Cohen v. Nebraska Dept. Administrative Services, 4:99CV3171.
Decision Date | 08 February 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 4:99CV3171.,4:99CV3171. |
Citation | 83 F.Supp.2d 1042 |
Parties | Carol COHEN, Plaintiff, v. State of NEBRASKA, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, DIVISION OF CENTRAL DATA PROCESSING; David Hattan, James Unverferth and George Gillespie; and Resource Support Associates, Inc.; Gerald Barton and Philip J. Rossi, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
Elaine A. Waggoner, Sean M. Reagan, Waggoner Law Firm, Lincoln, NE, for plaintiff.
Patrick J. Barrett, McGrath, North Law Firm, Omaha, NE, for defendants.
This is an action stemming from the termination of plaintiff Carol Cohen's employment after she took unpaid leave to care for her ailing father. Cohen brings claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1999) ("FMLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1999), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994), and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. (1999) ("ERISA"), as well as state claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with a contractual relationship.
Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss (filing 49) filed by defendants State of Nebraska, Department of Administrative Services, Division of Central Data Processing ("State"); David Hattan; James Unverferth; and George Gillespie.
Carol Cohen's amended complaint (filing 46) alleges that Cohen, a Nebraska resident, was an employee of Resource Support Associates, Inc., ("RSA") a Colorado corporation that contracted with the State of Nebraska ("State") to provide staff members to perform computer work for the State. The contract provided that RSA would supply computer specialists and experts to the State and that such individuals would be supervised by the State, but paid by RSA. (Filing 46, Amended Complaint ¶ 13.) Cohen alleges that defendants Hattan, Unverferth, and Gillespie were State employees who worked in the Division of Central Data Processing and who "exercised supervisory responsibilities in regard to plaintiff and carried out the terms and conditions of the contract between Defendant State and Defendant RSA." (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.)
Cohen brings an FMLA claim against the State and section 1983 and 1985 claims against defendants Hattan, Gillespie, and Unverferth, requesting monetary damages in the form of back and front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages, as well as attorney fees. Specifically, Cohen alleges that the State violated the FMLA when it terminated Cohen after she requested leave to care for her ailing father; that defendants Hattan and Gillespie violated her due process and equal protection rights when her employment was terminated; that defendant Unverferth violated Cohen's due process and equal protection rights when he refused to accept her application to perform as an independent contractor for the State six months after she was terminated due to a change in unwritten State policy; and that Hattan, Gillespie, and Unverferth conspired to deprive Cohen of her due process and equal protection rights when they took the above actions.
Cohen's amended complaint contains no indication as to whether she sues the State defendants in their official or individual capacities. While Cohen's initial complaint (filing 1) explicitly stated the capacities in which the defendants were being sued, Cohen deleted all such references in her amended complaint. NELR 15.1 states that an amended pleading shall "supersede the pleading amended in all respects; no portion of the prior pleading may be incorporated into the proposed amended pleading by reference." Therefore, the complaint that is in effect is one that implicates the Eleventh Amendment and one that lacks a clear statement that state officials are being sued in their personal capacities. When faced with a complaint such as this, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals requires me to interpret the complaint as including only official-capacity claims. Murphy v. State of Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754-55 (8th Cir. 1997) ( ); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir.1989) (same); Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 619-20 (8th Cir.1995) ( ).
The defendant State moves to dismiss Cohen's FMLA claim against it for the reason that this claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. By virtue of the Eleventh Amendment1, a state is immune from suits brought in federal court by its own citizens and by citizens of other states unless (1) the state has unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity and has consented to suit in federal court, or (2) Congress has unequivocally, by legislation, abrogated state immunity in order to effectuate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492-494 (8th Cir.1991). The parties in this case agree that the State of Nebraska has not generally waived its sovereign immunity, nor has it explicitly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to FMLA cases brought against it.
Thus, the question in this case is whether Congress, in enacting the FMLA, unequivocally abrogated the states' immunity, a question which requires resolving two questions: (1) did Congress unequivocally express its intent to abrogate the states' immunity; and (2) if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, ___ U.S. ____, 120 S.Ct. 631, 640, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 145 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996)). Both parties in this case agree that the FMLA expresses a clear intent to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity; however, they differ regarding whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority when it enacted the FMLA.
The only circuit court and all of the district courts that have considered this issue since 1998 have concluded that Congress lacked the power to abrogate the states' immunity from suit under the FMLA. Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.1999) ( ), pet. for cert. filed, No. 99-1240 (Jan. 24, 2000); Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F.Supp.2d 403, 409 (M.D.Pa.1999) ( ); Sims v. University of Cincinnati, 46 F.Supp.2d 736 (S.D.Ohio 1999) ( ); Post v. State, 1998 WL 928677 (D.Kan. Dec.10, 1998) ( ); Driesse v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 26 F.Supp.2d 1328 (M.D.Fla.1998) ( ); McGregor v. Goord, 18 F.Supp.2d 204 (N.D.N.Y.1998) ( ); Thomson v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 5 F.Supp.2d 574, 580 (S.D.Ohio 1998) ( ).2
I have carefully examined each of the above decisions, as well as the abrogation analysis contained in recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals3 as applied to other acts, and I conclude, for the reasons stated in the above cases, that Congress did not effectively abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from suit under the FMLA, and the Eleventh Amendment therefore bars Plaintiff's FMLA claim against the State. Accordingly, the State's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's FMLA claim against it must be granted.
As stated above, Cohen brings claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against defendants Hattan, Gillespie, and Unverferth, seeking monetary damages. These defendants move to dismiss Cohen's section 1983 and 1985 claims against them for...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Bass v. Univ. of Ark. At Pine Bluff
...2007 WL 1321838, at *3 (W.D. Ark. May 4, 2007), aff'd, 283 F. App'x 421 (8th Cir. 2008); Cohen v. Neb. Dep't of Admin. Servs., Div. of Cent. Data Processing, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (D. Neb. 2000). The Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice as to Ms. Bass's § 1985 claim......
-
Schall v. Wichita State University
...from FMLA claims and holding that the FMLA does not satisfy the second prong of Katzenbach); Cohen v. Nebraska Dept. Administrative Services, 83 F. Supp.2d 1042, 1046 (D. Neb. 2000) (holding that Congress did not act pursuant to a valid grant of power in enacting the FMLA, thereby allowing ......
-
Cooley v. Mississippi Dept. of Transp., CIV.A. 3:99CV799BN.
...861 (5th Cir.1989)(recognizing Eleventh Amendment immunity in a case brought under §§ 1981 and 1983); Cohen v. Nebraska Dept. of Admin. Serv., 83 F.Supp.2d 1042, 1045 (D.Neb.2000)(noting that "[t]he only circuit court and all of the district courts that have considered [whether Congress eff......
-
Townsel v. Missouri
...Bd. of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999) (same), cert. granted,3 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000); Cohen v. Nebraska Dep't of Admin. Servs., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (D. Neb. 2000) (of circuits and district courts to consider issue since 1998, all have concluded that Congress lacked pow......