Clowney v. State, 80

Decision Date16 October 1957
Docket NumberNo. 80,80
Citation97 So.2d 316
PartiesJames Raymond CLOWNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

J. Ben Watkins (of Truett & Watkins), Tallahassee, Elmer O. Roberts, Ft. Lauderdale, and Reasbeck & Fegers, West Hollywood, for appellant.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and David U. Tumin, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ALLEN, Judge.

The appellant in this case was convicted on a charge of driving an automobile while intoxicated and causing the death of a human being. Appellant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and was sentenced to a term of two years in the State Penitentiary.

The information filed against the appellant was in two counts, the first charging manslaughter by culpable negligence and the other charging manslaughter from operating an automobile while intoxicated.

Two separate counts or charges are often made by the State when prosecuting a defendant for a death resulting from driving an automobile while intoxicated, one of which charges culpable negligence. If the State proves a death resulting from the operation of an automobile while intoxicated, this meets the requirements of statutory manslaughter set forth in Florida Statutes, Section 860.01, F.S.A.

It is not sufficient under Section 860.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., to prove that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating beverages; it must be proved the defendant was intoxicated. If, however, manslaughter by reason of culpable negligence is charged, the State may show that the defendant was intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating beverages in addition to other acts which tend to show culpable negligence.

In this case, the defendant, Clowney, was charged on two counts. One, manslaughter through culpable negligence, and the other causing a death while driving an automobile in an intoxicated condition; two separate charges. Was the defendant prejudiced by the charge of the lower court that:

'If the death of any human being be caused by the operation of an automobile by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor, he shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and upon conviction, shall be punished as provided by the law relating to manslaughter.'?

Florida Statutes, Section 860.01, F.S.A., provides:

'Driving automobile while intoxicated; punishment.--It is unlawful for any person, while in an intoxicated condition or under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such extent as to deprive him of full possession of his normal faculties, to drive or operate over the highways or streets or thoroughfares of Florida any automobile, truck or vehicle or motorcycle or any other vehicle propelled by gasoline, gas, vapor, electricity, steam or other power. Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished as provided by section 317.20.

'If however, damage to property or person of another, other than damage resulting in death of any person, is done by said intoxicated person under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such extent as to deprive him of full possession of his normal faculties, by reason of the operation of any of said vehicles mentioned herein, he shall upon conviction be fined not more than five hundred dollars, and also be imprisoned not less than three months nor more than twelve months, and if the death of any human being be caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by any person while intoxicated, such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter and, on conviction be punished as provided by existing law relating to manslaughter.

'Convictions under the provisions of this section shall not be a bar to any civil suit for damages against the person so convicted.'

The Judge of the Criminal Court of Record charged the jury that the defendant, James Raymond Clowney, was charged with manslaughter in two counts, the first count being that the defendant did unlawfully, by and through his own act, procurement and culpable negligence, operate an automobile in such a manner as to cause the death of Claude L. Todd, and in count 2 did unlawfully, while intoxicated by the voluntary use of alcoholic liquor, operate a certain automobile in such a manner as to run up or against an automobile in which Claude L. Todd was present, with such force and violence as to cause said automobile in which the said Claude L. Todd was present to catch afire, thereby inflicting in and upon the person of said Claude L. Todd certain mortal injuries, of which injuries the said Claude L. Todd then and there languished and died, etc.

The Judge below then charged the jury on the various degrees of homicide and manslaughter, all of which were applicable to count 1 of the Information. The court then charged the jury as follows:

'As to the second Count of Manslaughter While Intoxicated by the Voluntary Use of Alcoholic Liquor. It is unlawful for any person, while in an intoxicated condition or under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such extent as to deprive him of full possession of his normal faculties, to drive or operate over the highways or streets, or thoroughfares of Florida, any automobile, truck or vehicle or motorcycle or any other vehicle propelled by gasoline, gas, vapor, electricity, steam or other power. Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished as provided by law. If the death of any human being be caused by the operation of an automobile by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor he shall be deemed guilty of Manslaughter, and upon conviction shall be punished as provided by the law relating to Manslaughter.

