Cochrane v. Van De Vanter

• Decision Date: 27 December 1895
• Citation: 13 Wash. 323,43 P. 42
• Parties: COCHRANE v. VAN DE VANTER ET AL. [1]
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

43 P. 42

13 Wash. 323

COCHRANE v. VAN DE VANTER ET AL. ^[1]

Supreme Court of Washington

December 27, 1895

Appeal from superior court, King county; J. W. Langley, Judge.

Action by William Cochrane against A. D. Van de Vanter and another to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment recovered against plaintiff. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Stratton Lewis & Gilman and E. S. Lyons, for appellant.

Williamson & Franklin, for respondents.

DUNBAR J.

On the 22d day of November, 1890, the respondent Gunderson obtained a judgment against the appellant Cochrane for the sum of $500 and costs, with interest thereon from the said 22d day of November, at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, from which judgment the said Cochrane appealed to this court. Said appeal was dismissed, and said judgment affirmed, with costs of said appeal to the appellant. It may be in order to state that there were two attempts by the appellant to sustain this appeal, both of which were denied by this court. After a petition for rehearing had been denied, and the remittitur returned from this court to the superior court, affirming the judgment of the superior court the appellant commenced an action in the equity department of the superior court of King county to restrain the respondents from carrying into effect the judgment of this court until the cause could be retried. To this complaint or petition the respondents demurred, for the reason that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained by the court, upon which the appellant filed a bond to stay proceedings; and this is a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that this court has no jurisdiction of an appeal from the orders from which the appeal was taken, or an appeal from either of said orders. Respondents move the court to affirm said orders, and further move for damages to be paid by the appellant to the respondents, on the ground that such appeal was and is manifestly unauthorized by law, and that it was taken merely for delay.

We do not think it is necessary to pass upon the first contention of the respondents in their motion, viz. that the order appealed from is not an appealable order, for we think the second contention is fully sustained, viz. that the lower court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and, not having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, such jurisdiction could not be conferred by consent, even if the consent of the respondents could be gathered from the record. The latter proposition is so universally accepted as the law that the citation of authorities is not called for.

As to the first proposition,-the want of authority in the superior court to in any way interfere with the judgment of this court,-it was decided by this court in the case of State v. Superior Court of Spokane Co., 7 Wash. 234, 34 P 930, that the judgment of the supreme court upon an appeal from an equity cause which, by our statute, is required to be tried de novo...