Cloud v. Georgia Cent. Credit Union

• Decision Date: 08 September 1994
• Docket Number: Nos. A94A1292,A94A1341 and A94A1344,s. A94A1292
• Citation: 448 S.E.2d 913,214 Ga.App. 594
• Parties: CLOUD et al. v. GEORGIA CENTRAL CREDIT UNION et al. (Two Cases) CLOUD et al. v. CHRYSLER FIRST BUSINESS CREDIT CORPORATION.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 913

448 S.E.2d 913

214 Ga.App. 594

CLOUD et al. v. GEORGIA CENTRAL CREDIT UNION et al. (Two Cases)

CLOUD et al. v. CHRYSLER FIRST BUSINESS CREDIT CORPORATION.

Nos. A94A1292, A94A1341 and A94A1344.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Sept. 8, 1994.

J.L. Jordan, College Park, for the Clouds.

Davis & Doster, Joseph G. Davis, Jr., Phillip L. Pleska, Charles Waters, Jr., Atlanta, for Chrysler First Business Credit Corp.

Macey, Wilensky, Cohen, Whittner & Kessler, Susan L. Howick, Atlanta, for Georgia Cent. Credit Union.

BIRDSONG, Presiding Judge.

In these appeals Cynthia E.M. Cloud, Wilbert Cloud, and Diane M. Knapp appeal several rulings of the trial court in favor of Georgia Central Credit Union and Chrysler First Business Credit Corporation on claims arising from a foreclosure sale of property securing debts owed by appellants and the later dispossessory of appellants from the property that was sold pursuant to the foreclosure. Appellants contend that the foreclosure sale was unlawful, that the trial court improperly required a supersedeas bond, and that the trial court improperly granted the dispossessory.

The records show that Chrysler First obtained title to certain real property in Decatur, Georgia, pursuant to a nonjudicial foreclosure sale conducted by Georgia Central. Subsequently, appellants challenged that action alleging that the foreclosure sale was unlawful. After the trial court ruled against appellants, they appealed.

Then, because appellants did not leave the property after the foreclosure sale, Chrysler First filed a dispossessory action under OCGA § 44-7-50. In this action appellants admitted that Georgia Central effected a non-judicial foreclosure sale of the property to Chrysler First, but maintained that appellees conspired to prevent them from asserting their rights. After the lower court ordered a writ of possession, appellants also appealed.

Then, after appellants filed their notice of appeal in the dispossessory, Chrysler First moved for and was granted a supersedeas bond under OCGA § 5-6-46. Appellants have also appealed that order.

Although these were separate actions below and separate appeals, the appeals are consolidated as they concern the same parties and arise from litigation concerning the same property. Held:

Case No. A94A1292

1. Appellants contend the trial court erred by granting Georgia Central's and Chrysler First's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment because appellants and Georgia Central mutually agreed to a departure from the contract terms; because genuine issues of material fact remain; because notice allegedly required by OCGA § 13-4-4 was not given; because issues of waiver and bad faith necessitated a jury trial; because DeKalb County was the proper venue for an action against Georgia Central; and because Georgia Central and Chrysler First acted in concert to oppress the plaintiffs.

The primary thrust of appellants' arguments is that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Georgia Central because the foreclosure sale was unauthorized since Georgia Central had effected a departure from the terms of the note sufficient to authorize appellants' failure to make payments on the debt. This argument is based on the contention that because Georgia Central earlier accepted late and irregular payments, Georgia Central somehow agreed that appellants would not be required to make payments under the mortgage. Compare Sandifer v. Long Investors, 211 Ga.App. 757(2a), 440 S.E.2d 479.

While parties may agree to depart from the terms of a contract (see OCGA § 13-4-4; Smith v. General Finance Corp., 243 Ga. 500, 255 S.E.2d 14) to support such a departure, there must be some evidence that an agreement to do so had been reached. In this appeal we find no evidence of the agreement appellants assert. Since at the time of the foreclosure appellants had not made a payment for over a year, for appellants to prevail on this claim there must have been some evidence that Georgia Central authorized this great deviation from the payment schedule. As nothing in this record shows that Georgia Central agreed to allow appellants, in effect, to cease making payments, appellants' argument is without merit. See Duncan v. Lagunas, 253 Ga. 61, 62-63, 316 S.E.2d 747; Lewis v. C & S Nat. Bank, 174 Ga.App. 847, 848, 332 S.E.2d 11; Shalom Farms v. Columbus Bank, etc., Co., 169 Ga.App. 145, 147-148, 312 S.E.2d 138. Further, since the evidence shows there was no deviation from the contract terms, notice under OCGA § 13-4-4 was not required.

2. Appellants' argument that they should have been allowed to redeem the property is also based upon a premise that is not supported by the evidence. Appellants contend that because Georgia Central's agent sent them a notice stating that they could redeem the property by making a payment of the arrearages by a certain date, they were allowed to redeem the property. As review of the security deed, however, shows that it contains no right to redeem the property by reinstating the debt after foreclosure, appellants have no right to do so. Pretermitting whether the letter, apparently sent to appellants in error, had any force and effect, is the fact that appellants did not pay the arrearages by the date specified in the letter or later. Thus, appellants did not exercise the right of redemption they now claim.

3. Appellants further contend the lower court erred by granting summary judgment when genuine issues of material fact remained for trial on appellees' bad faith. This argument too is without merit because appellants have produced no evidence creating a genuine issue on this claim. Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474. The record shows that when finally advised that one of the appellants had filed a bankruptcy petition months earlier, appellees, with the consent of the appellants concerned, took action to protect their financial interests by moving to vacate the automatic stay in bankruptcy as to this property. The record shows no evidence showing that appellees took this action in bad faith. Instead, the record shows that the foreclosure sale was conducted only after having been authorized by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court upon appellants' consent to appellees' motion. If appellants have a complaint with the actions of the bankruptcy court, they should have raised them in the proper forum in a timely manner. This is not the proper forum to challenge the decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.

4. We find no error in the lower court's dismissal of appellants' claim against Georgia Central because the record shows that Georgia Central neither maintained an...