Young v. Sonoco Products Co.

• Decision Date: 14 March 1947
• Docket Number: 15926.
• Parties: YOUNG v. SONOCO PRODUCTS CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

41 S.E.2d 860

210 S.C. 146

YOUNG v. SONOCO PRODUCTS CO. et al.

No. 15926.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 14, 1947

John F. Wilmeth and Robert W. Shand, both of Hartsville, for appellants.

B. W. Hyman, of Darlington, for respondent.

OXNER Justice.

This is an appeal by the employer and carrier from an order of the Circuit Court affirming an award of the Industrial Commission in favor of claimant, Mrs. Ella S. Young. The Commission awarded claimant compensation for 50% loss of use of the right arm and also $250 for serious bodily disfigurement on account of an alleged accident sustained on February 4, 1944. There are two questions for determination: (1) Did claimant's injury result from an accident? (2) Is the right to any compensation barred by failure to file claim with the Industrial Commission within one year after the alleged accident? These two questions will be discussed in the order stated.

For a period of approximately two years prior to February 4, 1944 claimant was employed at the plant of the Sonoco Products Company, hereinafter for convenience referred to as 'Sonoco', and operated what is known as a scorer. She testified that in operating this machine the employee has to 'hold the cone with the left hand and break with the right'; that in breaking cones, 'it is an awkward twist for you have to twist it backwards, not like you usually turn something'; that on February 4, 1944 while twisting a cone, she 'had a sudden tearing pain' in her right elbow; and that although she had been operating this particular machine for ten months previously she had not suffered any trouble with her arm prior to this time except for a slight soreness which did not interfere with her work. Immediately after the above occurrence, claimant went to the first aid room provided by the employer and reported her injury. A Mrs. Vaughan, who was the nurse in charge of this room, filled out a report. After about an hour and a half claimant returned to work and graded cones with her left hand during the remainder of the day. She continued working after the alleged accident, but doing a different type of work which required the use of only her left hand, until September, 1944, when she had to stop work because of her arm.

About a week or ten days after the alleged accident, claimant was sent by the employer to Dr. Byerly who treated her until April 1, 1944, at which time she secured permission to consult her family physician, Dr. Wilcox, who thereafter referred the patient to Dr. Dawson. Dr. Dawson first saw claimant on October 31, 1944, and she has since been under his care. He diagnosed her condition as that of 'tennis elbow', while one of the other physicians described her condition as 'a traumatic injury to the ulnar nerve' in the right elbow. All these physicians agreed that there was a permanent impairment in the use of the right arm, although disagreeing somewhat as to the extent of the loss of use. Claimant was unable to work from September 23, 1944, to March 18, 1945. On the latter date she returned to work, but was unable to use her right arm, and remained in the employ of Sonoco until October, 1945, when she was dismissed because of the discontinuance by the employer of the type of work claimant was doing.

Appellants' contention that claimant suffered no accidental injury is based on statements claimed to have been made by her subsequent to the date of the alleged accident. Mrs. Vaughan, who was in charge of the first aid room and to whom claimant first reported her injury, testified that claimant told her that the pain in her arm commenced after she started operating the machine and developed gradually. All of the attending physicians testified that claimant gave them no history of having received an injury on any specific date, although Dr. Byerly testified that claimant's condition could have resulted from 'a sudden wrench, twist or jerk'. On December 6, 1944, claimant signed, at the request of a representative of the carrier, a statement to the effect that her injury was not caused by an accident but was brought about by a continuous operation of the machine over a period of about ten months. Claimant admitted her signature on this paper but denied knowing that it contained such a statement. She testified that the paper she signed was prepared by this representative and was not read over to her. She positively denied saying that her injury developed gradually and was not caused by an accident.

Several women who at the time of the alleged injury were working near claimant on similar machines testified that they observed claimant holding her arm while on her way to the first aid room and inquired how she had hurt her arm, to which claimant replied that 'a terrible pain struck her when she was twisting cones.' Several other employees also testified that claimant made similar remarks after returning from the first aid room.

The evidence is undisputed, and it is apparently conceded, that claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Appellants' contention is that the injury did not result from an accident but developed over a period of time from the continuous operation of this machine. Claimant's testimony, if believed by the Industrial Commission, was sufficient to show an 'injury by accident' under the numerous decisions of this Court defining that phrase. Next of Kin of Cole v. Anderson Cotton Mills et al., 191 S.C. 458, 4 S.E.2d 908; Strawhorn v. J. A. Chapman Construction Co. et al.,

202 S.C. 43, 24 S.E.2d 116; Willis et al. v. Aiken County, 203 S.C. 96, 26 S.E.2d 313; Lanford v. Clinton Cotton Mills et al., 204 S.C. 423, 30 S.E.2d 36. Her testimony is corroborated by that of the other employees to whom claimant related the manner of her injury immediately after the alleged occurrence. But it is sharply contradicted by testimony of other witnesses to the effect that claimant told them that her injury developed gradually and did not result from an accident. However, it was the province of the triers of the facts to pass upon the credibility of this testimony. We are not at liberty to do so.

The other question, relating to the failure to file a claim with the Industrial Commission within one year after the accident, is more difficult. It is conceded that claimant filed no claim with the Industrial Commission until October 19, 1945, approximately twenty months after the alleged accident, at which time she wrote a letter to the Commission demanding compensation. The Industrial Commission found that the conduct of appellants was such as to estop them from invoking the one year limitation for filing claims. This finding was sustained by the Circuit Judge, who also held that the reports made by appellants to the Commission within one year after the alleged accident were sufficient to constitute a filing of the claim. However, in view of our conclusion on the question of estoppel, it is unnecessary to determine the correctness of the second ground assigned by the Circuit Judge in support of his holding that the claim was not barred by the one year limitation.

Shortly after the alleged accident the nurse in charge of the first aid room filled out a report on a form prescribed by the Commission for the first report of an injury. This report was signed by her and the employer's Safety Engineer and forwarded to the Commission. In addition to workmen's compensation insurance, Sonoco carried a policy with the Equitable Life Assurance Society which provided for a certain indemnity to the employees in the event of illness and also insured them against such accidents as were not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Two-thirds of the cost of this insurance was paid by the employees and one-third by Sonoco. A Mr. Marshall was employed by Sonoco as 'Employee Insurance Manager'. When an accident occurred it was he who determined whether claim should be made for workmen's compensation or whether the claim should be filed under the Equitable policy. All claims under the Equitable policy were handled by him. In April, 1944, he received a report of claimant's injury from Dr. Wilcox and filed claim under the Equitable policy. That insurer paid disability compensation covering a period of approximately five weeks which amounted to $51.40. Mr Marshall testified that he later received a report from Dr. Dawson from which he concluded that the claim did not properly come under the Equitable policy and referred claimant to a Mr. DuBose, Safety Director of Sonoco, who handled all claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Mr. Marshall further testified that in December, 1944, the carrier denied liability and he so advised the claimant, whereupon he again filed claim under the Equitable policy. Sometime later the Equitable Life forwarded a check for $78.57. According to Marshall's testimony, claimant refused to accept this check 'until something definite was settled.' He stated that he advised claimant not to accept the check if 'she was going to appeal before the Commission for a...