State v. Superior Court of Franklin County

• Decision Date: 16 June 1915
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. PRENTICE et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY et al.

149 P. 321

86 Wash. 90

STATE ex rel. PRENTICE et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 16, 1915

Department 2. Original prohibition proceeding by the State, on relation of John Prentice and others, against the Superior Court of Franklin County and others. Peremptory writ quashed, and permanent writ denied.

See also, 54 Wash. 587, 103 P. 831.

Driscoll & Leonard, of Pasco, for plaintiff.

A. J Elrod, of Pasco, for respondent.

ELLIS J.

The relator, John Prentice, as plaintiff, on October 13, 1906 commenced on action against Franklin county and its treasurer seeking to vacate and set aside certain tax foreclosure proceedings. On January 14, 1907, the parties stipulated that the tax foreclosure proceedings against the property of the plaintiff be set aside; that the plaintiff pay to Franklin county the sum of $2,000 in full of all taxes, interest, and penalties upon the property to date; that the decree in the cause should be entered within 3 days after being signed by the judge; that the $2,000 should be paid within 20 days after the decree was filed; and that upon such payment or demand thereafter the county should make a quitclaim deed of the property to the plaintiff. This stipulation was executed by both the plaintiff and his attorney, and by the county commissioners and prosecuting attorney of Franklin county. Thereafter the county commissioners attempted to revoke the stipulation, and moved to withdraw it, claiming that it had been obtained by fraud and mistake. The motion was resisted a complete hearing on evidence was had, and on Jane 13, 1908, a decree was entered reading in part as follows:

'Wherefore it is adjudged, considered, and decreed that the certain judgment and decree of foreclosure made and dated June 24, 1902, and entered and filed in the superior court of Franklin county, state of Washington, by said court, on the 28th day of June, 1902, * * * is hereby set aside, annulled, and held for naught, * * * and it is further adjudged, considered, and decreed that plaintiff pay the sum of $2,000 to the treasurer of Franklin county, within 20 days after the filing of this decree with the clerk of this court, which, when paid, will be in full of all taxes, interest, and penalties upon and against said property to date, and, upon the receipt of said money, said treasurer shall forthwith enter said taxes against each piece, parcel, lot, and block of said property as fully paid and satisfied to date, and the said county of Franklin, through its county commissioners, and property officers shall within the said 20 days cause to be executed and to execute a quitclaim deed of said described property to said John Prentice. * * *'

The county perfected an appeal from that decree to this court, but on July 8, 1908, the county commissioners entered an order in effect abandoning the appeal, and directing a discontinuance and dismissal of all proceedings looking to an appeal from or review of the decree. The plaintiff paid the $2,000, and received a receipt therefor, and subsequently the auditor of the county executed a quitclaim deed of the property to plaintiff. Upon motion of Prentice this court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the controversy had ceased. Prentice v. Franklin County, 54 Wash. 587, 103 P. 831.

In November, 1911, the defendant Franklin county taxed the property involved in the former litigation in the sum of $146.70 for the year 1908. The relator Prentice paid these taxes under protest. Prentice having assigned to N. R. Sylvester his claim against Franklin county for reimbursement, Sylvester brought an action to recover the money so paid. The defendant Franklin county filed a cross-complaint making Prentice a party, and alleging that the judgment of June 13, 1908, should have read as of the date of the stipulation of January 14, 1907; that it was in excess of the court's authority and void; that, if not void, it was entered by mistake or fraud, and should be reformed and amended so as to conform to the stipulation upon which the judgment was based. Prentice and the other plaintiffs contested the jurisdiction of the court to vacate or modify the judgment. Upon the issues framed the trial court rendered a written decision indicating an intention to grant the prayer of the cross-complaint on the ground that the judgment of June 13, 1908, should be modified and vacated so as to take effect as of the date of the stipulation, January 14, 1907, instead of June 13, 1908. The plaintiffs, as relators, have applied to this court for a writ prohibiting the threatened action of the trial court. An alternative writ was issued. The question now is: Shall it be made permanent?

The respondents by way of demurrer to the application and affidavit, and for answer to the alternative writ, contend upon many grounds that the permanent writ should be denied. We find it necessary to consider only two of these grounds. They are these: (1) That the application for the writ shows upon its face that the superior court was proceeding within its jurisdiction, and, having jurisdiction, its decision would be final, and, if erroneous, the relators have an adequate remedy by appeal, if the original action is one involving the validity of the tax; (2) that it appears upon the face of the application that the original action was a civil action for the recovery of money not exceeding the sum of $200, and not involving the validity of a tax or assessment within the meaning of article 4, § 4, of the state Constitution, that the superiod court was proceeding within its jurisdiction, and that in such a case the writ of prohibition is not available as a substitute for appeal, and that this court therefore has no jurisdiction to issue the writ.

We find it unnecessary to decide whether the action the judgment in which is sought to be prohibited is a mere civil action for the recovery of money not exceeding $200, hence not appealable, or an action involving the validity of a tax, hence appealable, though it would seem to be the latter. In either event, under out decisions, prohibition will not lie where the superior court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action. This court has repeatedly held that, where the superior court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy, prohibition will not lie to prevent an erroneous exercise of such jurisdiction, where there is an adequate remedy by appeal or writ of review. The writ is not issued to prevent the commission of mere error, not to take the place of an appeal, nor perform the office of a writ of review for the correction of error. The writ will only issue to inferior courts where they are proceeding, or threatening to proceed, without, or in excess of, their jurisdiction.

'The writ of prohibition will not be issued as of course, nor because it may be the most convenient remedy. Nor will it be allowed to take the place of an appeal, or perform the offices of a writ of review. It is a preventive remedy, and, as such, is bounded by rigid rules, and is only issued in cases of extreme necessity. The remedy is employed only to restrain courts and inferior tribunals exercising judicial functions from acting without or in excess of their jurisdiction; and, if the court or tribunal sought to be restrained has jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy, a mistaken exercise of its acknowledged powers will not justify the issuance of the writ.' State ex rel. Lewis v. Hogg, 22 Wash. 646, 649, 62 P. 143, 144.

See, also, State ex rel. Baldwin v. Superior Court, 11 Wash. 111, 39 P. 818; State ex rel. Vincent v. Benson, Judge, 21 Wash. 571, 58 P. 1066; State ex rel. Cann v. Moore, Judge, 23 Wash. 115, 62 P. 441; State ex rel. Foster v. Superior Court, 30 Wash. 156, 70 P. 230, 73 P. 690; State ex rel. Stetson & Post Mill Co. v. Superior Court, 32 Wash. 498, 73 P. 479; State ex rel. Twigg v. Superior Court, 34 Wash. 643, 76 P. 282; State ex rel. Goupille v. Superior Court, 41 Wash. 128, 83 P. 14; High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, § 772.

This court has also held that when the amount involved is less than $200, and the case does not fall within any of the exceptions to the limitation of our jurisdiction to cases in excess of that amount contained in article 4, § 4, of the Constitution, the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus will not lie either to prohibit the superior court from assuming jurisdiction when it has none, or to compel the superior court to exercise a jurisdiction which it has; this on the ground that the jurisdiction of this court in the issuance of the writs of mandamus and prohibition must be construed as subject to the same...