Coates v. State, 55,784
| Decision Date | 24 September 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 55,784,55,784 |
| Citation | 495 So.2d 464 |
| Parties | Earl Junior COATES v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Michael R. Farrow, Columbus, for appellant.
Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen., by Billy L. Gore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and ROBERTSON and ANDERSON, JJ.
I.
Factually this appeal presents the disquieting story of an ongoing sexual relationship between a 36 year old man and his young teenage stepdaughter. Those interested in the development of the criminal procedural jurisprudence of this state, however, will find the case far more remarkable for the reverse discovery violation found: the defendant, not the prosecution, for whatever reason withheld discoverable material evidence and then sought to use same at trial. Recognizing that the day of trial by ambush was over and that, subject to constitutional limitations not applicable here, discovery in criminal cases is a two-way street, the Circuit Court sustained the prosecution's objections to the undiscovered evidence. For the reasons articulated below, we consider that the Circuit Court was wholly within its authority in this ruling and, as a consequence, we affirm the judgment below.
II.
Earl Junior Coates, Defendant below and Appellant here, has been indicted, tried and convicted of the offense of sexual battery. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 97-3-95 (Supp.1985). According to the indictment, Coates committed sexual battery upon his then 15 year old stepdaughter, C.H., "on or about or before the 31st day of August, 1983," without her consent.
On this appeal no question is raised regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to undergird a conviction. For this reason, no useful purpose would be served here by reciting the sordid details of the sexual encounters between Coates and his stepdaughter. Suffice it to say that C.H. testified--and Coates in open court admitted--to a continuing series of substantially similar sexual encounters including the specifically charged act of cunnilingus. See Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 97-3-97(a) (Supp.1985).
There is only one significant variance in the evidence. C.H. testified that the acts in which she participated with Coates were all done without her consent and by virtue of Coates' repeated threats of death or serious bodily harm. Coates, on the other hand, denied any such threats and insisted that everything he did was with C.H.'s consent. While it is certainly true that under our law consent is a defense to a charge of sexual battery committed with a person fourteen years of age and over, Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 97-3-95(a) and (c) (Supp.1985), the jury had before it substantial credible evidence upon which it could have based a finding that C.H. was threatened and did not voluntarily consent. See Gill v. State, 485 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Miss.1986); Hines v. State, 472 So.2d 386, 392 (Miss.1985); Bennett v. State, 468 So.2d 855, 856 (Miss.1985).
Indeed, the jury did on May 18, 1984, return a verdict finding Coates guilty as charged in the indictment. Several days later, the court held a sentencing hearing, Rule 5.13, Miss.Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Prac., and on May 22, 1984, sentenced Coates to serve a term of ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Coates' motion for a new trial was overruled and this appeal has followed.
III.
Coates' principal assignment of error challenges the Circuit Court's exclusion from evidence of certain letters his stepdaughter, the prosecutrix, had written to him during September and October of 1983. The record reflects that the prosecution's objections to these letters was predicated upon the failure of the defense to disclose them in pre-trial discovery. Likewise, this was the basis upon which the Circuit Court sustained the objection.
The letters appear to be nine in number and aggregate 31 handwritten pages.
The discovery violations aside, the letters were competent evidence. At their core the letters reflect (on their face) a rather caring (and normal) stepfather and stepdaughter relationship, arguably substantially at odds with the prosecution's theory that Coates employed threats of violence or death and thus forced his stepdaughter to engage in sexual acts with him. On other points, the letters contain various matters which would seem to impeach the testimony of the prosecutrix as well as to contradict other more peripheral parts of the case for the prosecution. On this appeal, as at trial, Coates argues that the letters were highly relevant to his defense of consent. While this might have been argued from them, the letters are simply silent regarding the aspect of the relationship between Coates and his stepdaughter which is the subject of this prosecution.
