motor, which is running, has been linked through a gear shift with the pump rather than with the wheels. The case is similar to General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Hanley Oil Co., 321 Mass. 72, 72 N.E.2d 1 (1947), a suit based on a liability clause agreeing to pay the legal liability of the insured for damages to property "caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle." In that case the truck involved was used for the delivery of oil to residential users by means of an outside fill pipe leading to the basement. By means of a mechanism with which the truck was equipped oil...
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