Jackson v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 26 January 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 8:14-cv-04906-RMG-JDA
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Gray Helms Jackson, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Gray Helms Jackson, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin,Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 8:14-cv-04906-RMG-JDA

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

January 26, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).¹ Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI").² For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for administrative action consistent with this recommendation, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 29, 2011, and March 31, 2011, respectively, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging disability beginning February 25, 2011. [R. 192-201.] The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 68-79, 82-109.] Plaintiff filed a request for hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), and on June 20, 2013, ALJ Clinton C. Hicks conducted a hearing on Plaintiff's claims. [R. 35-65.]

On September 13, 2013, the ALJ issued his decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled. [R. 18-28.] At Step 1³, the ALJ found Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act ("the Act") on December 31, 2014, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 25, 2011, the alleged onset date [R. 20, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: viral hepatitis; hepatic encephalopathy; grade II, stage II to III septal fibrosis; osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees, status-post right total knee arthroplasty; chronic gastroesophageal reflux disease; atrial fibrillation status-post pacemaker implantation; sick sinus syndrome and chronic hypertension. [R. 20, Finding 3.] The ALJ also found Plaintiff had the following non-severe impairments: other conditions mentioned in the claimant's medical records; and claimant's medically determinable mental impairments of generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, and bipolar disorder. [Id. at 21.]

At Step 3, the ALJ determined Plaintiff's impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments. [R. 23, Finding 4.] The ALJ specifically considered Listings 1.00, 2.00, 4.00, 5.00, 14.00, and specifically considered the additional effects of the claimant's obesity under Social Security Ruling 02-1p. [Id.]

Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant would be precluded from squatting and climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds; would be limited to occasional climbing ramps and stairs and would require the ability to sit and stand at will.

[R. 23, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC, at Step 4, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant work as a loan officer. [R. 28, Finding 6.] Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from February 25, 2011, through the date of the decision, nor was he entitled to SSI based on his March 31, 2011, application. [R. 28.]

Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ's decision with the Appeals Council, which denied review on November 13, 2014. [R. 1-6.] Plaintiff commenced an action for judicial review in this Court on December 31, 2014. [Doc. 1.]

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

Plaintiff contends the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and contains multiple legal errors warranting the reversal and remand of the case. [See Doc. 8.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ:

1. erred by failing to find Plaintiff's mental impairments severe and by discounting the opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians and the state agency physician based solely on Plaintiff's activities of daily living [id. at 8-13];

2. erred by improperly discounting Plaintiff's credibility with respect to his testimony regarding the limitations associated with his psychiatric symptoms [id. at 14-15]; and,

3. erred by finding Plaintiff could return to his past work without any evidence that his job had a sit/stand option [id. at 15-16].

The Commissioner contends the ALJ's decision should be affirmed because there is substantial evidence of record that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. [See Doc. 9.] Specifically, the Commissioner contends the ALJ:

1. appropriately determined that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment and properly weighed the medical evidence related to his mental illness [id. at 11-17];

2. performed a proper credibility analysis and reasonably discounted Plaintiff's subjective complaints regarding his psychiatric symptoms and resulting limitations [id. at 18-21]; and,

3. complied with applicable regulations and rulings in making his Step 4 determination that Plaintiff could return to his past work [id. at 21-23].

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963)) ("Substantial evidence, it has been held, is evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is 'substantial evidence.'").

Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Bird v. Comm'r, 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).

The reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision 'with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Remand is unnecessary where "the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose." Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974).

The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sargent v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). To remand under sentence four, the reviewing court must find either that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding remand was appropriate where the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair record of the claimant's residual functional capacity); Brehem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding remand was appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm but was also insufficient for court to find the claimant disabled). Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a remand under sentence four is usually the proper course to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for the decision or for additional investigation. See Radford v. Comm'r, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985);see also Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (remanding case where decision of ALJ contained "a gap in its reasoning" because ALJ did not say he was discounting testimony or why); ...