Cole's Next of Kin v. Anderson Cotton Mills

• Decision Date: 10 October 1939
• Docket Number: 14943.
• Citation: 4 S.E.2d 908,191 S.C. 458
• Parties: COLE'S NEXT OF KIN v. ANDERSON COTTON MILLS et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

4 S.E.2d 908

191 S.C. 458

COLE'S NEXT OF KIN v. ANDERSON COTTON MILLS et al.

No. 14943.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 10, 1939

Watkins & Prince, of Anderson, for appellants.

S Eugene Haley, of Anderson, for respondents.

BONHAM Justice.

Clinton Cole was an employee of the Anderson Cotton Mills as a loom-fixer. On Friday, May 21, 1937, he was engaged in overhauling looms, putting on "stop motions", and working with the overhauling crew. He was using a wrench about seven inches long with which he tightened nuts, or bolts, on stop motions. In the forenoon of May 21, he complained to his immediate overseer, who was his father that a catch came in his arm while he was tightening a seven inch nut with the wrench. He told his father that he had hurt his shoulder. He was treated by Dr. J. B. Latimer, who saw him first on Monday, May 24, and treated him until he was taken to the hospital and operated on twice; he died June 6 1937.

Claim was made under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and heard in the first instance by Commissioner Dukes. Much testimony was taken and, after argument, Commissioner Dukes made an award in favor of the claimant. An appeal was taken to the Full Commission which by a majority opinion affirmed the award. This award was taken by appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, which in due time affirmed the action of the Full Commission; and now the appeal comes to this Court.

When A. C. Cole, the father of Clinton Cole, was on the stand, in answer to a question, he said: "He came to me sometime about the noon hour and told me he had hurt himself." Defendant's counsel objected to the question on the grounds that the answer would "be a self-serving declaration and incompetent as hearsay". The objection was overruled.

When Dr. J. B. Latimer was on the stand, he was asked: "Did he give you any history as to what was the cause of his pain?" Objection was made to this question on the ground that it also "would be a self-serving declaration and incompetent as hearsay". The objection was overruled.

This same objection was made and overruled whenever a witness for plaintiff was asked if the deceased had told witnesses how he had been hurt. It is needless to recite the exact occurrence each time. Is such testimony as these questions would evoke, incompetent on the ground that it would be a self-serving declaration and incompetent as hearsay?

It is significant that in no one of the South Carolina cases in which the Workmen's Compensation Act, 39 St. at Large, p. 1231, has been before the Court has this question been directly decided. When it has been raised in some cases, it has not been considered because each of such cases was decided on some other ground. It is a matter continually arising and it would seem proper that it be disposed of.

The answer does not depend upon an application of the common law rule, nor does it depend upon the citation of the decisions of the Courts of other jurisdictions which have Workmen's Compensation Acts. Some of these Acts have features in common, but we have found no two of them alike.

It would seem logical that if an employee be required by the terms of the Act to report to his immediate superior that he has suffered an injury, that the superior should be allowed to testify as to what the workman said in making his report. Or if it be necessary that the workman consult a doctor, that the doctor should be allowed to testify as to what the workman said in giving a history of his case. Suppose the injured person is all alone when the injury is sustained, or suppose he dies immediately from the effect of the injury, shall his beneficiaries be deprived of the benefits of compensation because there is no one who can testify as an eye witness, or as one to whom the injured person told how the accident occurred? It is universally recognized that a physician must depend upon his patient for a history of his trouble. It is recognized that in such circumstances the claimant may falsify the facts and impose upon the credulity of the questioner. It is doubtless for that reason that in some jurisdictions the rule has been laid down that such questions may be asked and answered, but that no award shall be allowed unless such evidence be supported by facts and circumstances duly proved.

From the case of Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. et al. v. Frank A. Cardillo, Deputy Commissioner et al., 70 App.D.C. 303, 106 F.2d 327, 328, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in which the opinion was filed June 26, 1939, we quote:

"This is an employee's compensation case. Whitman P. Conn, the employee, died on January 3, 1937, of a cerebral hemorrhage. The Deputy Commissioner awarded compensation on the basis of findings that on November 15, 1936, Mr. Conn struck his right temple against a filing cabinet in defendant's office, and that this injury caused the hemorrhage. The employer and the insurance carrier sued in the District Court to set aside the award. They have appealed from a decree dismissing their bill.

"Conn's widow and daughter testified that he came home from the office about November 15, at the usual time, and told them he had struck his head on a filing cabinet there. A brother-in-law testified to a like statement by Conn on Thanksgiving day. The Deputy Commissioner is not bound by common-law rules of evidence; and the statute which so provides also provides that the 'declarations of a deceased employee concerning the injury *** shall be received in evidence and shall, if corroborated by other evidence, be sufficient to establish the injury.'

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"The Deputy Commissioner and the District Court were within their discretion in finding, in effect, that Conn's declarations concerning the injury were corroborated. 'The further definition of the term "corroboration," by detailed rules of law, is unwise and unpractical.' 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2062. Whatever tends to make a story substantially more credible or probable corroborates it. *** We should be construing the Act very narrowly if we held, in effect, that awards must be supported by eye-witness testimony. As appellees' counsel point out in their brief: apart from declarations of the deceased, fatal 'injuries sustained by employees while working alone or while not under observation *** cannot be ordinarily proved by any means other than the introduction of (1) testimony, such as was adduced in the present case *** that cuts, bruises, lacerations, or other objective symptoms of injury were observed *** shortly after the injury was alleged to. have been sustained, and (2) medical evidence that the alleged injury could have occurred in the manner described by the decedent and could have caused the condition of the decedent disclosed by medical examination or autopsy."'

It is true that the above opinion of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is not binding on us, but it is suggestive and persuasive. It is also true that that decision relies largely on the provisions of the pertinent statute, but it states principles and conclusions announced and relied on in other jurisdictions. It is also true that our statute does not in express terms state what evidence shall be admissible in proving a claim, but it does say in Section 54 of the Act: "Processes and procedure under this Act shall be as summary and simple as reasonably may be."

This language does not immediately relate to or regulate the taking of testimony, nor does it prescribe any rule governing the nature of the testimony admissible or pertinent; but it plainly indicates that the Legislature which made the law intended to simplify the process and procedure by which the workman could test his right to compensation for injury sustained. To that end the trial of his cause in the Court of Common Pleas, with its strict rules and technicalities of the law, is superseded by the process and procedure set forth in the Act. It seems to us to be an entirely reasonable declaration to say that the person injured, the person to whom he reported his injury, the doctor who...