'Intoxication, Lady and Gentlemen, I charge you, as used in the second Count of the Information, means under the influence of Intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to deprive one of the normal control of one's body or mental faculties, or both.'

The Court then gave the following requested charge by the State:

'Lady and Gentlemen of the Jury, you are instructed that under the Statute creating offense of manslaughter by intoxicated motorist, the State has no burden to prove that at the time of the accident the defendant was negligent, but such element is established if it be shown that the defendant was not at the time of the accident in possession of his faculties due to the voluntary use of intoxicants.'

The jury returned the following verdict:

'We, the jury, at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this 26th day of January A.D. 1956, find the defendant James Raymond Clowney Guilty as to Count II of the Information. So say we all.'

The effect of the above verdict was to find the defendant Not Guilty of the manslaughter charge based on culpable negligence.

The defendant moved for a new trial and, among other grounds, alleged the errors of the court in instructing the jury the defendant could be found guilty of manslaughter if he caused the death of a person while operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; also for failing to give a requested instruction of the defendant.

In the case of Cannon v. State, 1926, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360, 362, the Supreme Court in an Opinion by Chief Justice Brown, said:

'The language of the indictment, while sufficient to charge the offense defined in section 5039 [F.S.A. § 782.07], the gist of one element of which is the culpable negligence of the defendant as being the cause of the death, was not sufficient to constitute a charge of manslaughter under this amendatory act. The additional words in the indictment, 'being at the time under the influence of intoxicating liquor,' are not, in the commonly accepted meaning of such words, synonymous with or equivalent to the words in the amendatory statute, which are 'while intoxicated.' Though all persons intoxicated by the use of alcoholic liquors are 'under the influence of intoxicating liquors,' the reverse of the proposition is not true; for a person may be under the influence of intoxicating liquors without being intoxicated.'

The Court further stated:

'It was permissible, as shown by some of the cases above cited, to allow the state to introduce evidence showing or tending to show that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time the deceased was struck and injured, or that she was in that condition so shortly thereafter as to afford a reasonable inference that such condition existed at the time of the injury. See, also, 1 Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) 235. This was admissible in support of the charge of culpable negligence,...

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5 cases
  • Jackson v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 18 Febrero 1958
    ...v. State, 101 Fla. 990, 132 So. 491.8 Preston v. State, Fla., 56 So.2d 543.9 Smith v. State, Fla.1953, 65 So.2d 303; Clowney v. State, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 316; Fowlkes v. State, Fla.App.1957, 100 So.2d 826.10 Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685, 131 A.L.R. 886.11 Maxey v. State,......
  • State v. Redden, 71--873
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 22 Noviembre 1972
    ...but misleading. He cites Jackson v. State, Fla.App.1st 1958, 100 So.2d 839; Smith v. State, Fla.1953, 65 So.2d 203, and Clowney v. State, Fla.App.2d 1957, 97 So.2d 316, as authority. In Jackson and Clowney the convictions were affirmed. In Smith, the jury acquitted the defendant on the coun......
  • State v. Harris
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 17 Marzo 1977
    ...influence of intoxicating liquors" are different terms and do not mean the same thing. The District Court of Appeal in Clowney v. State, 97 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA, 1957), certiorari discharged, 102 So.2d 619 (Fla.1958), discussed a difference between use of the terminology "under the influe......
  • Grimley v. State, B-111
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 29 Septiembre 1959
    ...v. Revell, Fla.App.1959, 112 So.2d 71.3 Jackson v. State, see note 1; Fowlkes v. State, Fla.App.1957, 100 So.2d 826; Clowney v. State, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 316; Smith v. State, Fla.1953, 65 So.2d 303.4 Maxey v. State, Fla.1953, 64 So.2d 677; Williams v. State, Fla.1951, 54 So.2d 66.5 Mill......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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