Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cnty.
| Decision Date | 16 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. B239849.,B239849. |
| Citation | 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 324,211 Cal.App.4th 57 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Cynthia Anderson–Barker, Real Party in Interest. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
See 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Witnesses, § 30.
John F. Krattli, Acting County Counsel, Jonathan McCaverty, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner.
Robert Mann and Donald W. Cook, Los Angeles, for Real Party in Interest.
No appearance for Respondent.
This writ petition presents the following question: May a surrogate for a party to a pending lawsuit against a public entity obtain documents under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) relating to the attorney fees charged by litigation counsel for the public entity? In this case, we answer the question in the affirmative.
Under the CPRA (Gov.Code, § 6250 et seq.),1 “ ‘every person’ has a right to inspect any public record (§ 6253, subd. (a)), for any purpose (§ 6257.5), subject to certain exemptions....” ( County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court ( Axelrad ) (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 819, 825, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 564( Axelrad ).) The CPRA contains a number of exemptions, including one which excepts from disclosure records “pertaining to pending litigation to which the public agency is a party ... until the pending litigation ... has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled.” ( § 6254, subd. (b).)
By case law, the CPRA is broadly construed. Exemptions, however, are narrowly construed. Consistent with this construction, the trial court here ruled the pending litigation exemption did not apply to billing and payment records reflecting the amount of money the County of Los Angeles (County) had paid in attorney fees to defend itself against a pending civil rights action.
The County claims the trial court erred in construing the statutory exemption and ordering disclosure of the records in question. We reject the contention and deny the County's petition for a writ of mandate.
Real party in interest Cynthia Anderson–Barker is an attorney. She works in the same office as attorneys Robert Mann and Donald Cook, who are her attorneys of record in this CPRA action both in the trial court and in this court. Attorneys Mann and Cook also represent the plaintiffs in a civil rights action that has been pending in the Los Angeles County Superior Court since 1999— Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (BC207136) (the Venegas action). 2 The Venegas action has been the subject of numerous appellate proceedings. (See Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (Aug. 23, 2011, B218948), 2011 WL 3672932 [nonpub. opn.]; Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1230, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 741;Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1.) In October 2011, after the most recent appellate decision, the case was returned to the trial court for trial.
One month later, in November 2011, Anderson–Barker filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court, seeking disclosure under the CPRA of certain records relating to the Venegas action, records that the County had refused to disclose in response to a formal CPRA request.3 (See § 6259, subd. (a) [].) Specifically, she sought (1) all invoices or other requests for payment submitted to the County by any law firm representing it in the Venegas action, (2) each such law firm's time records for the Venegas action, and (3) canceled checks and other writings reflecting payment by the County to such law firms.
In its answer to the mandate petition, the County maintained that the documents in question were not subject disclosure because, among other things, (1) they were attorney-client communications, (2) they were attorney work product, and (3) they were exempt from disclosure under the CPRA's “pending litigation” exemption in section 6254, subdivision (b).
Before the hearing on the matter, the trial court issued a tentative decision which became the ruling of the court after the parties submitted on the tentative without substantive argument. The trial court ruled the documents in question were not attorney-client privileged communications, but they did contain some attorney work product. Thus, attorney time records reflect legal research performed, as well as the thought processes and impressions of counsel. The court ruled that the information should be redacted “to show [only] the information that is not work product—the hours worked, the identity of the person performing the work, and the amount charged.”
With respect to the pending litigation exemption, and citing Fairley v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1414, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 648( Fairley ),the trial court ruled the exemption applied only to “records specifically prepared for use in litigation.” Because the documents in question were prepared “in connection with [the Venegas ] case, but not specifically for use in that case,” the exemption did not apply.
The County filed a writ petition with this court challenging the trial court's ruling. (See § 6259, subd. (c) []; Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 89, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160 [].) The County does not challenge the trial court's ruling with respect to the attorney-client and work product privileges. It argues here only that the redacted documents it was ordered to disclose are exempt from disclosure under the CPRA's pending litigation exemption.
We initially denied the petition summarily. However, the Supreme Court granted the County's petition for review and transferred the matter to us with directions to issue an order to show cause. We issued such an order, received additional briefing from the parties, and heard oral argument.4
As with any statute, the construction and interpretation of the CPRA is a question of law which we review de novo. ( BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 750, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 519;Fairley, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 648.) Where, as here, the relevant facts are undisputed, application of the CPRA to those facts presents an issue of law. ( BRV, at p. 750, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 519.) However, the substantial evidence test applies with respect to any factual determinations the trial court made as part of its CPRA ruling. ( Axelrad, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 824, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 564.)
The CPRA was enacted in 1968 and is modeled after the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.). ( Axelrad, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 825, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 564.) It was enacted “for the purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving members of the public access to information in the possession of public agencies.” ( Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 425, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 49 P.3d 194.) In enacting the CPRA, the Legislature declared that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.” (§ 6250.)
Under the CPRA, subject to certain express exemptions, “every person” has a right to inspect any “public record” maintained by a “state or local agency.” (§ 6253, subd. (a).) The County is a local agency under the CPRA (§ 6252, subd. (a)), and there is no dispute that the records at issue in this writ proceeding qualify as public records (§ 6252, subd. (e) [] ). Because the statute furthers the people's right of access, it must be construed broadly. ( Marken v. Santa Monica–Malibu Unified School District (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1262, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 395; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2) [].)
The CPRA “does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.” (§ 6257.5.) As the Court of Appeal explained in Axelrad, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at page 826, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, ” (Quoting Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Adm'r of Hughes (9th Cir.1995) 72 F.3d 686, 693, last brackets in original.) Therefore, the mere fact that Anderson–Barker may be seeking public records to assist her colleagues in connection with a pending action is not relevant to the issue before us.
Section 6254 lists a variety of exemptions to the disclosure obligations contained in the CPRA. Exemptions under the CPRA “are to be narrowly construed [citation], and the government agency opposing disclosure bears the burden of proving that one or more apply in a particular case.” ( Axelrad, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at 825, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 564; see also Marken v. Santa...
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