Cochran v. City of Boston
| Decision Date | 01 March 1912 |
| Parties | COCHRAN v. CITY OF BOSTON. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Fowler,
Bauer & Kenney, for plaintiff.
Geo. A Flynn, for defendant.
This is an action for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while a traveler from a defect in a highway. The only question to be decided is whether in such an action the plaintiff is entitled to an instruction to the effect that in ascertaining damages the jury have a right to add to the fair compensation interest by reason of delay. The plaintiff relies on Frazer v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 141 Mass. 126, 4 N.E 620, where it was held that in an action for injury to property 'the jury, in their discretion, and as incident to determining the amount of the real loss, may consider the delay caused by the defendant.' This case has been followed in other cases of tortious injury to property. Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N.E. 746, 57 L. R. A. 132, 91 Am. St. Rep. 314, Atwood v. Boston Forwarding & Transfer Co., 185 Mass. 557, 71 N.E. 72 and Peabody v. N. Y., N.H. & H. R. R., 187 Mass. 489, 493, 73 N.E. 649. The rule in substance adopted in these cases is that while interest is not allowed as matter of right, the time for which the plaintiff has been kept out of the use of his property or the damage occasioned it by the wrong of the defendant may be considered and an amount not exceeding the legal rate of interest may be included therefor in the verdict if necessary in order to give adequate compensation. This principle is applicable to cases where there has been a definite injury to specific property. The reason is that stated by Chief Justice Shaw in Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. 198, in laying down the rule for the computation of interest where property is taken by eminent domain. The injury occurs and is finished in its results on a particular day, and can then best be ascertained, and exact justice would be done by a contemporaneous determination of the loss. An action for personal injuries is essentially different in its nature. The damages are not complete and ended on the day of the accident, but continue for a greater or less period thereafter. The extent and magnitude of the injury are not infrequently unappreciated and incapable of reasonable ascertainment on the day it is received. Its degree of permanence is often deceptive at the first, and commonly the determination of conditions requisite for recovery is materially assisted by the perspective of time. The most helpful aids in learning the nature and degree of actual injury may be events occurring after the event complained of.
There is no fixed standard by which the compensation to be awarded can be measured. Its general rules have been stated many times. The sum of money fixed upon must be such as fairly compensates the injured person for the loss of time, the physical pain and the mental suffering, both that undergone in the past and likely to occur in the future, and also money reasonably expended and to be expended in assuaging pain and in restoration to health. Elements that are past and also those which are to come must be considered. Most of them are not capable of mathematical computation. They can be settled only by the sound judgment and conscience of the tribunal by which they are assessed, and they are peculiarly within its province. The damages are to be determined, moreover, as of the day of the trial. It is apparent that interest or consideration akin to interest have no place in an inquiry of this sort. Interest is compensation for the use of money which is due. But the money which the wrongdoer is required by law to pay for the future suffering, expense or loss of time of one whom he has injured is not due until judgment is made up. It is not a debt and does not become a definite obligation until a verdict or finding has been finally entered. It is composed of divers elements, together...
To continue reading
Request your trial