Cochran v. Richberger

Decision Date17 April 1893
Citation70 Miss. 843,12 So. 851
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
PartiesT. J. AND C. W. COCHRAN v. GEORGE RICHBERGER ET AL

March 1893

FROM the chancery court of Quitman county, HON. W. R. TRIGG Chancellor.

The lands in controversy, situated in Quitman county, were sold to the liquidating levee commissioners in 1868, for nonpayment of levee taxes, and appellees claim under this sale. They were again sold to the liquidating levee commissioners in 1869. But the court finds from the record that R. J. Love, the original owner, redeemed the lands from both of these sales. Notwithstanding this, however, G. W Neel purchased the lands from Gwin and Hemingway commissioners of the liquidating levee board, in February 1878, and received a deed therefor.

In January, 1872, the lands were sold to the state for nonpayment of state and county taxes, and they were again sold to the state, under the abatement act, May 10, 1875. On October 21, 1880, they were purchased from the state by A. S. Oliver, who conveyed them to appellants, T. J. and C. W. Cochran. While the lands were held or claimed by the state, under the sales before mentioned, they were, on March 3, 1879, again sold by the tax-collector of Quitman county, being struck off to the state. But, on January 30, 1880, Neel, who had purchased from the liquidating levee commissioners, and who claimed the lands, redeemed them from this sale, paying the auditor the taxes for two years, and receiving a certificate of redemption.

Neel owned adjoining land, upon which he had tenants, who cut timber from both tracts, and asserted ownership and possession to some extent, as stated in the opinion. Neel conveyed to Wilbourne, who also asserted ownership, and he conveyed to appellee, Richberger, who gave a trust-deed on the lands, to secure a debt to the Clarksdale Bank & Trust Company.

The bill in this case was filed by the appellants, T. J. and C. W. Cochran, March 13, 1891, against Richberger and the trustee in the deed to the bank. Complainants claimed under their purchase from the state, alleging that they were the real owners of the land, and seeking to cancel the claim of the defendants as a cloud upon their title. The defendants answered, denying the title of complainants, and asserting title in the said Richberger. Among other things, they averred that said defendant, and those through whom he claimed, had been in the actual, adverse, and exclusive possession of the lands for more than ten years next before the filing of the bill; that they claimed under a tax-title from the state of Mississippi, and had been in possession of the lands thereunder for more than one year. They also set up the bar arising from three years' occupancy of the lands under said deed, and also the lapse of five years after the execution of said deed before suit under the act of 1860. Laws, p. 213. Because of the several statutes of limitation so pleaded, the defendants averred that their title was absolute and indefeasible, and that complainants were barred of all relief. Defendants also set up that they had made valuable improvements, and had paid a large amount in taxes on the lands, and they asked that a charge be fixed thereon to satisfy the same, in the event their title should be held invalid.

On final hearing, a decree was rendered in favor of defendants, dismissing the bill, from which decree complainants appeal. The opinion contains a further statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the questions decided by the court.

Decree reversed.

J. B. Cochran, for appellants.

1. The evidence shows that there was a redemption from the sale to the levee board in 1868.

In the case of Shotwell v. Railway Co. , 69 Miss. 541, this court held that, by virtue of the act of 1876, the title to all lands held by district No. 1, if not redeemed or purchased before a certain date, was vested in the state. The act seems to apply as well to lands belonging to the liquidating levee commissioners. If it does, appellants are the owners of all tax-titles shown by the record. Neel does not claim to have purchased from Gwin and Hemingway until after January 1, 1878.

2. In the lower court appellees invoked every statute of limitation known to the law, and introduced evidence to prove possession, but it is only necessary to refer to the depositions in the record to show that they failed as to this.

J. W. & W. D. Cutrer, for appellees.

1. The land in controversy is shown to have been sold to the liquidating levee board in 1868. The deed is prima facie evidence of a valid sale. Laws 1858, pp. 36, 37; Laws 1867, pp. 238, 239; Carlisle v. Yoder, 69 Miss. 384.

2. More than five years elapsed from the date of sale before an attack was made upon it, and the title is now perfect. Sigman v. Lundy, 66 Miss. 522; Carlisle v. Yoder, supra.

3. The act to quiet and settle titles claimed under sales for delinquent liquidating levee taxes, in express terms makes the title of appellees valid, notwithstanding any defect or irregularity in the sale. Such title can only be impeached by proof that the taxes for which the land was sold had been paid. Laws 1888, p. 42.

4. The land was conveyed by Gwin and Hemingway to Neel. Subsequently he redeemed from the state, after which he held the title free from all prior claims. The title is paramount. On this incontrovertible state of facts, the conclusion cannot be escaped that the appellants have failed to show a good tax-title.

5. The sale to the levee board in 1868 cannot be controverted. This being true, the land was not subject to sale to the state either in 1872 or in 1875, as this court has invariably held. The title of appellants rests upon sales which have already been adjudicated to be void. Neel bought from Gwin and Hemingway in 1878, and this sale carries with it the presumption that all claims against the land prior...

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