On May 10, 1984, a week before trial, Coates' counsel filed with the court a motion for discovery. Rule 4.06, Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Prac., in pertinent part, provides:
If the defendant requests discovery under this rule, the defendant shall, subject to constitutional limitations, disclose to the prosecutor and permit him to inspect, copy, test and photograph, the following information and material which corresponds to that which the defendant sought and which is in the possession or control of the defendant or his counsel:
* * *
(2) Exhibit any physical evidence and photos to be offered in evidence; and ...
* * *
Defense counsel shall make the foregoing disclosures simultaneously with the corresponding disclosure from the prosecutor.
The prosecution complied with the Coates' discovery request--at least no issue is made regarding same on this appeal.
As a part of its case-in-chief, the prosecution, of course, called C.H. as its principal witness. During the course of cross-examination, defense counsel produced the letters and sought to pursue an impeachment line of questioning. The prosecuting attorney objected on grounds that the letters had not been furnished in pre-trial discovery. Defense counsel conceded that this was so.
As the matter was developed further, it became clear that the letters were written by C.H. to Coates while he was in Louisiana during September and October of 1983. The letters had been in Coates' possession since that time. The letters had been turned over to one of Coates' attorneys sometime before trial. The attorney cross-examining C.H. stated that he had seen the letters for the first time the night before, but he acknowledged that the letters had been in the possession of co-counsel for some time prior thereto. No excuse or reason was offered why the letters were not produced in pretrial discovery in compliance with Rule 4.06. The Circuit Court did little more than enforce the rule according to its tenor when he precluded defense from use of the letters.
On appeal, Coates acknowledges the plain language of the rule but seeks to sidestep it on several grounds. First, Coates argues that the letters were impeachment evidence only and, on that score, not discoverable. While it is true they were impeachment exhibits in the sense that they contradicted testimony which had been given by the prosecutrix, these letters were much more than that. They outlined the Defendant's substantive theory of the case. In the context of the Defendant's concession that the sexual acts between him and his stepdaughter occurred, these letters went to the defense of consent in the question put otherwise of whether there were threats of force or violence. In recent decisions we have been loathe to allow the prosecution to circumvent our discovery rules by pleas that the evidence was used for impeachment purposes. See Johnson v. State, 491 So.2d 834, 836-37 (Miss.1986); Tolbert v. State, 441 So.2d 1374, 1375 (Miss.1983). A similar policy is appropriate for defense discovery violations.
Second, Coates acknowledges the clear language of the primary rule--that the defendant shall make discovery simultaneously with the prosecution's production of evidence the materials it was required to produce under Rule 4.06--but argues nevertheless that the rule should not be construed as an exclusionary rule. Rather, Coates points to the fact that Rule 4.06 merely authorizes the circuit court, upon finding a violation of the rule, to merely "enter such ... order as it deems just under the circumstances." It may be true that in years past we have stated in the context of prosecution discovery violations that Rule 4.06 was not an automatic...
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McGilberry v. State, 97-DP-00213-SCT.
...of witnesses in the context of criminal cases. Emil v. The Mississippi Bar, 690 So.2d 301, 317 (Miss.1997); Coates v. State, 495 So.2d 464, 466 (Miss. 1986); Johnson v. State, 491 So.2d 834, 836-37 (Miss.1986); Tolbert v. State, 441 So.2d 1374, 1375 (Miss.1983). In an effort to eliminate fi......
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De La Beckwith v. State
...when confronted with evidence not timely disclosed by the defense. Houston v. State, 531 So.2d 598, 611 (Miss.1988); Coates v. State, 495 So.2d 464, 466-68 (Miss.1986). Helpful to our determination of whether such a sanction was appropriate in this case is Taylor, ¶103 In Taylor, the trial ......
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...murder). The State contends that a similar attempt to subvert the reciprocal discovery rules was addressed and condemned in Coates v. State, 495 So.2d 464 (Miss.1986). s 108. In Coates, the defendant was indicted for sexual battery of his minor stepdaughter. On cross-examination, the defens......
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